Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

155. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 21, 1971, 4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• The President Prince Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, Saudi Arabia
• Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
• Emil Mosbacher, US Chief of Protocol
• Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
• Camille Nowfel, Department of State, Interpreter

Prince Fahd began by expressing his gratitude for the opportunity to see the President despite the President’s busy schedule. King Faisal cherishes his personal relationship with the President and instructed Fahd to seek a meeting with the President so there could be a frank exchange of views on the current situation in the Middle East. The King had asked the Prince to bring a written letter as well as to state orally the King’s views on that situation.

The President responded by saying that he welcomed the Prince because of the personal friendship he feels toward King Faisal and toward the prince and because of the warm reception which the Saudis had given the Vice President.² He felt it is important to stay in close personal touch. He had received personal reports from Secretary Rogers, Mr. Sisco and then later in the summer from the Vice President himself.³

Prince Fahd gave the President a copy of King Faisal’s letter (translation attached).⁴ Then in supplement he made the following points:

• — King Faisal sees a very difficult time ahead in the Middle East if there is no solution to the Arab-Israeli problem this fall.
• —The pressures on President Sadat are great. He could be overturned if there is no solution in the near future.
• —President Sadat is genuinely interested in an interim settlement around the Suez Canal. Were the King not convinced of Sadat’s sincerity in this respect he would not have sent Fahd to Washington. King Faisal believes that such a settlement would also be in the interest of Israel, as would an overall peace settlement.
• —President Sadat would be willing to reduce his relationship with the Communist countries if there could be a settlement. He wants a stronger relationship with the United States.
• —Communist forces have suffered a setback in the Middle East this summer, notably in the Sudan and in Egypt. But King Faisal fears that if President Sadat is thrust aside the Communist forces will regain ground. He reiterated President Sadat’s willingness to reduce the Egyptian relationship with the Communist nations and King Faisal’s judgment that it is important to the West to create a situation in which that reduction could take place.
• —Saudi policy has been to try to convince the other Arab leaders that the United States is genuinely interested in serving the interests of the Arabs but that because of American domestic considerations we Arabs should not expect the U.S. to show immediate results. The King hopes that the situation within the Arab world will not deteriorate to the point it becomes impossible for America’s friends, such as the King, to keep defending the United States.
• —The Prince concluded with an earnest appeal to the President for a major effort to bring about a solution this fall. He felt that such a solution is in the hands of the United States.

The President replied agreeing that friends should talk frankly and expressing his appreciation that King Faisal had sent the Prince all the way to the United States for such a talk. He knew that the Prince would be having more detailed discussions with Secretary Rogers and Mr. Sisco.⁵

The President assured the Prince that he would give most careful consideration to the written message that King Faisal had sent and to the oral presentation that Prince Fahd had made. The President assured the Prince that this problem receives his constant personal attention. Nevertheless, it is a good thing to have a friend like Prince Fahd come and underline the urgency and the importance which the Saudis feel the situation deserves.

The President said that this problem is of a personal importance to him for several reasons. First of all, the US and the President himself have personal friends in the Arab world like King Faisal and Prince Fahd. For their sake and for ours, we have an interest in limiting Communist intrigue, and we recognize that the longer there is no Arab-Israeli situation [settlement] the greater will be the likelihood of such intrigue. As Prince Fahd himself had said, we also believe that a peace settlement is in the interest of Israel. Moreover, we also see the importance of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran for the sake of stability in the Gulf against radical forces in that area.

The President went on, saying that we are going to continue to give this problem our most serious attention. Secretary Rogers in New York would be holding discussions on the subject. We do not promise results, but we are going to try very hard to achieve forward movement.

The President said that he recognized from his private visit in 1963 to Egypt that the Egyptians are a great people. They like the Saudis will make an important contribution to the world. The US wants normal diplomatic relations with Egypt. We do not believe we have an interest in the continuation of the unusual situation that had followed the break of relations in 1967.

The President said he had not met President Sadat, but Secretary Rogers feels that he is sincere in his efforts to achieve peace.⁶

The meeting concluded with Prince Fahd again expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the President. The President reiterated his pleasure in seeing the Prince again and escorted the Prince to his car.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. In a September 17 memorandum, Eliot provided Kissinger with briefing material for the meeting. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD)Kissinger provided Nixon with Talking Points in a September 20 memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1277, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia) During his visit, Fahd also met with Rogers and Sisco. (Telegram 174902 to Jidda, Dhahran, and Bahrain; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD)
2. Agnew met with King Faisal on July 8. Agnew visited Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Spain, and Portugal June 26–July 28. Telegram 3205 from Addis Ababa, July 11, summarizes Agnew’s talk with Faisal. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 951, VIP Visits, Vice President’s Trip, June–July 71) Agnew’s own account is in an undated memorandum to Nixon. (Ibid.)
3. For Rogers’s report, See Document 149. The reference to Sisco’s report is presumably to a record of his meeting with Faisal on May 27 during the King’s visit to Washington. (Memorandum of conversation, May 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD)
4. Attached but not printed.
5. According to telegram 177287 to Jidda, September 27, Prince Fahd’s September 22 meeting with Sisco focused on the current Arab political situation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD) Fahd’s meeting with Rogers focused on Persian Gulf issues. (Telegram 177026 to Jidda, September 25; ibid.)
6. Rogers was in Egypt May 4–6 to discuss Arab-Israeli issues.