Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

349. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State¹

Port-au-Prince, October 21, 1965, 2242Z.

220. For Asst Secy Vaughn and Amb Stewart, ARA/CAR.

1. Following updating of my views on USG policy toward Haiti may be timely in context both of Deptʼs current consideration of what USG reply, if any, should be made to Duvalierʼs letters to President of June 3 and Aug 12,² and of Secretaryʼs talk in NY Oct 8 with Ministers Chalmers and Desinor.³ (June 3 letter contains direct request for resumption USG economic assistance; Aug 12 letter is more generalized request or hope for resumption some form US military assistance.)

2. Comments this tel of necessity highly compressed. Dept already has available Embʼs extensive analysis of Haitian situation and US policy as they have evolved during past two years. I consider that basic US policy goal as laid down in current LAPC paper⁴ remains entirely valid, i.e. maintenance effective USG presence (i.e. Amb and essential Emb personnel) in Haiti so as to be in position influence events when Duvalier passes from scene, and to frustrate any Communist attempt to take over before or after. Meanwhile, there other short-run policy objectives of considerable importance to US national interests here, including (a) persuading GOH to support USG positions in OAS, UN and other international orgs, (b) protection US nationals and investments in Haiti, (c) servicing GOH debts to USG and private US citizens (GOH recently resumed service on debts to Ex-Im Bank and AID). Concurrently, USG has in operation two very limited programs of assistance to Haiti (malaria eradication and Title III P.L. 480 assistance through vol agencies) which are designed benefit Haitian people directly and avoid political exploitation by Duvalier.

3. As Dept aware, GOH has acceded to all USG requests for support in last two years (see especially Embʼs A–332, Feb 24).⁵ Particularly important examples were (a) GOH support of US at 1964 MFM on Cuba, (b) at time of landing US forces in DomRep last April, and (c) subsequently at 10th MFM on DomRep. GOH has also consistently supported USG on UN items, including Chinese representation, disarmament and Article 19, and at USG request made statement in UNGA Oct 1 this year generally supporting US policy in Viet-Nam (Depcirtel 3166⁶ and Embtels 166⁷). Latest example of GOH support contained Embtels 216.⁸ I need not emphasize that such support does not imply any change in character of Duvalier regime, which remains brutal and regressive dictatorship, but is motivated entirely by GOH self-interest (e.g. fear that Caamano/Bosch govt in DomRep would have allowed Haitian exiles mount operations against Haiti) and hope that GOH support of USG would lead to resumption of US economic and military assistance to Haiti. Landing of US troops in DomRep has also undoubtedly had salutary effect on Duvalier (as well as on local Communists), although some desperate act (such as firing PAP) by Duvalier in event of, say, substantial exile invasion, is always possibility (CAS htp 784).

4. I remain reasonably confident that even if USG makes no reply at all to Duvalierʼs two letters, he will not attempt PNG reprisals against USG presence here although he remains intensely suspicious US intentions toward him (see especially [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]).⁹ However, he might be tempted begin withhold some of full GOH support now being accorded US policy. This connection, I assume it important that GOH continue vote with USG on unfinished DomRep business in 10th MFM. There is also upcoming Rio Conference to consider. These and other factors indicate desirability avoiding any flatly negative response (or fail to respond at all) to Duvalierʼs June 3 letter and indeed point to need insure maintenance low key “lowcost” dialogue with GOH, so as to keep ball in play in USGʼs own self-interest. Examples of items recently injected into dialogue from US side are resumption of carefully-spaced US naval visits to PAP for R and R (Deptel Wirom 71)9 and USG approval in principle of GOH request Oct 8 for increase in modest Title III program (Deptel 104).¹⁰

5. Focusing these considerations down to Duvalierʼs June 3 letter, I recommend following approach, dealing first with substance of reply, and then form.

6. (A) Request in June 3 letter covers both bilateral USG econ assistance, and also loans from international financial institutions such as IDB.

(B) Duvalier basically wants a bilateral “injection of dollars” into Haiti by USG, e.g., general budget-supporting assistance. I remain completely opposed for several reasons. On technical side, money would simply go into pockets of regime without benefit to Haitian people, and it would be impossible for USG to control. Of even more weight is fact any such aid would constitute, and would be so interpreted in Haiti and outside, as US political support for regime. This clearly undesirable and unacceptable to USG, and to Congressional and US public opinion.

(C) However, as Dept has had in mind for some time (Deptel 694, June 25),¹¹ and as was I believe touched on by Secy in talk with Chalmers Oct 8, it seems desirable to explore with GOH whether a carefully delimited social-benefit project, to be financed indirectly with AID funds, could be undertaken, while avoiding political and administrative problems which brought almost all direct US econ assistance to Haiti to an end in 1962–63. Have in mind project whereby a US university or private foundation, with AID financing, would work with GOH on creating effective national health service (NHS). This would be vehicle for attacking many types medical and public health problems in Haiti, and consolidating gains from Malaria Eradication Program, now well advanced. But, most importantly, such an NHS could be vehicle for implementing a population program, if GOH decides embark on one. A response along this line would be very limited but nevertheless positive reply to a portion of June 3 letter, would serve to keep dialogue going, and might even lead to a valuable institution-building project if properly implemented and controlled. Doubt that Duvalier could get any political mileage out of it, especially if aid financing is indirect. Even if nothing came of exploratory discussions, useful time would have been gained.

(D) As regards Duvalierʼs request as it affects international institutions, both UNTA program and IDB either have in operation or are considering limited TA projects here with institution-building objectives. UN projects should continue, and I recommend that US Executive Director IDB be authorized approve four Haitian TA projects now under consideration. Additionally, however, to further US objectives spelled out above, there is room for some limited and carefully controlled international capital assistance to Haiti, similar to $2.3 million water supply loan granted GOH by IDB in 1964. Therefore recommend that USG indicate informally to IDB management that US would not oppose IDB working up a sound project for, say, further loan to IDAI (which already has $3.5 million line of credit from IDB). (Perhaps some financing for Peligre electrification could be worked out within IDAI framework.) Such loan assistance would benefit Haitian economy long after Duvalier goes, and here again I doubt it would have any significantly negative political by-products in US public opinion if way properly prepared. Water supply project seems going well under strict IDB control and not subject political exploitation by Duvalier.

(E) If USG adopts line contained foregoing subparas, we could reply to Duvalier that bilaterally USG is prepared see if worthwhile specific project could be developed. Multilaterally, we could say that USG naturally prepared have IDB consider sound Haitian projects on merits. GOH already fully aware that USG holds absolute veto over IDB loans (Fund for Special Operations) to Haiti; thus if Haiti gets a small loan for IDAI GOH will know that USG was determining factor, and this again would constitute very limited but positive reply to second aspect Duvalierʼs June 3 letter.

7. As regards form of US reply to two letters, I recommend against substantive written reply, on ground that Duvalier might release it publicly or otherwise exploit. This leaves following alternatives: President, or Secretary on his behalf, could send brief generalized letter, saying President has taken note of views Duvalier expressed, etc. and that there are some matters which Amb Timmons will pursue with FonMin (this picks up note on which Secy/Chalmers Oct 8 talk ended), or I could give oral reply to Chalmers along same line. On balance I prefer brief noncommittal letter. In either case I would then begin talking to Chalmers as indicated subparas (C), (D) and (E) para 6 above and after working out careful scenario with appropriate political filling.

8. Duvalierʼs broad hint, in Aug 12 letter, regarding resumption US military assistance, should be ignored, and I recommend USG continue maintain strict policy of not supplying any such assistance to GOH, and of continuing frustrate Duvalierʼs efforts obtain arms in US or elsewhere.

9. Appreciated Deptʼs reaction.

10. Country Team concurs.

Timmons

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 HAI-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Received at 9:26 p.m.
2. For summaries of these letters, see Documents 344 and 348.
3. See Document 347.
4. See Documents 329 and 338.
5. Document 338.
6. To all posts, August 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S)
7. Dated September 17. (Ibid.)
8. Dated October 20. (Ibid., POL HAI-US)
9. Not found.
10. Dated August 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18–9 LA)
11. Actually dated June 24, not June 25. (Ibid., AID (US) HAI)