350. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

SUBJECT

  • Reply to Duvalier

Last June 3 and August 12 Duvalier sent the President letters asking, in effect, for renewal of U.S. economic assistance to Haiti (see attached Read-to-Bundy memo).2 The August 12 letter contains highly offensive language charging that our Embassy (under Ambassador Thurston) and the MAAG worked with the Haitian armed forces to overthrow him.

After several months of delay on when and how the letters should be acknowledged, State has now suggested that the President send the brief, non-committal acknowledgement included in the attached memo.

The background to Stateʼs delay is important. From June to October they deliberately postponed answering the correspondence, first [Page 809] because they were awaiting the more substantive August 12 letter and after that because of the problem of Duvalierʼs mood. During this period, Duvalier was making noises about PNGing Ambassador Timmons. State wanted to string him along, making no commitments on assistance and avoiding giving him any pretext to act against the Embassy. In October, they decided that the situation was calm enough to reply. I advised ARA, in order to avoid the President getting involved in correspondence with Duvalier, to take advantage of his hospitalization to have Secretary Rusk reply on his behalf. They readily bought this, drafted a letter and sent it to the Seventh Floor for signature. In the Secretaryʼs absence, the reply went to Ball. He refused to sign it because it did not take issue with the objectionable paragraphs. Then Tom Mann got into the act and he decided that a Presidential reply is necessary to avoid antagonizing Duvalier. I checked back with Tom to see how strongly he felt about this. He is still of a mind that the President should send a non-committal acknowledgement along the lines of the one suggested, avoiding any reference to the objectionable paragraphs.

My view is that we should not put the President in the position of replying to Duvalier. One reason is the long delay in answering the correspondence. Another is that I prefer not to have the President corresponding with this petty tyrant. But much more important are the highly offensive paragraphs. I donʼt see how the President can send a letter ignoring the charges. And if he replies rejecting them, we run the serious risk of Duvalier reacting against our Embassy, which it is in our interest to prevent.

I think that the nature of Duvalierʼs charges and the language used are such that State could have declined to accept the August letter on delivery. If it had done so, however, it probably would have produced the Duvalier reaction that we wanted to avoid. But perhaps now the paragraphs offer an escape hatch.

I would recommend no written reply, either from here or from State. I would have Allan Stewart or Jack Vaughn call in the Haitian Ambassador and tell him in very polite language that:

1.
the offensive paragraphs make it very difficult for us to reply formally without taking strong issue with the charges, which we, of course, do not accept;
2.
because of this, we would prefer not to have to reply as we do not believe it would further relations between our two countries;
3.
perhaps the useful conversations between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Chalmers at New York and Rio3 might be considered [Page 810] an adequate substitute; or if the GOH prefers, we would be pleased to entertain a new letter without the paragraphs in question.

If you agree on this approach, I recommend that you call Tom Mann and tell him that we would prefer to handle it in this fashion.4

WGB
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Haiti-Duvalier Correspondence. Confidential. A notation in Bundyʼs handwriting at the top of the memorandum reads: “You tell ʼem [illegible] to do it your way. Itʼs absurd to answer an August letter in December. MGB.”
  2. Attached but not printed.
  3. See Document 347 for Ruskʼs conversation with Chalmers in New York. A memorandum of their conversation at the Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro on November 23 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV.
  4. A notation in Bundyʼs handwriting next to this sentence reads: “Yes tell him.” A December 20 memorandum from Bowdler to Read informed the Department of Bundyʼs decision. (Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence File, Haiti-Duvalier Correspondence) A memorandum of conversation, dated January 12, 1966, reported that Vaughn informed Ambassador Theard that morning that the President had decided not to answer the two letters sent by President Duvalier because of the objectionable references in the second letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL HAI-US)