Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

329. Policy Paper Prepared in the Embassy in Haiti and the Office of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State¹

Washington, April 23, 1964.

HAITI

Proposed Plan of Action for Period Beginning May 1, 1964

[Omitted here are sections 1–10 assessing Haitiʼs political, military, economic, and foreign relations situations.]

11. Role of the United States in Haiti—Interests and Objectives

(a) The United States is now faced with the prospect that the Duvalier regime will continue to rule Haiti for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances it is in the United States interest to seek to bring about at least a minimum level of mutual accommodation, realizing that room for such accommodation may be very limited and of dubious duration. United States interests range from the need to protect American citizens and property interests to ensuring that Haiti votes on the merit of questions of importance to the United States and the free world in international organizations and forums. The United States also has an abiding interest in the social and economic welfare of the Haitian people, although past experience shows that effective cooperation with the Duvalier regime in these fields is beset by very great difficulties. It may be possible to avoid many of the pitfalls of bilateral cooperation by bringing Haiti into a meaningful relationship with the Alliance for Progress including the CIAP and such international financial organizations as the IDB, thus shifting primary responsibility to a multilateral “impersonal” organization. In any event, the well-being of the Haitian people or lack thereof has an important long-term bearing on the key United States interest of denying Haiti to the Communists.

[Omitted here is an account of U.S.-Haitian relations from 1915 to 1963.]

Objectives, Conclusions and Recommendations

[Omitted here are sections on objectives and conclusions.]

C. Recommendations

Economic and financial—The United States Government should:

1. Refrain from granting emergency or budget-supporting assistance to Haiti in the absence of some overriding consideration of political expediency.

2. Make clear to the Haitian Government that its economic development program and other self-help plans, by means of which Haiti would participate in the Alliance for Progress, should be evaluated by the CIAP, and, if Haiti is found eligible for AFP assistance, the Government of Haiti should look primarily to the IDB and other international lending organizations. This would not exclude some United States bilateral assistance should our fundamental interests require this.

3. Support the IMF in its efforts to balance the Haitian budget, maintain the convertibility of the gourde and amortize the Haitian internal and external debt (including payments to private American citizens, Ex-Im, AID, etc.).

4. Encourage selected European countries (such as the German Federal Republic) to grant modest amounts of technical and capital assistance to Haiti, while opposing aid in such amounts that Duvalier would gain any real liberty of action.

5. Continue the United States financing (approximately $1.5 per year) of the Malaria Eradication Program (which is administered as a four-way operation—Government of Haiti, United States Government, PAHO and UNICEF).

6. Encourage United States private religious and charitable organizations to continue their programs in Haiti. Continue to make foodstuffs available to such organizations under Title III of PL 480.

7. Continue to encourage tourism in Haiti by responding favorably to requests for advice from American shipping companies, tourist organizations, and individual citizens.

8. Encourage United States private investment in Haiti by approving applications for investment guaranties where such applications meet AIDʼs criteria.

Political—The United States Government should:

1. Seek to continue the substantive dialogue already begun, and cultivate meaningful contacts with officials of the Haitian Government, as part of the process of arriving at a minimum level of mutual accommodation.

2. If, as a result of the fact that the United States is not prepared to resume immediately bilateral aid to Haiti, Duvalier reverts to his usual tactics of reprisals against United States representatives in Haiti, or attempts to blackmail the United States in the OAS, it should be made clear that the United States will not be intimidated. (If a firm stand is taken, Duvalier would probably not risk a reversal in the present trend of United States-Haitian relations, which is basically favorable to his own selfish interests.)

3. Attempt to thwart any further efforts of Duvalier to go around the Embassy, or to use unofficial intermediaries.

4. For the time being, discourage visits to Haiti by high-ranking officials of the United States Government, other governments or international organizations which could be exploited by Duvalier.

5. Continue the present USIS information and cultural program.

6. Resume visits to Haiti by United States naval vessels, subject to advance clearance by the Embassy in each case.

7. Maintain continuing close observation of activity in the two small Communist groups in Haiti, and seek, when and as propitious occasions may arise, the elimination of pro-Communist members of the Government (e.g. Paul Blanchet, Minister of Information).

8. Disassociate itself from any exile attempt to invade Haiti, or any plot against Duvalier, except in the circumstances (1) that the prospects for success appear favorable, (2) that public knowledge of United States Government involvement could be successfully avoided, and (3) that the installation of an acceptable successor group is virtually assured.

9. Continue discreet contacts with Haitians outside the Government (and with those in exile) in order to attempt to build up assets for the future.

10. Defer for the time being any attempt to reconstitute a MAAG in Haiti, and deny any further United States military assistance if such should be requested by the Government of Haiti.

11. Continue to oppose and frustrate Duvalierʼs attempts to purchase arms in other countries.

12. Discourage Haiti from extending its political or economic relationship with the Soviet Bloc (Poland is the only Bloc country with which Haiti maintains diplomatic relations). Watch carefully for any signs that Haiti has any type of contact with Cuba and move immediately to urge the Haitian Government to cut off any such contacts.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. III. Secret. Drafted in the Office of Caribbean Affairs with contributions from the Embassy in Port-au-Prince. The memorandum is attached to a May 5 covering memorandum from Executive Secretary James M. Frey to the Latin American Policy Committee. The Latin American Policy Committee approved the Plan of Action on May 21, according to various records, including Document 338. No copy of the approved plan has been found, and there is no record of the draft paper having been revised. Annex I, “Summary of Developments from December 15, 1963 to March 15, 1964” was attached but not printed.