299. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Crimmins) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)1
SUBJECT
- US–UK-Canadian Talks on Cuba
Purpose—The talks have two purposes: 1) to try to come to a common assessment of the present situation and outlook in Cuba, and 2) to set out and examine, on the basis of this common assessment, the range of options2 open to the West. Although lines of policy will inevitably be discussed, it is clearly understood by all concerned that there will be no attempt during the talks to fix a common policy toward Cuba.
Possible British Position—We cannot be sure about British motivations in the talks, for which they took the initiative.3 It is possible that they are approaching the discussions with an open mind, intent only upon an examination of the facts. On the other hand, they may regard the talks as the first step in a process to move us toward a relaxation of current pressures on Cuba.
If the British have the latter intention, they may advocate the line, set forth in various “think-piece” despatches written by their Ambassador in Havana, Adam Watson (whom you met last summer), that whereas our policy toward Cuba has been successful in isolating Cuba, it cannot overthrow the Castro regime or induce any changes in his basic policies. Therefore, the British may argue it is necessary to provide inducements to Castro (in addition to keeping some pressure on him) [Page 710] in order to reduce or terminate his subversive activities and to lessen his dependence on the Soviet Union. The inducements would be (1) expanded economic and other relations with the non-OAS West (i.e., the US would cease its objections to such ties); and (2) an end to “subversive activities” against Cuba, to be keyed to Castroʼs cessation of activities against Latin America.
There are, however, some indications that the British may have somewhat revised the assessments upon which the approach above was based, and are now thinking in more modest terms, having in mind a more limited objective and the consequent employment of narrower inducements. We may find that they will stress the single goal of preventing Castro from, as they put it, being forced irreversibly into complete dependence upon the Soviets. The means by which this would be accomplished would be the expansion of trade and other relations between Cuba and the non-OAS West. There would be no reciprocal arrangement on subversive activities.
Recommended US Position—The policy which the US is following arises from two key judgments: 1) the present Cuban Government has as a firm long-range goal the organization of Latin America in a form inimical to Western interests; and 2) the close association of the Soviet Union with the present regime, manifested by its dependence upon the Soviet Union for its security, constitutes an extension of Soviet power and influence into Latin America which is unacceptable to the West as a whole and particularly to the nations of this Hemisphere. Our objectives, therefore, are to prevent the present Cuban Government from attaining its own objectives in Latin America and to bring about the retraction of Soviet power and influence.
US Views on Possible British Position—While we agree that an opening to the West might give Castro more independence in his dealings with the USSR, we see little or no reason to believe that this would affect his bed-rock, continuing reliance on the Soviets for basic economic support and military guarantees, which no one in the West, outside the United States, can provide. Moreover—and this is a basic point—there is no evidence whatsoever that Castro has any intention of making an ideological shift, of moving out of the “Socialist” camp, or of being ready to abandon his objectives in Latin America. His strong desire for greater independence relates to his relationships within, not outside, the camp. We believe that an arrangement like the one which the British may propose would be advantageous to Cuba and the USSR and distinctly disadvantageous to us. We consider that such a policy would be less effective than our present low-cost, low-risk policy in keeping Castro from moving toward his objective in the Hemisphere and in inducing a retraction of Soviet power and influence. In fact, the “relaxed” policy could well be destructive of any hopes of further progress toward our (and the OAS) goals.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL CUBA. Secret.↩
- According to a March 2 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, Secretary Rusk told Crimmins that he wanted “no new initiatives on Cuba policy for the time being.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Memos re: Cuba Miscellaneous, 11/63–6/65)↩
- In a January 15 memorandum to Rusk, Mann stated that the British Embassy, “acting on instructions from London” had inquired informally of Crimmins “concerning the Departmentʼs receptivity toward an informal US–UK examination of the Cuba question.” The British added that they would be interested in inviting the Canadians to participate. Mann, Thompson, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Tyler agreed “that a review of the kind suggested by the British could be useful.” Rusk initialed his approval of an informal exchange with the British and the Canadians, but added in a postscript that “In agreeing to informal discussions, it should be made clear that the U.S. has clear and far-reaching agreements with the members of the OAS with respect to Cuba and this factor must be fully taken into account.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL CUBA)↩