Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

300. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 19, 1965.

SUBJECT

• U.S./U.K./Canadian Talks on Cuba

On Wednesday and Thursday,² I attended the U.S./U.K./Canadian talks on Cuba. Jack Vaughn³ chaired the meeting, which included John Crimmins and Bill Bowdler on the U.S. side (Tommy Thompson attended the last session); Rennie (Head of Latin American Affairs) and Watson (Ambassador to Cuba) on the British side; and Pick (Head of Latin American Affairs) on the Canadian side. The purpose of the two-day talks was (a) to assess the situation inside Cuba and (b) to take a look at the policy options now available to the West. By and large, the talks consisted of a U.S./U.K. dialogue, with the Canadians listening and chipping in only occasionally.

1. The first order of business was to assess the economic situation in Cuba; on this, there seemed to be general agreement.

(a) Sugar—The crop this year will probably be about 5 million tons; it could be smaller if the cane does not get cut in time. In this regard, external activist pressures on Cuba seem to make some difference on cane-cutting; if there were a relaxation, there would be fewer soldiers and more experts available to cut cane.

Cubaʼs sugar production will probably reach 6.0 to 7.5 million tons by 1970 (6.8 million in 1961), which is a lot of sugar but which is considerably short of the Cuban target of 10 million tons. Russian combines are now being used and will undoubtedly be used more and more in the future. Sugar expansion in Cuba does seem to have some limiting factors—e.g., the difficulty of putting too many resources into this one industry, in view of other requirements.

(b) Trade with West—Cuba sells an average of 1.5 million tons of sugar to the Free World each year; the Cubans have a dilemma here in that they like to earn the convertible currency but definitely do not like the price these days. Imports from the West will drop considerably in 1965 as opposed to 1964 because of Cubaʼs foreign exchange problems.

(c) Trade With and Aid From the Bloc—It is hard to say just how much subsidy the Soviets pay for Cuban sugar; while the announced price is considerably above the world market price, it should be noted that the sugar is part of a barter deal—and we donʼt really know the true value of what the Soviets are giving the Cubans in exchange for the sugar. With respect to aid, Russian loans are probably not very hard and they probably donʼt expect to get repaid. As a general point, it is amazing how little the Russians get, in the form of Cuban good behavior, for the investment they are making.

(d) Miscellaneous—A number of interesting miscellaneous points were made. First, the management problem is severe in Cuba. There is entirely too much transferring of personnel; also, the penalties for failure are excessive and lead to over-caution. Second, Fidel is not always happy about sending trainees to Russia—e.g., learning to farm in a cold climate is not very applicable to farming in Cuba. Third, next to sugar, cattle production is the second most important economic activity; arable crops donʼt seem to count for much. Fourth, in terms of growth, Cuba seems to be at the bottom of the pendulum. The economy may swing back and make up the ground it has lost since 1961, but it is probably going to take Cuba a number of years before there is any real economic growth.

2. Political Currents in Cuban Leadership—The group generally agreed with the set of conclusions attached at Tab 1. Ambassador Watson did go on to elaborate at some length on the struggle between Castro and the Old Guard communists. He made the point that the removal of the Old Guard from points of power might not only be a reflection of Castroʼs dissatisfaction with this group; it is also possible that the Old Guard is getting more and more disenchanted with Cuban progress and, in fact, is not unhappy to withdraw from the fray. In this regard, Watson speculated that the Old Guard may do much to feed Moscowʼs doubts about Russian involvement in Cuba.

3. Cuban Relations with Latin America—At the outset, the British expressed strong reservations about the U.S. view regarding the threat of Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere. In the first place, there is not much subversion (e.g., “surely there is more OAS subversion against Cuba than there is Cuban subversion against Latin America”). In the second place, Cuban subversion is negotiable. Castro is beginning to have doubts about it. He is not so sure there will be revolution in Latin America in the near future and, in any event, he is not so sure he will be the leader of it. These beliefs, in addition to the belief that Castro may want to concentrate on his own island, lead the British to believe that he would reduce his subversion if he got something meaningful in return. In a related regard, the British speculated that any recent increase in subversive activity has to do with the fact that Castro may feel that his efforts at rapprochement with the West have been rebuffed.

The U.S. pointed out that, while it would be nonsense to attribute all Latin American tension to Cuba, it would be inaccurate to say that Cuba had no responsibility for a considerable part of it. Certainly, there was plenty of evidence around to indicate Cubaʼs subversive interests. First, there was the recent meeting in Havana among Latin American communists to revitalize the subversive effort. Second, there is in operation today a very energetic National Liberation Section in the Cuban Governmentʼs Directorate General of Intelligence. Third, the public line has been getting harder. Cuba no longer talks so much about “exporting revolution by example.” In a recent speech, for instance,Guevara talked about “bullets instead of ballots.” Fourth, there are recent hard cases in point, too. In Colombia, for example, the leader of a recent carefully planned subversive incident had spent two months in Cuba just before coming home to lead the insurgency. Fifth, the training of guerrillas goes on. Ambassador Vaughn noted that in Panama literally hundreds have received training over the past couple years and that this number of people can make quite an impact on a fragile society. His personal experience with a few of these trainees indicates that they are Chinese-oriented, fanatical, and violent.

By the end of the discussion, the British, while still implying that a deal might be made with Castro on subversion, seemed to have a somewhat better appreciation of the Cuban threat in Latin America.

4. Soviet Intentions Towards Cuba—While there was a difference in emphasis between the U.S. and the British, by and large there was close agreement with the summary paragraphs attached at Tab 2.⁴ The British emphasized the point that the Russians are not very happy with the present burden and that they would certainly be prepared to accept closer Western/Cuban relations.

There was a good deal of discussion on the question of just how far the Soviets would be willing to disengage from Cuba. They would conceivably go pretty far—e.g., permit downfall of the Old Guard; agree to military neutralization of Cuba (although Cuba would have some contrary views on this). On the other hand, even the British did not think that the Soviets would willingly permit Cuba to leave the Socialist camp, although they did imply that this could conceivably come about over the long pull once the West had its foot firmly in the door.

5. Options for the West—By the end of the talks, the British view seemed to boil down to the following elements: First, the U.S. policy has been “brilliant” (Watson), and has provided us with a remarkable opportunity to loosen the Cuban/Soviet tie. This is an important opportunity since we do not want to make the Cuban/Soviet tie indissoluble. Second, while it is clear that the U.S. and the OAS should probably not ease their pressures, the non-OAS Free World countries should be encouraged to sound out the Cubans on what their terms might be. In this regard, one of the Western carrots might be an offer of increased contact with the non-OAS Free World (e.g., trade and cultural contacts), in exchange for good behavior on Castroʼs part—i.e., less subversion.

The case for the present policy and for a harder policy was made by the U.S. and ran roughly as follows: We want to reduce subversion and induce a retraction of the USSR from the Hemisphere; in this regard, we are engaged in a policy designed to strengthen the internal resistance of L.A. governments, weaken Cuba, and demonstrate to the Soviets that they have made a mistake. Thus far, the policy has had moderate but measurable success. First, economic prospects in Cuba are not bright; the regimeʼs failure to demonstrate progress has hurt the regime with its own people and has hurt Cuba as an example in Latin America. Second, Cuba has been denied any subversive successes in Latin America. Third, this hard policy has increased Cuban/Soviet tensions. Fourth, it should be emphasized that this is a policy which has called for very modest risks and costs on the part of the West.

Moreover, one could argue that a modest intensification of the present policy would improve results. (In this regard, for all practical purposes, the non-OAS West has had no political restraints on their relations with Cuba.) Among other things, an intensification might increase Soviet/Cuban tensions and make Castro look like even more of a satellite to Latin Americans. This course, which does not significantly increase the chances of Cuban subversion, allows us to wait comfortably and safely for the breaks and for the chance of hitting the jackpot (eviction of the Soviets). On the other hand, relaxation may reduce the chances that we will ever hit the jackpot, may give Cuba political and economic respectability, and may demonstrate to Latin Americans that the Cuban path is worthwhile after all.

6. A considerable amount of documentation related to the U.S./U.K./Canadian talks has been done and is still in process. First, State is drafting up a joint record of conclusions which will be cleared by the British and Canadians⁵ and which primarily will spell out the options for the West, with the arguments pro and con. I will show these to you when we get them. Second, there are in being a number of British, U.S., and Canadian papers on such subjects as the Cuban economic situation, political currents in Cuba, Cuban relations with Latin America, and Soviet intentions towards Cuba.⁶ I will not burden you with these unless you indicate that you would like to take a look at some or all of them.

7. So far as the U.S. is concerned, the meetings were quite useful. In addition to providing us with an excuse to march up the Cuban hill again, the meetings gave us an opportunity to educate the British and Canadians to our side of the story and, hopefully, to persuade them that we are really not madmen when it comes to Cuba. The next step is to get together among ourselves and, taking into account the British views, give a good, hard, inter-departmental look at where we are headed and what we want to do about Cuba in the future. This process is in the works now and will be picking up steam over the next few weeks.

GC

Tab 1

Conclusions

The principal conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing analysis are:

1. Castro remains the dominant figure on the Cuban scene. Power centers in him. He is the dynamic of the revolution. His popular support remains strong, despite the gradual erosion. He holds the rival elements together and is the arbiter of their differences. He will accept no diminution of his personal leadership. There is no force in Cuba today in a position to challenge his authority.

2. Castro turned to the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1960 more out of necessity than conviction, dictated by the internal and external programs he set for himself. In the process of reorienting Cuba toward the Soviet Bloc he came to accept Marxism-Leninism. His strong emotional commitment to radical change predisposed him in this direction. He is motivated, however, more by personal ambition than by ideological commitment. Having transformed Cuba into a Marxist-Leninist state and associated her with the Bloc, he finds himself more dependent upon Moscow than is compatible with his plans and temperament.

3. While Castro would like greater elbowroom within the “Socialist” camp, there is no evidence to indicate that he desires to break away. A Communist world organized along the lines of regional poly-centrism in which Cuba would lead an independent Latin American group is more in line with his objectives.

4. Of the various groups which comprise the Cuban political spectrum, the neo-Communists are clearly dominant. This is due to their numerical strength, the positions they hold in the party-state apparatus, and the fact that Castro is himself a neo-Communist. No other group is in a position to challenge the neo-Communists as long as Castro takes their side.

5. The old-guard Communists are passing through a critical period in which Castro appears intent on severely reducing, if not eliminating, their influence. The only support which the old-guard has comes from Moscow. This is sufficient, however, to make Castro move cautiously against them.

6. The fact that the neo-Communists appear to be on the ascendancy represents no advantage for the West because they are more fanatical, more emotionally “anti-imperialist”, and more disposed to push armed struggle as the appropriate means for achieving power in Latin America.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, US/UK/Canadian Talks, 2/65–3/65. Secret.
2. March 17 and 18.
3. Mann resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on March 17, and Jack H. Vaughn assumed this position 5 days later.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Reference is to “Resume of US-UK-Canadian Talks on Cuba,” March 18. ( Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, US/UK/Canadian Talks, 2/65–3/65)
6. These papers are ibid. and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL CUBA.