Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

298. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Williams) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Adams)¹

Washington, March 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting March 4, 1965

The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee held on March 4, 1965 contain the following items:

[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

“Cuba—Proposed Political Action Operation to Acerbate Cuban-Soviet Relations²

“In the proposed deception operation to acerbate Cuban-Soviet relations, Mr. FitzGerald said that the Agency was withdrawing the proposed use of former Senator Kenneth Keating and hoped to build a similar confusion operation around an actual trip to Moscow planned by lawyer James Britt Donovan. Mr. Donovan would remain unwitting. Ambassador Thompson asked if this would not preclude Mr. Donovanʼs usefulness in other possible missions in the future. The reply was that there are no plans in sight to make use of Mr. Donovanʼs services. The proposal was considered as approved.”

“Cuba—Future of CIAʼs Cuban Paramilitary Program; Proposed UDT Sabotage Operation³

• >“a. The Committee vetoed the proposed UDT operation for the present time. A discussion followed in which Mr. FitzGerald stated that keeping paramilitary assets in being is an expensive process and such a ‘shelf life’ is limited in duration. He emphasized that only the lesser motivated types are willing to remain on ice indefinitely—better caliber people drift away.
• “b. While accepting this difficulty, it was the opinion of Ambassador Thompson that this asset could be needed in the future, and Mr. Vance felt it important to preserve the capability despite its tendency to waste away. It was agreed to expend the necessary funds to keep such a paramilitary capability in force.”

“Cuba—Support to Artime

“In regard to the two papers on support to Artime, Mr. FitzGerald stated that there was no basic disagreement between State⁴ and the Agency;⁵ it was a matter of how best to terminate Artime. He felt that there was some obligation now to ‘get the boys back home.’ After some discussion back and forth, it was decided that an undetermined sum to return the Cubans from Caribbean outposts was in order. Mr. Bundy directed that these arrangements be established and completed by the end of April. Ambassador Thompson asked some questions concerning the internal operation of Cubela and indicated that it was a matter of some concern to the Department and that it be made absolutely clear that there was no U.S. commitment to Cubela via Artime. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed this. He felt that Cubela was living on borrowed time.”

“Cuba—Problem of U.S. Support for Cuban Exile Organization RECE

“This brought the discussion to the RECE proposals.⁶ It was the consensus of the group that ‘either-you-do-or-you-donʼt’ and that the U.S. should not be involved with another exile organization. The committee agreed to reimburse Major Oliva some $17,000 and to offer Oliva himself some help in finding a sort of job commensurate with his talents. A suggestion of enrollment in the International Police Academy was made, and Mr. Vance and Mr. FitzGerald agreed to collaborate on finding a solution.”

“Cuba—Emergency Exfiltration Operation

“The committee approved a one shot emergency exfiltration operation for 5 March 1965. The paper concerning his operation was circulated at the meeting and is hereby attached.”⁷

“Cuba—Question and Answer for Presidential Press Conference

• “a. Paragraph 3.d. of the minutes of 7 January 1965 authorized a proposed draft of a planted question and answer on the subject of Cuba for a forthcoming Presidential press conference. The purpose of this question and answer was to reiterate a theme made by the late President Kennedy⁸ a week before he died to the effect that there were Cubans within Cuba with whom the U.S. would be willing to deal.
• “b. Mr. Bundy directed that the draft be circulated to members for comment at a future meeting. There was some doubt expressed whether a press conference at this time could appropriately generate a question on Cuba. The draft is appended to these minutes as an attachment.”⁷

“Previous Approvals by Telephone

“The Cuban infiltration/exfiltration operations for March were approved by voice vote on 17 February.”

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. A January 25 memorandum to the 303 Committee proposed that Castroʼs suspicions of the Soviets be aroused by having a prominent American announce a trip to Moscow and inform the press that the purpose of the trip was to publish articles, and meet Kosygin or another top Russian official at the Kremlin. The individual would return to the United States, but instead of publishing anything about his Soviet visit, he would visit Florida, the Caribbean area, and Washington, trying to make it appear as if secret negotiations about Cuba had been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union behind Castroʼs back. ( Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. I, 11/63–7/65)
3. A January 18 memorandum to the 303 Committee reported that a substantial number of Cubans had been “selected and intensively trained in all aspects of paramilitary work, including commando tactics and sabotage,” but were “becoming discouraged at inaction,” and that, therefore, some type of underwater demolition team action against Cuban navy patrol vessels or “other Cuban targets of opportunity” should be taken. The memorandum stated that “If an operation of this type is not considered acceptable,” the “CIA be authorized to begin reduction of its commitments in the paramilitary field.” (Ibid.)
4. See Document 297.
5. According to the ARA–CIA Weekly Meeting Report of February 25, FitzGerald expressed concern that DDC had “circulated” a paper recommending that aid to Artime be cut off as of the end of February. FitzGerald stated that the Agencyʼs view was that aid should be continued for another 2 months to give Artime time to develop his potential for action with Cuba. (Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files,ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting Reports) The CIA paper on this subject has not been found.
6. In a March 1 study by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, prepared in consultation with operating-level representatives of the 303 Committee agencies, and forwarded to the Committee under a March 1 covering memorandum, Crimmins discussed the background of the RECE (Representation of Cubans in Exile) request for U.S. support, the basic factors affecting a decision, and the principal conclusion that the U.S. Government had “only a limited interest in keeping RECE alive.” The covering memorandum concludes with the statement that “the Department is inclined to favor giving no assistance to RECE.” ( Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activities, Vol. II, 1964, 1965)
7. Attached but not printed.
8. See Document 295.
7. Attached but not printed.