Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

266. Summary Record of the 530th National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 2, 1964, 10 a.m.

OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA

The meeting began without the President. Mr. McCone distributed, and the group read, the attached SNIE 85–2–64, “Likelihood of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U–2.”² The conclusion was that Castro prefers to try to halt the U–2 flights by pressure at the UN and elsewhere, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down.

Secretary Rusk said we need to deal with four questions:

(1) What is our intelligence requirement for aerial reconnaissance?

(2) What do we think Castro will do to prevent our overflights?

(3) What is the best way to meet our intelligence requirements?

(4) Are there any additional political actions which we could take in the immediate future to reduce the risk that Castro will try to shoot down a U–2?

Director McCone, reading from a paper,³ made the following points in response to Secretary Ruskʼs request for the views of the intelligence community:

(1) Aerial photography is the only dependable evidence we have on the status of Soviet military equipment in Cuba. All alternatives to aerial photography have been carefully studied and all have been found wanting.

(2) The intelligence community has concluded that overflights must be continued but the number of missions can be reduced from the number now flown. Three flights per week are considered essential. There have been forty-two refugee reports about missiles in Cuba since January 1, 1964. In order to check on these reports, we must have aerial photography.

(3) Castro will probably take over control of the SAM sites and he probably will try to shoot down a U–2 at some time in the near future.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we had aerial photography which we had not read out. Mr. McCone replied that we did not. However, we have taken pictures of the same objects many times but we continue to have a requirement for current pictures in order to check on incoming refugee reports.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said all agree that overflights are required. The number of flights could be reduced but this made little difference because the risk of a shoot-down remained approximately the same and the political cost of the overflight problem was not materially affected by the number of missions flown.

Secretary Rusk and Mr. McCone expressed the agreement of all those present that there is a requirement for from two to three flights per week—two certainly and an additional one if cloud cover or other operational problems make the third flight necessary.

Ambassador Thompson commented that overflights of Cuba create a strain on Soviet-Cuban relations. The Soviets, in their May Day slogans, had downgraded the Cuban problem. The Soviets believed, however, that because we had sent a note on overflights to the Cubans via the Czechs, we were taking a new initiative and launching a new move against Castro. They felt we had concluded that we had interpreted the climate of improving U.S.-Soviet relations to mean that we had a free hand to do what we wished to Castro as far as the USSR was concerned.

Secretary Rusk said Dobrynin had asked him directly⁴ why we had raised the problem of the overflights in a note in writing. He had left the impression that we could have handled this in another way, thereby avoiding making a direct issue of a problem which had not been causing concern for months.

Secretary Rusk recalled that during the missile crisis of October 1962 we had discussed a nuclear free zone in Latin America and onsite inspection in Cuba by the UN. These ideas had been accepted by Khrushchev but flatly rejected by Castro.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that Castro, in his recent speech, had made clear that the overflights issue was not of a nature to lead to the possibility of nuclear war. However, the Ambassador believes the danger of a Cuban shoot-down of a U–2 will increase.

Secretary Rusk said that a shoot-down was not imminent. Assistant Secretary Mann also agreed with this view which is expressed in the SNIE. However, there is a strong possibility that Castro will raise this question in the UN.

Secretary Rusk then asked how we could best meet the agreed intelligence requirement. Mr. McCone said that the U–2 was vulnerable. If we equipped it with electronic countermeasures (ECM), its vulnerability would be greatly decreased, but countermeasures would be developed very rapidly, thereby reducing the effectiveness of existing ECM equipment. In addition, the use of ECM risks compromising the equipment in the event that an ECM-equipped U–2 were shot down. The Russians know about our system but they are not familiar with specific equipment which we have developed.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that if the Russians knew our ECM was on a U–2, they might try very hard to shoot one down.

Mr. Fubini, as the expert, answered a question as to whether the Powers plane had been equipped with ECM. He said the plane did have some ECM equipment which undoubtedly had been obtained by the Russians. Secretary McNamara added that all the Governmentʼs ECM experts are agreed that the Soviets have our ECM equipment or equipment similar to it. General LeMay noted that he believed the Soviets may have the idea of our system but they do not have specific knowledge of our equipment.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that ECM is not on our major strike forces. If an ECM-equipped U–2 is shot at, the plane would be ordered to abort its mission and its chances of survival would be almost 100%. If the plane were shot at, we would then have a new confrontation requiring additional U.S. action. This particular situation is not included in the present contingency plan which is based on a U–2 having been shot down.

General LeMay said that the Cubans had the option of not shooting at the first mission of an ECM-equipped U–2. In a short time they would learn how to deal with the ECM equipment and then would be in a position to attack the U–2.

Secretary McNamara said that even after practice the Cubans would have only an approximate 20% chance of shooting down an ECM-equipped U–2. Deputy Secretary Vance commented that the chances of hitting a U–2 were much greater if it did not have ECM equipment.

Director McCone commented on the following alternative methods of fulfilling our intelligence requirements:

(1) Peripheral photography. This is useful for targets on the coast but it does not cover inland targets and will not provide the intelligence we require.

(2) Drones. They do not produce as good coverage as the U–2. They are more vulnerable. The shooting down of a drone would call for a different response by the U.S. because no pilot is involved.

(3) Balloons. These could operate at 90–100 thousand feet with good cameras and would be relatively invulnerable. However, they cannot be controlled without an elaborate setup which does not exist but which could be constructed. The coverage depends on the control of the balloons. Thus, the coverage is not as good as the U–2 and the American public, learning of this, could complain that we were not adequately covering the island. Secretary Rusk said that a balloon is different only because it is unmanned.

General LeMay, responding to Secretary Ruskʼs question, said the pilot of a U–2 cannot outmaneuver a SAM missile. To do so keeps the plane in the area a longer time, and, therefore, increases the risk. SAM missile guidance makes them lethal.

(4) Oxcart. This plane is not ready to fly at its peak capacity and will not be for several months. It is now able to fly mach 2.2 at 75 thousand feet. It could not be shot down but its presence would be detected. The propaganda difficulty would not be relieved because the plane makes a loud sonic boom which would be heard by many people on the ground. Secretary Rusk commented that we might use the Oxcart with its sonic boom and then ask Castro if he preferred that we go back to the silent U–2. This might be something to talk about.

(5) Satellites. Mr. McCone said the camera resolution is not good enough for our purposes. The weather is often difficult and cloud cover is a problem. As to specific targets, it is not possible to synchronize the satellite so that specific targets would be covered by plan not by coincidence. There is the difficulty of the north and south orbit of present satellites. Only 5% of the island would be covered in a four-day orbit. There is a possibility of an east-west satellite orbit, but it would take at least nine months to establish tracking stations to make such an orbit possible. The expanse of an east-west orbit system would be considerable. In summary, there is no satisfactory alternative to the U–2.

In answer to a question, General LeMay said the B-58 could not do the job even with ECM. The plane is capable of a supersonic burst and the first mission would get through, but following missions would have great difficulty.

Secretary Rusk discussed political actions which might be taken:

(1) Negotiations on the overflight problem with Castro would be fruitless.

(2) The UN Security Council might be asked to vote against the overflights. We could probably prevent an adverse vote by telling Council members that the problem was being dealt with by the OAS. If we could persuade the Council that the OAS was seized of the problem, we could avoid an adverse vote but we could not possibly get a favorable vote.

(3) The General Assembly, which will not meet until Fall, could be kept from a 2/3 adverse vote. We would probably get more “yes” than “no” votes but many countries would abstain.

(4) We might revise the October 1962 proposals for onsite inspection in Cuba. The risk here is that the Cubans might accept and then we would have to give up overflights in return. Would a UN on-site inspection system meet our intelligence requirements? In October 1962 we answered this question in the negative.

Director McCone said he was not prepared to answer the question but he would look at it carefully. He personally doubted the value of a UN on-site inspection in Cuba.

(5) World Court. Secretary Rusk is not too sanguine about what we would do if Castro took us to the World Court in an effort to disprove our right to overfly Cuba. We could show that our authority for the overflights was given us by the OAS but is an OAS ruling binding on Cuba which refused to accept the OAS decision? We say it is, but the International Court of Justice might not say it is. One way to deal with an effort by Castro to use the World Court would be for us to offer to adjudicate all outstanding legal issues with Cuba. We could thus confuse the overflight issue by talking about the legality of the nationalization of American property in Cuba, etc. There is always the possibility that Cuba could formally withdraw from the OAS and denounce the treaty, thereby claiming that it was not bound by any OAS action. One action we could take would be to go again to the OAS to request a reaffirmation of the 1962 resolution.

Secretary Rusk concluded by saying that inevitably we must continue the U–2 flights. We should look again, perhaps at a later date, at the possibility of using Oxcart.

The President entered the meeting at 10:45. Secretary Rusk summarized the earlier discussion and Secretary McNamara summarized the conclusions, pro and con, of the use of ECM.

Mr. Bundy said that everyone agrees that overflights are necessary.

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the use of ECM on U–2s overflying Cuba because of the risk of reducing the effective implementation of our Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). He said that he personally felt we could use the ECM and would have a 95% survival chance of escaping on the first shot if the U–2 immediately aborted. He did not recommend the use of ECM now because he did not think the Cubans were ready to attempt a shoot-down. He recommended that the use of ECM be reconsidered on the basis of a review each week of the risk of a Cuban effort to shoot down a U–2.

In response to a question, both Mr. McCone and General LeMay said that the ECM equipment could be put on the U–2 a very few hours after a decision to do so is made.

Secretary Rusk raised again the feasibility of using the A–11. Mr. McCone described the sonic boom problem with the A–11 which the U–2 does not have. When the A–11 is flying at maximum altitude and maximum speed, it is dubious whether the SAM missile could hit it. It might not even be seen by Cuban radar.

The President said we had no choice but to continue our overflights. However, we should take every precaution to avoid a U–2 being shot down. He asked that we explore again the use of ECM. He asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review their position and to weigh the use of the ECM against the possibility of a U–2 shoot-down and what would flow from that action. We will meet again Tuesday to discuss the matter further. A careful study of the use of the A–11 as an alternative would be available then. We must provide the required intelligence, but we must make every effort to increase the security of the overflight planes. We should get our information in a most secure way and make the overflights as secure as possible. In the meantime, we should continue our present program.

Secretary Rusk said we might consider a mix of overflight instruments such as U–2s, interspersed with the A–11.

Secretary McNamara, referring to the contingency plan in the event a U–2 is shot down, commented that the plan did not discuss what we would do if an ECM-equipped U–2 were shot at but not shot down.

Mr. Bundy said the contingency plan was available for the Presidentʼs reading. It provided for military reaction under certain circumstances.

The President expressed an interest in the contingency plan, particularly in view of the fact that he had read in the press all about what it was supposed to contain. He expressed his irritation that war plans leak to the press. He had gotten almost to a point where he hated to meet with Foreign Ministers because he read in the press the following day everything he had said to the Minister and some things he hadnʼt said. Only four people were present at a recent meeting, but reports of what went on appeared in the press. (This apparently referred to a conversation with Foreign Minister Butler.) We must tighten up security and put an end to such press leaks.

Bromley Smith ⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2, Tab 2, May 2, 1964. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
2. Document 264.
3. See footnote 2, Document 265.
4. See Document 261.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.