Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

265. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 2, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Discussion at National Security Council meeting Saturday—2 May 1964
• Note: the initial part of the meeting the President did not attend

PRESENT

• The President, Rusk, Ball, Johnson, McNamara, Vance, LeMay (representing JCS), Bundy, Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Thompson
• Note: Several White House Staff members were present

1. McCone opened the meeting by discussing pages 1 through 3 of the attached May 1st memorandum reviewing actions taken by USIB² on the recommendation of COMOR on the 2nd of April and in the past few days, reaffirming the need for overflights but on a reduced scale and indicating that, except for a most unusual circumstance, two to three flights per week would meet COMOR requirements.

2. Thompson stated that his analysis of recent statements by Khrushchev and Castro indicated that there was a strain between the Soviets and Castro. It appeared to him that Castro is concerned that the relaxed tensions between the U.S. and the USSR exposed Cuba to actions by the U.S. which would not be seriously challenged by Khrushchev.

3. Rusk stated that he felt that the threat was not immediate.

4. McCone contributed the SNIE³ which was read carefully and all agreed with the conclusions.

5. There was some discussion in which there was complete agreement on the obvious necessity for continued overflights. Rusk stated that we cannot negotiate with Castro—this was out of the question. Castro will attempt to bring the issue to the Security Council or the General Assembly. He will receive considerable sympathy but he will not receive an affirmative vote in the Security Council and he could not get the two-thirds majority necessary to place the subject before the General Assembly.

6. Our tactic will be to throw the issue into the OAS, thus keeping it out of the UN and depending upon the October, 1962 resolution which calls for continuing aerial surveillance in the absence of on-site inspection. Rusk did not expect a blessing from the UN or the world at large, but he does not expect an adverse vote in any form.

7. The question arose as to reopening the UN offer for on-site inspection. McCone stated that much would depend on how this inspection was carried out. UN inspection has not been very satisfactory and that probably (though not assuredly) aerial photography would be necessary to complement on-site inspection.

8. Rusk said that their attorneys felt that if the issue was brought to the World Court, our case would not be good, however they could confuse it by concurrently putting forth a great many counter claims against Cuba such as ceding property, etc., etc.

9. I then turned to a discussion of the alternatives as covered in pages 4 through 7. I added a point made at USIB that a shootdown of a drone would not create an incident exactly paralleling the shootdown of a U–2 and also put forward the idea of drones. Also in the discussion I noted State Departmentʼs reservations, but not their dissent at USIB, on the question of the intensity of the overflight program.

10. My final recommendation was that the U–2 flights should be continued, the use of ECMʼs should be carefully considered and in the final analysis the compromise of ECM equipment was up to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Alternate means of aerial photography were not satisfactory; alternate intelligence assets would not suffice our needs; we could expect a continuing flow of human resource information concerning “missiles in Cuba”, which must be checked out.

11. There was no disagreement with these recommendations.

12. The President then joined the meeting.

13. Rusk reviewed the discussions accurately, except in interpreting the SNIE he indicated to the President the Board was not concerned about the immediacy of an incident. I stated the Board could not be sure about this.

14. After some discussion, and inviting any dissents, the President decided that:

a. We should continue the U–2ʼs overflights on the basis of two to three a week as determined by USIB;

b. He favored use of the ECM; he instructed McNamara and the Chiefs to review the subject on Monday;⁴ he felt the JCSʼ arguments were probably not valid and he wished them studied in the light of the morning discussion.

c. He called a meeting for 12:00 oʼclock noon Tuesday to make a final decision on the use of ECM equipment.

15. During the meeting there was considerable discussion of the use of the Oxcart. I stated that it was my opinion (though I had not checked it out with our operators) that it could be used in a matter of weeks at about 2.2 Mach, 75,000 feet and several months later at 3.2 Mach and 85,000 or 90,000 feet, that its presence would be known because it would appear on the radar and the sonic boom would be audible, it would be more disturbing to people in Cuba than U–2ʼs because they could not see the U–2 but they would hear the Oxcart, that because of the absence of the Tall King search radar I felt the SAMs with their Fan Song would not be effective on the U–2 because of their short reaction time. I pointed out the use of the Oxcart would compromise it as a reconnaissance vehicle. No decision was reached.

16. McNamara stated that if ECM equipment was used, he felt there would be a 95% or more possibility that the first U–2 that was attacked would survive and come home. He pointed and, and I confirmed, that this would create a new situation as it would demonstrate Castroʼs true intentions which were now only a matter of conjecture. McNamara asked that the Contingency Plan be amended to discuss courses of action under such a situation.

17. McNamara then stated that while he does not agree with the Joint Chiefs on the seriousness of the compromise of ECM equipment, he is against using it now, suggests it be kept in readiness, and the question be reviewed from week to week.

18. The actions are as follows:

a. Study the operational capabilities of the Oxcart.

b. Study the vulnerability of the Oxcart.

Note: Both of the above to be discussed with JCS Monday afternoon in preparation for Tuesdayʼs meeting.

c. Develop in detail the Agency position on ECM which varies from the SAG-JCS position.

d. Prepare to supply CIA planes equipped with ECM on short notice until the SAC planes are fully modified.

Note: In this discussion McNamara stated that ECM equipment similar to Systems 13–15 was aboard the Powersʼ plane and therefore known to the Soviets.

Action: I would like this explored because this question did not arise in the Powersʼ Hearings.⁵ I was very much surprised to hear that Powers had ECM equipment aboard and raised the question in my mind as to why he did not turn it on when he had received the warning. Also I raised the question as to why this matter, if true, was not brought out in the very extensive Hearings with Powers upon his return.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 4. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary the President joined the meeting in progress in the Cabinet Room at 10:40 a.m. (Johnson Library)
2. Attached but not printed, this memorandum noted that there were continuing reports of offensive missiles in Cuba and that most of these reports had been disproved through the examination of concurrent photography. It noted that the vulnerable U–2 aircraft could be made less so if electronic countermeasures (ECM) were used, but that the “continued use of ECM would, in the opinion of experts, permit the early development of counter countermeasures and hence the value of the ECM equipment would rapidly deteriorate.” Peripheral photographic reconnaissance “will not provide needed intelligence.” The USIB stated that drones “would produce useful photography though not as good as the U–2,” but that they were “vulnerable, more so than the U–2.” The new CIA-developed high-altitude, high-speed Oxcart reconnaissance aircraft, later known as the SR–71 Blackbird, would “not be operational at the design speed of 3.2 Mach and 85,000 to 90,000 feet for another few months.” The CORONA satellite system was judged to be “not sufficient to give us useful photography.”
3. Document 264.
4. May 4.
5. Francis Gary Powersʼ U–2 aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. After his release from captivity by the Soviets, he spoke about the U–2 incident at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 6, 1962.