Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

261. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 22, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
• David Henry, Deputy Director, SOV

After a discussion of the other subjects the Secretary raised the matter of Cuba. He said that the United States had hoped the Western Hemisphere could be protected against aggression from Cuba either by the original US–USSR agreement of October 1962 for ground inspection, which the USSR had been unable to persuade Castro to accept, or by the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America which would offer sufficient protection if it could contain some provision for following up on indications of violation. Unfortunately, neither of these had worked out. The basic point he wished to make to the Ambassador was that the United States has no desire to inflame the situation further. The United States overflights are as discreet as possible, but it is essential for the United States to maintain them so that we can tell our people and those of the other Hemisphere nations that there is no danger from Cuba. The overflights are also related to Castroʼs activities in the Hemisphere. Gromyko had said that these activities were more talk than action; but the United States has indications of actual Cuban subversive action in, for example, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and most recently in Guatemala. The Secretary emphasized that he was mentioning these matters out of a desire to avoid a major crisis with Cuba. He hoped that the Soviet Government will caution Castro not to inflame the situation into a major crisis. The United States is not attempting to stir up a crisis over Cuba and he hoped Castro is in the same mood. He also hoped that some progress could be made toward a nuclear free zone in Latin America. He had the impression that the USSR would favor such a zone but that Castro opposed it.

The Ambassador in reply said that he would be frank. How could one convince a small country that it should allow the airplanes of a big country to overfly it? What self-respecting country could accept a note stating that overflights would continue? How can the United States have any right to overfly Cuba? The OAS has excluded Cuba, so how can the United States retain any rights from the OAS system and agreements? Cuba could not be a serious threat to the United States or the Western Hemisphere.

The Secretary replied that Castro knew he could live at peace with the other nations of the Hemisphere if he so desired, but on the contrary he had declared war against his neighbors. Therefore we must keep watch to assure against aggression. Cuba had mounted a real threat in Venezuela, and Guatemala, and was also involved in Panama. The basic point was that Castro was not trying to find a way to live at peace with his neighbors, but, the Secretary repeated, the United States is not looking for trouble over this issue.

In response to a question from Dobrynin the Secretary reminded him that the USSR had agreed to ground inspection of the missile sites in Cuba in October 1962. He added that the United States had been interested in a nuclear free zone in Latin America because such a zone would go far to meet the inspection problem. In response to a question the Secretary confirmed that the United States and other Western Hemisphere nations are still interested in the possibility of a nuclear free zone which would include all except the United States.

Dobrynin raised the question as to why Cuba had suddenly received so much attention during the last few days. There followed an exchange on this subject in which the Secretary emphasized the celebration in Cuba of the anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion while Dobrynin implied that the United States had itself generated the recent attention to Cuba.

Dobrynin then repeated that any self-respecting government would react against overflights of its territory and said the USSR could not support with Castro such a position (i.e., to urge him to accept the overflights).

The Secretary concluded the conversation by reiterating that Castro had an opportunity to live at peace with his neighbors but was not interested and that the United States wants no further crisis over “this wretched little man” and he trusted the USSR felt the same way.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretaryʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, April 1964. Confidential. Drafted by the Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs, David Henry on April 22 and approved in S on May 2. The meeting took place in the Secretaryʼs Office. The memorandum is part III of III; parts I and II concerned the site of the new Soviet Embassy building and Laos. (Ibid.)