Office of the Historian

232. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 07, 1974, 12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador David Ormsby Gore, British Embassy
  • The Under Secretary

I spoke this morning with Ambassador Ormsby Gore regarding the seizure of the Cuban shipping boats and the cutting off of the water supply at Guantanamo. I explained that the circumstances under which the boats invaded our territorial waters raised questions as to Cuban purposes. I pointed out that we might be at the outset of a deliberate Cuban policy of trying to drive us either into a dialogue or out of Guantanamo. I pointed out the possible relevance of Castroʼs trip to Russia and the pending problems in Panama.

I told the Ambassador that American public opinion was aroused and that Americans would be more than ever sensitive to actions by our friends that appeared to be assisting the Cubans—such as the British bus deal. I pointed out that Britain was being held responsible for breaking the line and that the French truck deal announced today appeared to the American public as a predictable result of the British action.

I explained that the imposition of economic sanctions against Cuba was the only weapon short of an act of war that could make the support of Castroʼs Cuba more costly to the Soviet Union, while at the same time creating conditions of economic stringency that might ultimately bring about the elimination of the Communist regime. It was very difficult for the American people to accept a situation in which their friends appeared to be frustrating such a possibility.

The Ambassador indicated that he was quite aware of our feelings on this matter. He said that, if the issue over Guantanamo should become tense, it might be possible—and he was speaking only for him-self—that his Government could do something to stop the delivery of the buses. He would certainly take it up with his Government promptly.

He said that he had already warned the Prime Minister to be prepared for a full discussion of the matter next week, and he hoped that clarification might come out of that discussion.2

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–4 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Ball on February 7 and approved in U the same day.↩
  2. Document 241.↩