Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

• British Side
  • Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
  • R. A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, The Foreign Office
  • Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
  • Sir Timothy Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
  • Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
• U.S. Side
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain
  • McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON
  • Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA

The President asked the Secretary to speak about sanctions on Cuba. He said that he had gone into the matter thoroughly with the Prime Minister in the morning,² and that the Prime Minister was willing to help, but had problems of his own. The President emphasized that we understand the British position, and have our own problems in the situation.

The Secretary opened by saying that trade within the Western Hemisphere with Cuba is now down to a rather low level, and includes no industrial trade, primarily because the hemisphere is concerned over Castro subversion efforts. We want measures to make the industrial situation in Cuba grind to a halt. There has been a 60% reduction in free-world shipping to Cuba, but it is still very substantial. We are also concerned over means of transportation, electrical equipment, spare parts and mining equipment. There was a little discussion of the number of British ships in the trade, with general agreement that about one-third of free-world ships in the trade are British.³

The Secretary said that the matter of trade with Cuba had been discussed with the Japanese, who are buying some 300,000 tons of sugar from Cuba, but who are in return sending drugs and textiles, and as little electrical or industrial equipment as possible.

The Secretary went on to say this was not simply a trade matter but one of security of the hemisphere. He said the overflights are continuing, the SAMs are increasingly under Cuban control, arms are being shipped to Venezuela, and the US people can hit the government on a very touchy nerve. This can erode the strength of support in the US for the NATO relationship. Cuba and Peiping are both of such a nature that they can have this effect on American opinion. We believe that our NATO allies need to see this matter as a security problem. In general, our cooperation has been good. Trade control must be economic or it does not work. We have taken every step possible short of war, and we have applied pressure of all kinds. If additional steps are required, the only ones possible are likely to be acts of violence. We do not wish to think about this until we have explored all non-violent means.

The Prime Minister said he fully understood the political problems Cuba presented for the US. The British have tried to use economic sanctions in the past, and feel that they do not work. The British are not giving credit outside ordinary commercial coverage. The UK lives by trade and if the UK refused such transactions as the bus deal, the French would immediately take the business. If the government went to the House of Commons with a proposal to support the kind of measures the US is using, there would be severe criticism of the US and of the government for giving in to US opinion. If British firms trading with Cuba are in danger in terms of their US contacts, this is another matter, but government policy must be clear. Some ships are British by flag, but the owners live somewhere else, and are mostly Greek. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would get at the ship owners again, but as a government it could not cut off trade. Mr. Butler added that the government would take another look at the credit matter.

The Secretary suggested the British might wish to look at their own attitude toward Venezuela, Mexico and other free countries in the vicinity of Cuba which are seriously concerned over Castro subversion. Perhaps the British could tell the Cubans that they could give government guarantees on exports only as long as Cuba is not injuring its neighbors who have good relations with the UK.

The Prime Minister said of course he realized the Cubans were up to various kinds of monkey business in Latin America but the Russians were up to monkey business throughout the world. He wondered if the US really thought that it was going to bring down Castro by economic pressure. Wouldnʼt he be more likely to tighten his belt and bear up heroically as a national leader. The Secretary responded by saying that if the Cuban economy was a shambles, Castro would not spend as much on ventures outside of Cuba. If Castro is not going to go away, and is to remain as a real threat, policies have to be devised to deal with this eventuality.

Mr. Bundy said that we did not engage in economic warfare with the Soviet Union. We sell wheat to the Soviet Union, which is of marginal importance to that large economy. The Cuban economy however is in bad shape, and will not last forever in terms of the internal stresses. We canʼt very well say that we know it wonʼt work, even though making it work is difficult.

Mr. Butler said that British trade is very small, having fallen from an annual average of about £12 million to about £1.9 million. Mr. Bundy wondered if we could talk about things which are in specific short supply in Cuba.

The Secretary said that the people on the UK side should know that it is not Castroʼs beard, or his organization of Cuba, that we object to. What we do object to, and what are not negotiable, are (a) the military connection with Moscow and (b) the interference in the hemisphere. If Castro realizes this, and accepts it, he can perfectly well negotiate his way back into the hemisphere. The Prime Minister wondered if there was any possibility of Castro approaching the US to talk about it. The Secretary said there were once three schools of thought in Cuba, one favoring Moscow, one favoring Peiping and one Titoist. He said he had seen no significant evidence of an effort to rejoin the hemisphere. Ambassador Ormsby Gore wondered if the Titoist policy would be consistent with membership in the hemisphere. The Secretary said that a Titoist policy, meaning Tito at his best, would open up a different situation, but this might take some time.

The Prime Minister said the whole thing was extremely difficult. He said that his government might talk to firms, might indicate that they could lose US business. He promised further to watch the situation on credits, and he noted that export guarantees are a type of insurance. Mr. Bundy said they were about the same as we give on Soviet wheat sales. The Secretary wondered if British firms would trade without credit, and the Prime Minister said they would if Cuba paid cash. The President inquired concerning the trend of British trade with Cuba. Mr. Butler said that it had fallen to £1.9 million in 1963, but he conceded that it was now going up. He observed that US trade in 1963 was about £12 million. He wondered what accounted for this size. The Secretary said the biggest item was food and drugs connected with the prisoner exchange. Trade also included payment for water, and the wages of Cubans working at Guantanamo, and both of these were not being reduced. The Prime Minister returned to the problem of Castroʼs status in Cuba, wondering if Castro could be repudiated by the people. Mr. Bundy said the regime was not responsible to the people, but the ruling group might split, and control by other elements might be possible.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretaryʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, February, 1964. Secret. The memorandum is part I of VI. Drafted by Armstrong on February 12 and approved in the White House on February 24 and in S on February 27. Douglas-Home made an official visit to Washington February 12–13 and met with the President both days.
2. Secretary Rusk met with Douglas-Home at the White House at 11 a.m. that morning. (Ibid.)
3. According to a January 24 memorandum of conversation among Rusk, Ball, and the British Ambassador, Ball said that “he felt it was necessary for the British to know that rightly or wrongly their sale of buses to Cuba was regarded in the United States as interference with a well-advertised U.S. policy.” Rusk added that “It should be remembered that Bristol was also discussing a $37 million contract with the United States. Companies were not going to trade both with the United States and Cuba.” (Ibid., January, 1964)