Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

14. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, August 29, 1964, 11 a.m.

221. For Crockett, ARA. Deptel 125.²

1. I welcome idea of approach to Balaguer and Bosch but believe we would be on sounder ground in talking with them if we avoided taking as open a position on elections as suggested in para 2 reftel. Other points re importance stabilization program and disinterested nature our help could well be made.

2. For one thing I believe it is asking too much to expect them, especially Balaguer, to agree that conditions for elections or “return to constitutionality” do not exist. Both men, along with certain other politicians, have been insisting that political “solution” is sine qua non for any successful economic stabilization program, that financial crisis is essentially fault of present regime, and that changing government is first order of business. Although he seems unlikely to return under present conditions, Bosch was after all the elected President and is not likely accept argument of this type which he would regard as action our part to protect regime which overthrew him. To the extent that underprivileged Dominicans have active political interests now, he may still be the most popular figure.

3. As for Balaguer, he probably believes conditions are ripening for him. He may be right. Embassy continues believe him a divisive force here due past association with Trujillo and his record of submissiveness to military and of economic demagogy (his policies contributed greatly to present fiscal problems); but we must bear in mind that, like him or not, we may have him to deal with again one day. His appeal is considerably broader than merely to Trujillistas, and extends into agricultural, business, labor, and military elements. Presumed intent of reactionary military group, if it were able carry out coup so much discussed here during recent days, would be to take over govt and then piously proclaim early elections in confidence Balaguer would win. Against this background it does not seem likely to me Balaguer would agree with alacrity to suggestion on our part that he postpone indefinitely what he must regard as good prospects.

4. Given attachment of DOM Rep, along with other countries of this Hemisphere to ideal of elections and constitutional govt, US should in my opinion avoid bad posture of being on public record as opposed to elections. Conversations in that vein with countryʼs two leading public figures, each with his own interests to further, would be public knowledge in short order. On other side of coin I find it equally disadvantageous to make implied commitment to either of these two that at some point we will help them return to country to participate in elections. Our present formula that US of course favors return to constitutional govt in DOM Rep but consider Dominicans themselves must make decision re type and timing of elections, I believe, serves our interests about as well as any we might devise. It preserves our flexibility and does not tie us to any one individual or solution. It is in the nature of the environment of a country like this one that we cannot escape being charged by the outs as favoring the ins, going on record re postponing elections would confirm what is now only an allegation.

5. Nor do I believe we will meet with any great success in ensuring publication and broadcast rights within DOM Rep for the two Bʼs, as suggested in para 4 reftel. I frankly do not think Bonillaʼs assurances in this regard are worth much—nor would any I might get from Reid be any more enforceable. Latter is thin-skinned and often tends regard legitimate difference of opinion with his proposals as base political machinations against him personally. He would see sedition much more quickly than we. In short, we could not deliver to Balaguer and Bosch with respect handling given within this country to their expressions of opinion, and I recommend we not get involved beyond stating our continued support of freedom of expression here.

6. A further point on which we should be careful in my opinion is the extent of our commitment to Reid. We should avoid overcommitting US to him. We should have no illusion that Reid is now a popular political figure. He is not. A principal reason for his survival this past week was not so much positive support for him and his policies as fear on the part of responsible elements over what would take his place. While he has thus far shown considerable responsibility as regards stabilization program, his administration of govt remains erratic and marked by actions which often alienate very elements who should and would like to support him. As reported before, there is instability in his make-up and he is strong-willed. Circumstances could lead him to take authoritarian turn if he considered he had carte blanche from us and full control over local military, many of whom think in such terms anyway (it is my opinion that, while he has thus far done adept job in balancing military, diverse ambitions this group make it an uncertain element and Reid is perhaps inclined to overestimate his mastery of them). There could well be actions and decision with which we would not want to be identified. We are giving and should continue to give Reid support to extent he deserves it, but I believe we shall get better results through keeping him on fairly short rein and not tieing ourselves to him irrevocably.

7. Agitation for some action on political problem is rising again. While apathy and distrust of politicians may rule countryside, political, press, and other elements including some in military are beginning to heat up electoral issue. We can expect more of it as September 25 anniversary of coup approaches. We are already being reminded by some that US recognition of triumvirate was based on promise of election schedule to begin this fall. Next crisis here may well revolve around the electoral issue. Agitation is not so much for actual elections as for the setting of a date for them. We may find it in our interest before much longer to add our voice to those who are urging that at least a date be set.

8. For all these reasons I believe approach to Balaguer and Bosch, which I heartily support, should be based on very legitimate grounds of their abuse of US hospitality through their indulging in political activity from US territory. It has long been accepted among Latin Americans that political exiles do not engage in home politics from their place of exile. Current agitation in Brazil over Goulartʼs activities in Uruguay is a case in point; and Mexico would not sit idly by if anti-govt broadcasts were beamed from Laredo or El Paso. However, rather than have approaches made by political level of Dept—with all that local rumor mill here would make of them—it would seem preferable to have matter raised by Justice Dept officials or Dept security officers and treated as straight violation of US hospitality. If latter not considered feasible, then I would still favor restricted approach along above lines by political officers in order put some restraint on Balaguer and Bosch.

9. It seems to me we have strong case here in making clear we cannot condone activities from US soil which involve us in internal Dominican politics. To the extent that we take position with them as regards elections, then it appears to me we involve ourselves in precisely what we wish to avoid.

Bennett

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. I, 6/64–4/65. Secret; Limdis.
2. Document 11.