Office of the Historian

13. Telegram From the Joint Army/Navy/Air Force Attachés to the Chief of Naval Operations (McDonald)1

Santo Domingo, August 26, 1964, 1455Z.

Joint msg C–40. Appraisal Current Political/Military Situation.

1.
In view Emb [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reporting of current widespread rumors of attempt overthrow of government by army San Cristobal group, believe a run-down of military attitudes may be helpful.
A.
Rumors that San Cristobal group interprets current strike as excuse overthrow triumvirate and install military junta being generally discussed in all military circles as well as by people on the street. Carbuccia, Air Force Chief, states group nothing more than debating society and should mind its own business; Wessin of training center states he would like San Cristobal group make move as excuse to eliminate them once and for all; Rivera of Navy states he will move two destroyers into position to bombard army camp if they get out of hand; Peguero, Police Chief, disdains the probability coup effort. Point is, rumors, whether or not based on fact, have caused split in armed forces unity—a very effective Communist or oppositionist maneuver.
B.
Attachés maintain belief that rumors are just that, and there is no group within army, or military, planning or plotting overthrow of government. San Cristobal group openly discussing requirement for Reid announce schedule of elections on ground that such action would ease political pressure now on triumvirate. Group strongly Balaguerista and are convinced when elections held Balaguer can win. Unquestionably other factions within armed forces, other than San Cristobal group, are restless and discontented, principally amongst junior officers of all services. Discontent stems from unfair promotion policies, disgust with graft and incompetence of senior officers, and pressures exerted by politicians. Attachés do not, however, find any cohesion among factions, nor any single group, including San Cristobal group, having sufficient strength undertake golpe on its own.
C.
Current strike, rumors, and public discontent unquestionably making military restless. For moment attachés see no sign change of military attitude towards Reid and believe they will follow him through current crisis. San Cristobal group views towards elections, however, may catch on. With the remainder of the military and coupled with the already existing pressures for elections from the politicians, become a serious issue that Reid will have to face and resolve.
2.
Fld coord: Amb. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. I, 6/64–4/65. Confidential. Also sent to CSAF, DA, USAFLDACTYGP FTBELVOIR, and DIA and repeated to the Department of State, CINCLANTFLT, CG FMFLANT, COMUSAFSO, OSD/ISA WASHDC, COMCARIBSEAFRON, USCINCSO, CG ANTCOMD USARSOUTH, and COMUSMILGP DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Printed from the copy sent by the JCS to the White House. A handwritten notation by Gordon Chase on the first page of the telegram reads: “Mr. Bundy, State expert on Dominican Republic agrees with this assessment. He feels that odds are 2 or 3 to 1 against coup during next few months. GC.”↩