Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

217. Telegram From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch, in Texas¹

Washington, November 26, 1966, 1631Z.

CAP 661063. For the President from Secretary Rusk.

1. As you know, Chiang Kai-shek has formally told us that he would withdraw immediately from the UN if the Italian draft study committee resolution passed. The vote on this may come as early as Monday night, so that any further action we take must be done at once.

2. We gave Ambassador McConaughy all the arguments, and he has laid them out brilliantly to the Gimo, but without apparently budging him. McConaughy has also been hitting every senior Chinese official he can reach. Finally, I have enlisted Walter Judd to write a personal message to the Gimo. However, it seems to me clear that the matter requires a personal message by you, in view of the disastrous effect of such a withdrawal and the very important impact that your personal intervention might have.

3. I have therefore drafted a fairly short and fundamental letter for your approval.² It stresses particularly holding off on any action until I can visit Taipei on my forthcoming trip, probably between December 5 and December 7 (well after the UN vote).

4. At same time, I have prepared a longer message from myself to the Chinese Foreign Minister in New York. It is designed to supplement your letter by repeating the more technical arguments. If, however, upon seeing the two messages together, you thought it desirable to transfer some or all of the arguments in the second draft letter to your own letter, this could readily be done.

5. I hope that you can give me your reaction so as to permit dispatch of both letters as soon as possible. This would permit the Gimo to reflect before his final decision—which as of now appears to be for withdrawal.

Attachment

1. Please deliver urgently to President Chiang following message from President Johnson:

2. “Dear Mr. President: Ambassador McConaughy has given me a full report on his recent conversation with you about our common problem in the United Nations. I appreciate your courtesy in explaining to him so fully the Republic of China’s position on the question of a General Assembly resolution calling for a study committee to consider the question of Chinese representation. In candor I must say that I was profoundly concerned to learn that your government is considering withdrawal from the United Nations should the General Assembly pass the Italian-sponsored resolution now before it. We cannot at this point predict whether the resolution will pass. But, even if it should, your withdrawal from the United Nations would in my opinion be a tragedy for both our countries. Its consequences would be far-reaching and fraught with dangers, not only for China but for the free world position in Asia.

3. “I have asked Secretary of State Rusk to make himself ready to visit Taipei to consult with you about problems of mutual concern, including especially the situation in the United Nations, when he is in Asia early next month. I hope you will be able to receive him at that time and that you will defer any final decision involving an irrevocable step on your part until you and he have had an opportunity to review the situation fully. Secretary Rusk will be prepared to go over with you in fullest detail the entire background of this matter, including our strenuous efforts over the years to maintain support in the United Nations for our traditional position on Chinese representation.

4. “I am writing you in these frank terms because of the high value I attach to your friendship and because the Republic of China is one of the United States closest and most trusted allies. Continuing close cooperation between our governments is vital to freedom’s cause in Asia; and, in the struggle for freedom, political actions are often as important as those fought on the field of battle. Your standing in history as one of the great leaders of the Chinese people, already secure, will gain added luster by your indomitable defense of your country’s rights in the United Nations. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson.”

Please deliver following personal letter to GRC Foreign Minister:

Begin text

Dear Mr. Minister:

1. As you undoubtedly know, Ambassador McConaughy has talked at length with your President about the position of your government in connection with the Italian resolution for a study committee. Although this conversation covered most of the critical matters, I am sending you this personal letter to underscore certain points. At the same time, President Johnson is sending a personal and separate letter to your President.

2. First of all, let me assure you again that the United States decision to vote for a non-prejudicial study committee resolution was taken only after the most careful and thoroughgoing deliberation. As you know, we have maintained closest consultations with the GRC in Taipei, Washington and New York from the time earlier in the year when I and other officials discussed with your government the danger which might develop at the UNGA this autumn and the possible need for new tactics. We have had only one objective in view: to preserve the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations.

3. In early November, Canada, without prior consultation and despite our strongest protests, told us that it would introduce a resolution with “one-China-one-Taiwan” overtones and calling for the seating of Peiping in the Security Council. The situation in the General Assembly was made even more perilous by the restiveness on the question shown by Italy, Belgium and Chile. In this sudden emergency we had no choice but to fall back on the tactic of a study committee in an effort to head off Canada’s dangerous initiative, which if unchecked could have lost us their support and the support of others on the important question and against the Albanian resolution. This step has now succeeded in forestalling the threatened Canadian move. I hope that it will also enable us to achieve a better vote than last year on the important question resolution and against the Albanian resolution.

4. I am sure you understand that in taking this step the United States is in no way altering its policy of firm support of the Republic of China. We remain determined to oppose with the full strength and influence of the United States all attempts to expel the Republic of China from the United Nations and to seat the Communists.

5. We have a close treaty bond with the Republic of China which is a solemn obligation. China and the United States have a history of particularly close friendship and alliance extending over many years. The cooperation and collaboration between us has had many remarkable accomplishments and successes and I am sure there will be many more. In view of this long and intimate association between our countries, I am confident that our position in this matter enjoys your understanding and that of your President.

6. Your President has suggested to Ambassador McConaughy that it might still be possible for the United States to maneuver to defeat the Italian resolution. We have told several governments who have asked us that we would not object if they were to vote against it. We have not urged any government to vote for it. As I told you last week, the United States would in fact be content if the Italian proposal were to fail, and we entirely understand your government’s efforts to defeat it. We cannot go beyond this because our vote for the Italian resolution was the price we had to pay for critically needed support on the important question and Albanian resolutions.

7. In talking to Ambassador McConaughy, your President observed that to the public the study committee resolution appears tantamount to a two-Chinas formula. This is not, however, the view of the United States. Our representatives have exerted themselves with success to assure that no language is incorporated in the study committee resolution which prejudges the outcome of the study. The resolution’s operative paragraph stipulates that the committee’s findings be “in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter.” This stipulation in our view was essential as a safeguard of the GRC position. There is moreover no means of foretelling at this time whether the committee will in fact ultimately arrive at any agreed conclusions; nor, if reached, what those conclusions might be; nor what action the General Assembly might take on them. Why leave the field of battle and thus precipitate the very situation we both have striven so long and successfully to prevent when the outcome has yet to be determined? This is the time to stay and fight and not withdraw.

8. There is one point your President made to Ambassador McCon-aughy which I want particularly to mention. This is the suggestion that the United States could still find means to prevent the Chinese Communists from entering the United Nations even if the Republic of China were to withdraw. If you should withdraw, we believe the voting situation would change drastically and that Peiping would be seated. Your withdrawal from the United Nations would bring about exactly what the supporters of the Albanian resolution desire.

9. Representatives from Communist China could with relative ease appear in the General Assembly and ask that their credentials be accepted as the only representatives from China. If you had withdrawn from the UN, it seems to us a foregone conclusion that the Assembly would accept such credentials. As to the Security Council, I reaffirmed our position to your President in 1964. That position stands. However, the Security Council would have to act independently on credentials of any representative seeking accreditation there. If your representatives had left the UN, there would be an overwhelming sentiment to accept representatives from Peiping, and the possibility of a veto would be far less relevant than in case of a contest between competing representatives, and indeed would in all probability no longer exist.

10. I believe the consequences of a withdrawal from the United Nations by the Republic of China would be extremely serious for both our countries. By opening the United Nations door to Peiping, the Communists would be given an important victory at no cost to themselves—and at a time when the Communist forces on the mainland of China are in deep disarray. The encouragement this victory would give to the Communists could have incalculable consequences for the struggle for freedom we are now waging in Viet-nam. It would deal a blow to the effectiveness of the United Nations, and it would make more difficult the position of our countries’ friends and allies in Asia.

11. Another consequence, which I consider just as serious, is the irreparable damage that withdrawal from the United Nations would do to the world position of your own government, which for the achievement of its policies must have international understanding and support. GRC withdrawal would confuse the Republic of China’s friends abroad and hearten its enemies. This step would come at a moment when the US particularly needs GRC cooperation in the difficult UN situation and would be regarded as a reverse to our common cause.

12. Finally, I would like to leave this thought with you. Communist China’s aim is to get the Republic of China out of the UN by one means or other, and establish itself in the UN and in the eyes of the world as the only legitimate government of China. So long as you remain in the UN, as they have repeated again only Thursday, the Communist Chinese will not accept membership. Your presence in the UN, in effect, is the surest guarantee against a Communist China presence.

Sincerely yours,

End text.

Dean Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Secret.
2. A note from Bromley Smith to Rostow, attached to the source text, states that the President cleared the short version of the letter to Chiang and that the Rusk message to the Foreign Minister was also sent.