Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

216. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 25, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin: ChiRep

PARTICIPANTS

• US Side
  • The Secretary
  • Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Dep.
  • Asst. Sec., EUR
• Canadian Side
  • Foreign Minister Martin
  • Yvon Beaulne, Minister

Referring to the Canadian proposal on Chinese representation, the Secretary said he had one action recommendation to make to the Foreign Minister. The Secretary noted that some of our Allies in the Far East who rely on us have the feeling that Canada would never have put forward its proposal without consultation and agreement with the United States. The Secretary hoped that Canadian Ambassadors in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand would make clear to their host governments that this was not the case. It was urgent that this should be done as soon as possible and before November 28, if feasible.

Martin said that Taiwan certainly knew the true situation on this matter since there had already been a discussion on the subject between Taiwan representatives and the Canadians. He would undertake to instruct other Canadian Ambassadors in the countries mentioned by the Secretary to clarify the situation to the host governments.

The Secretary said he had heard a news report that the question of Communist China’s entry into the Security Council might come up in January. He did not know exactly how this might arise; whether on an issue of credentials or otherwise, but in any case he wanted the Foreign Minister to know that we would vote against. We would expect that our vote in this sense would be considered as a veto; if not—if somehow the matter were considered as a procedural one—this would be intolerable for the United States. We will not be over-run on this issue. Martin said he did not see how Communist China could be considered for membership in the Security Council unless it were a member of the UN organization, but in any case he was sure that the US vote against would be regarded as a veto.

With regard to the Canadian proposal on ChiRep, Martin commented that he had told his people there were some things the Canadians had to do which Dean Rusk would not like, but nevertheless Rusk had never threatened him.

The Secretary said that Mr. Martin had to do what he considered necessary, but it was clear that the Canadian move on ChiRep had been made without the concurrence of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, Australia and even Communist China. No one went along with it.

Martin replied that the UK wanted the Canadians to go even further than they had gone. Nevertheless he was sure that what Canada had done was right and that the US would agree to this in due course.

The Secretary said that perhaps Martin had made his point with the Canadian press—The Toronto Globe—but internationally the move had not been accepted.

Martin replied that The Toronto Globe actually did not like the Canadian proposal on ChiRep, although its view on diplomatic recognition of China was another matter. In any event, he was sure that Canada had been right. He did not feel it was useful to pursue the discussion of this subject at this time, but perhaps at some later date they could talk with the Secretary about it when things had cooled off somewhat.

On another aspect of Chinese representation, Martin noted that the Indian Ambassador to the UN was convinced that there would be no progress concerning Communist China’s entry into the UN until Communist China and the United States started talking and worked out an arrangement. The UN could do nothing. The Secretary noted that we have done more talking directly with the Chinese Communists than any other member of the UN with the possible exception of the Soviet Union.

Commenting on his visit to Italy, Martin said that all of his discussions with Italian officials had been on Chinese representation. He had found Moro especially concerned to do nothing which would go counter to US views on the subject. Martin also had had a most interesting talk with Nenni. Nenni had said that he personally would like to go farther than the study resolution but he doubted the advisability of doing so, given the opposition of the United States. Nenni had noted that politics was the art of the possible and he advised against seeking more than the study resolution at this time.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in S on December 6. The source text is “Part 1 of 10 parts.” The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s dining room at the Department of State.