Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

218. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, November 28, 1966, 1130Z.

1568. ChiRep. Ref: State 91770 [91771].²

1. I had forty-five minute conversation with President Chiang at 11 this morning Nov 28 at his residence to deliver Pres Johnson’s letter contained reftel. DCM accompanied me, and as before only Mme Chiang, Acting FonMin Shen, and interpreter Frederick Ch’ien were present. Atmosphere was somewhat more relaxed than on my previous call Nov 23 (Taipei 1515).³

2. I made same introductory comments about the burden I knew Gimo was carrying, and hoped he had some relaxation over weekend. I said I appreciated his making time to see me on short notice. Gimo said he always took pleasure in seeing me and DCM Hummel.

3. I handed to Gimo original and copies of President Johnson’s letter, and interpreter gave immediate verbal rendering, Mme Chiang and Shen reading copies as translation proceeded. Gimo said he had listened carefully, and appreciated the letter.

4. I told Gimo that it seemed likely that Secy Rusk could come to Taipei on evening of Dec 6, staying all following day and leaving about noon Dec 8.

5. Gimo said that of course he welcomed Secretary’s visit. He said that insofar as UN problems were concerned, GRC still hoped Italian resolution might not pass and then GRC would need to take no action. The situation would of course be discussed with Secy Rusk. However, he said, he understood that voting in UN will take place this week and if Italian resolution passes, GRC cannot remain silent. The timing is very important. However, he said, referring to the letter from President Johnson, which he considered to be sincere and frank, he would bring the letter to the attention of officials of his govt so that they could consult further on the problem.

6. I asked if dates for Secy’s visit were convenient, and Gimo replied that they were.

7. Gimo said that the most important question to study now is how to defeat the Italian resolution. He said that once it has passed the GRC ”would have to make its position clear to the world.” He hoped this was understood by USG.

8. I replied that I understood what he had told me on this point in this conversation and in previous conversations.

9. Gimo said that of course before he took any action he would have to consult with officers of his govt. He said that he would inform the USG of his govt’s decision, would get USG reaction, and would continue consult with us.

10. I said I hoped we could keep in very close contact on this matter, and that I was available at any hour of day or night for any consultations.

11. Gimo repeated that the most important task is to defeat the Italian resolution. He said that he had studied the Secretary’s letter to FonMin Wei, and that although he fully understood that USG has adopted passive attitude, it is still most important that the resolution be defeated.

12. I said I wished to give a brief resume of recent developments relative to the pending UN resolutions. I said there had been full exchanges on this in Washington, New York, and elsewhere with GRC officials and with representatives of many countries. I said we had also told US Embassies to make it clear to other govts that we are not lobbying for, pushing, or soliciting votes for the resolution. Our representatives are also making it explicit that we would not object to or hold it against any country wishing to oppose the resolution.

13. I noted that our intention to vote affirmatively on Italian resolution was based on the commitment we were compelled to give in order to obtain the very crucial votes of certain countries that were wavering on the Albanian resolution. We are now bound to honor our word but Gimo could rest assured that our vote is not an enthusiastic one. We believe that our tactical decision has safeguarded from 6 to 8 votes which are essential in order to assure defeat of Albanian proposal. It could be seen that our move would have a successful result.

14. I said we had given careful and sympathetic consideration to the diplomatic note sent to us November 26 asking us not to vote for the Italian proposal.⁴ In view of commitment we have already made to other nations in order to assure defeat of the Albanian resolution, we cannot change our vote now. However, I was confident other nations understood our position and clearly realized we are not pressing any other country to vote for the Italian proposal.

15. Gimo asked if US position could be made clear to Japanese Govt. He said similar diplomatic note had also been sent to Japanese Embassy here requesting GOJ abstain. He said that what I had told him of US instructions should be made clear to GOJ and he made a direct request that we accomplish this.

16. I said I was sure that this had already been done, but would send a special message (see septel) asking that US position be explained once again to GOJ.⁵

17. Gimo expressed his thanks. He said that my approach today, the letter from President Johnson, and Secretary Rusk’s letter to FonMin Wei would all be discussed with GRC officials. He said that I would be informed of decision when it is reached.

18. I said we had carefully studied the voting prospects on all three resolutions, and that on the essential ones, which were the important question and the Albanian, we were confident of favorable outcome. We do not yet know, however, what will be the result of voting on Italian proposal. The position of many countries appeared uncertain, and we do not know whether it will be defeated or passed.

19 Gimo repeated that if USG were to support GRC in working on this, Italian resolution could be defeated. He said GRC is fully aware of the very important implications of the Italian resolution and would have to take a position based on GRC’s own interests, and also those of US, UN and allies. He said all these interests will be taken into account in GRC deliberations.

20. I said we had been thinking of contingency planning in the event that the Italian resolution were to pass and of appropriate action GRC might take to make its position clear. I said I would like to suggest in rough form some language GRC might wish to consider for use in a declaration in UN in that event, along following lines: “GRC has every confidence that any objective study of ChiRep must have the result of reaffirmation of the status of the GRC as the only qualified, lawful and representative Government of China. Therefore, GRC has nothing to fear from a study of the question, although it is unnecessary. However, in the event of any objectionable recommendation by the study committee, the GRC reserves its full rights to take any action it considers necessary and appropriate under the circumstances.” I said it was our belief that such a statement would be dignified, appropriate, and sufficient to safeguard GRC interests and prestige.

21. Gimo replied that my suggestion would be of value for GRC reference and discussion, but Chinese people would never understand if such a statement were made. However, he said, he would have to consult with other govt officials on this as well as other points.

22. I said I hoped the public would be enabled to understand the US position. I noted that Chinese press seems to be giving the erroneous impression that USG has been proceeding in the direction of a “two-Chinas” policy in the UN. This could be damaging to our joint interests if it should become widespread. I hoped the impression could be corrected.

23. Gimo assured me he would do what could be done to see that Chinese people understood and do not get wrong impression of US intentions. However, the Chinese people would not understand if GRC were to take any action that does not conform to its present foreign policies. He said he would carefully consider this matter. Alloted time for interview was clearly up at this point.

24. As we left Presidential residence, I told Acting FonMin Shen that I had a few additional points I wished to make and we adjourned to Shen’s office for further discussion.

25. I told Shen that I wished to reaffirm the contingency assurance given by Secretary Rusk in 1964 that USG intended veto any attempt at ChiCom admission to Security Council, if veto would be effective. However, if the GRC had already left the UN, our parliamentary position in trying to keep Chinese Communists out would be vastly more difficult. We have grave doubt that veto in the Security Council would be effective under those circumstances. Most Security Council members would probably think that in absence of GRC from UN, filling of vacant China seat would be purely procedural matter of credentials, and that veto would be inapplicable on those grounds. I told Shen GRC should not assume that it would be possible to keep ChiComs out of UN if GRC withdrew. We anticipated that once GRC left, ChiComs would have relatively easy sailing. If GRC stayed firmly in UN, however, chances of keeping ChiComs out would be very good. GRC should be under no delusion that walkout could be only a temporary maneuver. Both from the viewpoint of psychological effect on vote of countries that are already wavering, and in terms of parliamentary procedures open to the opposition, walkout would likely be final, however GRC intended.

26. I noted that recent ChiCom public statements reveal a somewhat softer position on conditions for ChiCom entry into UN. I referred to November 25 column in Peoples Daily, signed “Observer” which strongly attacked Canadian proposition but which omitted any reference to the preposterous conditions that ChiComs laid down last year as prerequisites to their entry into UN. This article also carefully avoided usual intemperate language which might alienate the uncommitted. It is possible that ChiComs are now actively interested in obtaining UN entry. In any event, it is evident to us that there would be great rejoicing in Peiping if GRC walked out. GRC should give most sober and skeptical consideration to any prospective course that would play into hands of ChiComs and harm US, UN, and allies.

27. I said it was our considered view that US security position in Southeast Asia could be seriously prejudiced by GRC walkout. I asked Shen to give this his solemn consideration. Chinese Communists would be emboldened by apparent success their tough stance, and might be tempted to intervene more openly in SEA. I reminded Shen that Gimo had assured Secretary Rusk on July 3 that GRC policy was first and foremost to give help to US position in Vietnam, ahead of any other GRC obligation. If GRC did not hold fast in UN, US position in Vietnam would be affected adversely. Secretary Rusk said in letter to FonMin Wei, GRC departure would confuse GRC’s friends and help its enemies. It would be interpreted as a grave setback for the US and allies, exposing allied position in Vietnam and undermining allied influence in UN.

28. I said that if GRC persisted in withdrawal move, it would almost seem that GRC was not interested in maintaining the traditional posture of a great national government, aware of its international ties and responsibilities. In self-imposed isolation from international life, GRC would have more the posture of a local regime of some kind. A GRC with no UN status would give impetus to the unfriendly argument in the UN that government here was acting as a local regime and should be considered as under the authority of Peiping. USG of course did not share such unwarranted opinion but its widespread existence in UN might make it difficult to uphold the juridical position of GRC.

29. I repeated my view expressed to Chang Chun on Nov. 26 that GRC could not really be humiliated by resolutely staying in UN and defending its principles. I said that abusive tactics of unworthy persons or nations cannot humilate those who are worthy. By remaining in UN, GRC status would by no means be demeaned, but rather would be enhanced by exhibition of GRC courage and resolve in standing up to contemptible efforts of its enemies.

30. Shen promised to convey all the foregoing representations to President immediately. He said would give final answer after further deliberations had been undertaken.

31. Shen then said with considerable asperity that the GRC had just about reached its limit in enduring insults at UN. He said GRC position in Security Council had been eroded, the GRC had been “kicked out of” Ecosoc, and with the departure of Wellington Koo for the first time there was no representative on the ICJ of a permanent member of SC. He said that most recently in course of tactical deliberation on Israel-Jordan situation, USG had not consulted GRC, that GRC was not included in any of consultative groups, and that the US officials “walked right by GRC representatives in UN lounge, without greeting or comment.” He said GRC is not in fact highly regarded by UN members or even by some US officials. However, calming down considerably, he said GRC would give all these US representations very serious consideration. He said he did not know how the decision would come out, but he thought it would be reached and would be conveyed to me in a very short time.

32. In closing the conversation I urged again that no final walkout decision if Italian resolution were to pass should be taken before Secretary Rusk’s visit.

33. Comment: Failure of Gimo and Shen to reiterate previous assertion that decision is final is of course hopeful sign. However, I believe crisis is far from over and it is entirely conceivable that Gimo has been somewhat stung by our references to rash and precipitous decision and is merely demonstrating to us the soberness with which GRC will consider all aspects of situation. It is also possible that representations made by me and by Embassy officers to substantial number of GRC figures may have resulted in some voices being raised against Gimo’s proposed course of action. If there have been such voices, however, they have probably not been very loud and Gimo clearly has capability to override them if he remains determined to walk out. GRC mind seems a little less closed today than yesterday but situation remains precarious.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 91771, November 26, transmitted the text of Johnson’s message to Chiang. Telegram 91770, November 26, sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei, transmitted the text of Rusk’s message to Wei. (Both ibid.) For texts of the messages, see Document 217.
3. Document 213.
4. Not found.
5. McConaughy sent this message in telegram 1565 from Taipei, November 28. Telegram 92145, November 28, conveyed the request to Tokyo, and telegram 3998 from Tokyo, November 29, reported that Ambassador Johnson had spoken to Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda, who stated that he would instruct the Japanese Ambassador in Taipei to make it clear to the GRC that the U.S. Government had never asked the Japanese Government to support the Italian resolution. (All in Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)