Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

95. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, October 25, 1966, 0940Z.

2237. Ref: State 69284.² US/ROK Discussions in Seoul: Korea in UN.

1. Our one really serious current disagreement with the Koreans concerns the handling of the Korean item in the UN. President Pak and his government feel that it is of vital importance to them in this election year to make a good showing in the UN without weakening their traditional formula. They are likely to raise this with the Secretary or possibly with the President in Seoul, and they probably will want to deal with it in the communique. For reasons given below, I think we should seriously consider raising it with them even if they do not take the initiative.

2. The problem is not only a disagreement on tactics to be employed in New York, but, more serious for US–ROK relations, it is a ROK conviction that the US is growing weary of this problem and is not pushing Korean interests as vigorously as the ROKs might reasonably expect from their most important ally. This feeling, which has recently reached a new peak, colors the ROK reaction to our every suggestion on tactics, leads to closed minds on their part with respect to our suggestions, and, unless we can restore Korean confidence in our understanding of their position and basic support for their objectives, can increasingly impair our overall relations.

3. To ROKG and Korean people, UN provides sanction of ROKG as only legal Government in Korean peninsula and basic framework within which ROKG functions as active member of international community. Voting pattern on Korean item is scrutinized by Korean press as measure of ROKG diplomatic efforts for entire year.

4. The Koreans feel passionately about the illegitimacy of the North Korean regime and have consistently refused to contemplate any direct contact with it. They interpret any action by US or others, particularly the UN, which tends to give any legitimacy to this regime, as a denigration of their own internationally established sovereignty. They have dug themselves in on a hard line of opposing any form of invitation to the North Koreans for discussions in New York, not only for the reasons just expressed, but because they feel that if they were in the North Korean’s shoes they would recognize that it would be internationally good tactics for the North Koreans to accept an invitation to express their views and they do not want to give them any opportunity to do so. They look at this question from a purely Korean viewpoint and tend to ignore the important problems and responsibilities which the US faces in the UN, of which the Korean items is only one. They tend also to underestimate the difficulties and risks involved for themselves in refusing to modify our tactics on this issue. If the choice is between a less favorable vote on the substantive resolution and any invitation to the North Koreans which might conceivably be accepted, the ROKs would choose the former.

5. This is a question of emotion, which has been growing deeper over time and is now dangerously strong. It is enhanced by our failure to oppose the separate inscription on the UN agenda of a Soviet item on Korea calling for withdrawal of US forces and dissolution of UNCURK. It fits into the pattern of ROK thinking that they should not have their fate determined by great power interests and they suspect that we are reluctant to support the position they advocate because of desire to reach a broader accommodation with the Soviet Union

6. The most recent manifestation of this attitude occurred when an Embassy officer attempted on October 22 to discuss the Department’s suggestions for GA tactics (reftel)³ with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Relations Bureau Director Pak Kun. The moment Pak perceived the direction of the Department’s thinking, he interrupted with a thirty minute emotional speech on the question of basic US unwillingness to support the Korean position, which precluded any rational discussion of the Department’s suggestions.

7. It would obviously be impossible and indeed undesirable to attempt to discuss strategy or tactics at the UN with the Koreans during the President’s visit. Nevertheless, the visit will provide an opportunity which it is important for us to seize, to try to re-convince the Koreans that the US does indeed share their objectives with respect to the Korean item in the UN, that suggestions for changes in tactics are put forward as a genuine effort to meet Korean objectives in the light of the realities of the situation, that we have not grown weary of the struggle to protect their fundamental interests, and to give the Koreans a better idea of some of the difficulties which could be presented for them by rigid adherence to a static formula in a changing UN situation.

8. If through personal talks with the Secretary in Seoul or perhaps even the President the old atmosphere of confidence and mutuality of interests on fundamentals could be reestablished, future discussions on tactics and strategy in the UN with the ROKs could be more fruitful, and a potentially serious source of discord between us could be avoided.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–4 KOR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok for the Secretary and Bundy and USUN.
2. Telegram 69284 to USUN, Seoul, and Moscow, October 19, discussed the Soviet attempt to debate the Korean item at the United Nations and to issue an invitation to North Korean representatives. (Ibid.)
3. The U.S. Embassy official was following the Department of State’s guidance suggesting that representatives from both Koreas be seated in the United Nations as long as North Korea “first unequivocally accepts competence and authority of UN, under Charter, to consider the Korean question.” At the same time, the United States would continue to urge its traditional position of supporting the UN presence in Korea. The Department also suggested approaches to North Korea by the United Nations and UNCURK as well as by the ROKG suggesting a unification conference. The United States expected all overtures to North Korea would be rejected, but believed its tactics would expose North Korean intransigence, which would quiet both the North Koreans and the Soviets.