96. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak1
President Park began by expressing his satisfaction at the Manila Conference and its various documents.2 He said the central problem was to get others to join in the Declaration. The grand objective must be to build on the principles of Manila a Pacific area community, including Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Republic of China, and Canada.
He urged President Johnson to take the initiative; but he added that first we must have success in Vietnam.
He turned then to the problem of the defense of Korea at the DMZ. He looks for no aggression from the North, but faces chronic problems and incidents. In response to President Johnson’s request for an example of incidents and incursions, he replied the North Koreans tended to create incidents at times when there are other events taking place in Asia; for example, at the time of negotiations in Japan there were student riots in Korea; before the Manila Conference; before President Johnson’s visit.3 He concluded that at the moment these incidents are an irritating factor, but not a serious danger. If fighting increases in Vietnam, there may be increased and more sustained pressure at the DMZ.
He then turned to the importance of keeping U.S. strength at its present level in Korea. The development by the Chicoms of nuclear weapons makes the U.S. force necessary as a credible deterrent. Foreign Minister Kishi of Japan said that if the U.S. began to withdraw from [Page 206] Korea, the Socialist movement would gain greatly in Japan. The size of the Korean armed forces is beyond the capacity of the Korean economy, but they must be given first priority.
As for the economy itself, there had been a high rate of growth in recent years, quite remarkable for a developing nation. The rate of inflation had decreased. They were placing great hope and faith in the next 5-year plan, in which they expected to raise per capita income to $200; reduce unemployment; move toward self-sufficiency and a decline in abnormal external assistance.
In particular they wished to encourage private capital to come to Korea. Korea was a place with a stable economy, and is prepared to welcome private capital.
These, he said, are his central priorities.
President Johnson said we share his view that the Manila Conference was a success. We had dispatched Ambassador Harriman to enlist the understanding and support of others. The most important achievement of Manila was that those closest to the danger were most concerned. The image had grown in the world—and in the United States—that we were the only ones concerned, and this was dangerous. After Manila, the multilateral nature of the concern and the course of action in South Vietnam would be better understood.
We all must not repeat the mistake of the 1930’s; but the local people must resist aggression seriously. This demonstration is critical in American political life.
There is no problem with Korea, which is putting up proportionately as much as the U.S. But there are relatively few troops from New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.
The President underlined that he had not come to Asia to raise troops, but that Park had struck at the heart of the problem in posting his questions. The longer we “dance away” from facing the problem, the greater will be our future difficulties. He (President Park) has an election in 1967; President Johnson, in 1968. Our people will support us if we are whole-hearted. The opposition will be greater if we appear half-hearted. The President noted a decline in the percentage of popular support for our Vietnam policy, and added: “We are not moving fast enough for our people.” We have all got problems in our countries at the level of headaches or a slight fever; but the place where there is a heart attack with a nation about to die is Vietnam. If aggression is not contained there, it will quickly spread over the whole area. Westmoreland says it can’t be contained without six to seven hundred thousand troops. If we had not present firepower and mobility, we would require many more. The measurement of requirements at the technology of five years ago is now out of date. What is relevant is the total power [Page 207] we can apply. In fact, because of new technology, we have greater strength everywhere we are committed than we did five years ago; for example, in Germany and Korea. Nevertheless, we shall need more men in Vietnam, and all of us must think how we can act promptly and decisively in Vietnam.
The Korean people should know that we have no plans to alter present strength here, although the effective power of our forces has sharply increased.
Summing up, President Johnson repeated his statement that we have no plans to alter our present strength in Korea, but added that future planners must look at effective strength and not numbers of men. The President added we should think of Westmoreland and how we would feel if we were in his position and asked help of the governments: what would we wish the governments to do?
President Park then asked Mr. Rostow to examine some of the economic problems of Korea while he is here.4 The President said that he would ask Mr. Rostow and Ambassador Brown, in whom he had unlimited confidence, to look into these matters. If Rostow and Brown didn’t know more about economic problems than he did, the Government was wasting a lot of money.
President Johnson said that, next to President Park, he was the man most interested in the future of Korea. It could not be otherwise. As long as Dean Rusk is Secretary of State, the President of the United States must be interested in Korea. Secretary Rusk had invested a good many years of his life here.
The President then noted that if they didn’t break up the meeting (being three-quarters of an hour late), Marvin Watson would throw a Molotov cocktail on the table. As the two Presidents walked to the door, President Johnson said that on military matters they were fully in agreement. On economic matters we would explore and see what we could do within limits on aid imposed by the United States Congress.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Asian Trip, Copies of Memos, etc. Secret. The memorandum indicates that the staffs of both Presidents were present.↩
- Documents from the Manila Conference are in Department of State Bulletin, November 14, 1966, pp. 730–735.↩
- Border incursions occurred during the early morning hours of November 2, while President Johnson was in Korea. In two separate incidents ROK and U.S. patrols encountered and engaged armed units from North Korea. One of those encounters resulted in the death of one South Korean and six U.S. soldiers and the wounding of several others. The attacks brought the number of border skirmishes occurring since October 15 to 29. (Telegram 2416 from Seoul, November 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–14 KOR) When investigating the matter, U.S. personnel in Korea confirmed that on October 26 ROK forces had initiated a raid against a North Korean outpost. (Telegram 2417 from Seoul, November 2; ibid.) On November 3 Brown expressed his disapproval of that action to the Korean Prime Minister as being against U.S. policy to uphold the armistice agreement and harmful to the prestige of the ROK in the UN and the court of public opinion. (Telegram 2441 from Seoul, November 3; ibid.) Brown reiterated that message in a conversation with the Prime Minister on November 17, when discussing ROK actions in the DMZ. (Telegram 2691 from Seoul, November 18; ibid.)↩
- Rostow met with Korean Minister of Finance Kim Hak-yol on November 1. Kim outlined areas in which Korea could assist Vietnam, such as by providing medical-service teams. He also stated that “if the United States could and would pay for them, Korea could also provide technicians in agricultural extension, textiles, and electronics.” Rostow suggested Korea could be very helpful in postwar planning and development. Kim also asked for U.S. support for Korea’s Second Five-year Plan and gave Rostow a summary proposal for the economic development of Korea that included projects requiring U.S. assistance and loans. (Memorandum of conversation, November 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea; Memorandum of conversation from Rostow to the President, November 3; ibid., Korea, Memos, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966)↩