Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

94. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak¹

Manila, October 23, 1966, 7:15–8 p.m.

[Here follows a brief notation recording that President Johnson met privately with President Marcos of the Philippines prior to meeting with Pak.]

MEMBERS OF PARTY

Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee; Ambassador Yoo, Korean Ambassador to the Philippines; Mr. Lee, Secretary to President Park; Mr. Cho, Interpreter

The President questioned General Park at some length on what he thought might come out of the conference. His response came to this: We must leave no stone unturned in persuading our enemies that we remain determined that our will has not weakened; but also that we are prepared for peace.

The President then responded as follows: First, he wished to recognize President Park for his role in bringing about the conference, and to express his gratitude for the troops he has sent. They have been magnificent soldiers and a great tribute to their nation. Second, he wished to tell President Park of his respect and pride for what has been accomplished in Korea in economic, social, and political development. It gives us great hope that something like that success story might emerge in Vietnam.

We seek peace. The President did not have too much hope right now that negotiations could happen. He is also aware that if we seem too anxious in this conference, our position might be misinterpreted in Hanoi as a sign of weakness.

Finally, the President said that there must be no leaks. There are those who would wish to pull us apart. We remain united and must stay that way. The President went on to say that he wished the world to know also that those closest to the danger are also strongest for our present course of action.

He wants a clear signal to Hanoi that might gain the sympathy of all the world from this conference.

We shall not escalate or threaten or blackmail. But we must altogether—not merely the U.S. but those closest to the danger and making the most sacrifice—send a strong signal: This war can’t be won in Washington or Seoul as the war in 1954 was won in Paris. We must demonstrate, above all, our unity and staying power while also indicating our willingness to go from the battlefield to the conference, provided they reciprocate. We must influence the world to tell Hanoi: You cannot win; there is no sense in going on this way.

We also wish to let the world know there is an Asia—an Asia where most of the people live—where hunger, disease, and poverty are the greatest.

We still remain concerned with, and committed to, Europe, but we also know there are new men, new leaders, in Asia, like the new leadership in Korea, who are determined and capable and whom we can support. The President wants from his trip and the conference an awareness around the world that a new face has been placed upon Asia. London, Paris, and Bonn remain important; but so are Seoul, Tokyo, Manila, Singapore, etc., important.

The President then said that he had been fighting discrimination in the U.S. and he does not believe that discrimination should be practiced among nations.

The President then turned to his struggle for health, education, and higher incomes which must be pursued not merely because it is right for people to live better, but because in poverty, ignorance, and disease are the root causes of war.

The President is interested in getting the Germans, French, British, and others, through this conference and this trip—through the highlighting of the progress in Korea and in other places—to put a new spotlight on this area.

In short, the President believes, first, we must remain united at this conference; secondly, we must demonstrate our determination that we shall not pull out and that Hanoi cannot win; third, focus the world’s attention on the problems of Asia: the new Asia, with new leaders and new programs, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong Valley development program, etc.

As the President said in Australia: You cannot impose freedom on people who don’t want it; but if they love liberty and freedom, we will stay with them and support them. If they don’t want freedom, the U.S. can look after itself and meet the threat at Honolulu.

[Here follows conversations between President Johnson and other Asian leaders.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Asian Trip, Memoranda of Conversations, October–November 1966. Secret. Johnson and Pak were in Manila to attend the conference on Vietnam. Their conversation took place in Johnson’s suite.