Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, October 19, 1966, 0233Z.

2122. Ref: State 67927.²

1. I can think of no surer way to destroy the good effects of President Johnson’s visit here than for us to raise the subject of more Korean forces for SVN either during his visit here or in Manila.³

2. The visit here is one of comradeship, of tribute to Korea’s accomplishments, of hope for Korea’s future, of highlighting Korea’s example as one of hope for others in Asia. To ask for more troops would be to transform it in President Pak’s, and later in Korean public’s eyes into a case of highlevel arm-twisting.

3. President Pak in his talk with me on October 17 (Seoul 2089)⁴ set what he considers to be the tone of the visit. A request for more troops would come as a severe personal shock to him. The good relationship which Pak feels now exists between him and President Johnson is a great asset for us and should not be endangered.

4. There is no basis here to corroborate indications that Korean military in SVN support deployment further Korean combat troops there. Certainly it does not represent President Pak’s thinking nor that of senior Korean military here.

5. I do not believe that President Pak or his government, or the National Assembly or the people of Korea are ready to send more combat troops to SVN. On the contrary, many Koreans already fear that they may be asked to do so. These fears have been expressed publicly as well as privately. Much public stress is being laid here on the fact that Korea already has a higher proportion of its population fighting in SVN than the US.

6. Any suggestion of request for further combat troops would leak sooner or later, would become major election issue, and would add heavily to President Pak’s domestic political difficulties, which should not be underestimated.

7. Therefore I most earnestly recommend that this subject not be raised through any channel, either during President Johnson’s visit here or in Manila.

8. General Bonesteel concurs.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/JOHNSON. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Manila Eyes Only for Secretary and Bundy and passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 67927 to Seoul, October 18, reported on McNamara’s impression during a recent visit to SVN that the ROK might consider sending more troops, possibly another division, to Vietnam. It also requested the Embassy’s views on that possibility as well as whether the question should be broached by President Johnson when he visited Seoul. (Ibid., ORG 7 OSD)
3. President Johnson attended a summit conference in Manila October 24–26 to discuss the situation in Vietnam with Asian heads of state; he made a state visit to Seoul October 31–November 2. In advance of the President’s Asian trip the CIA issued an intelligence report, “Security Conditions in Five Countries of the Western Pacific Area,” evaluating the potential for violence against the President in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. (SNIE 40/50–66, October 13; Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 40/50–66)
4. In telegram 2089 from Seoul, October 17, Brown reported that Pak had no particular problems to discuss during the Presidential visit and believed “his only purpose would be to ensure the warmest possible welcome for President Johnson.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/JOHNSON)