291. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
9439. 1. Last night we heard reading by an American voice of letter addressed to President which Smith was handed yesterday by Pak at Panmunjom. The tone of voice was subdued, as well it might be in view of degrading contents of letter. It is unimaginable that all 82 Americans of Pueblo would agree to such a condemnation of their government, their service and their principles after hardly more than one month’s confinement unless they were subjected to harshest mental/physical pressures. I do not believe for a moment that all of them did. FBIS English language tape of 1100/1200 GMT March four Pyongyang broadcast to Southeast Asia would contain text mentioned.
[Page 654]2. Broadcast no doubt monitored by governmental and private services, and if its sequence of admission of guilt and abject apology comes to public attention at home strong reactions may result. Also, it would seem from present handling of letter that NKs intend to keep repeating it, perhaps to lay foundation for whatever next move they may contemplate.
3. It is important, nevertheless, that officers and crew of Pueblo not be judged prematurely. Hopefully news media will cooperate in this. I suggest to deal with that aspect of matter and the problem generally, time may have arrived for you to consider complete press briefing in Washington during which efforts of USG to bring about reasonable solution of this matter could be related. There would seem no longer to be basis for continued silence on Panmunjom meetings. The NKs appear to be preparing field for further action against crew, and their use and re-use of “confessions,” “admissions of guilt,” and “apologies” should no longer go unchallenged. I do not know whether there is still a steel fist inside that silken glove, everything considered, but I am sure that our approach to this problem has been characterized by both restraint and reason of which our people would approve.
4. It might be desirable to give Pak notice at next meeting that we intend to publicize our proposals to NK which we consider fair and reasonable, and then to note his reaction. It will probably be nasty, and could bring about end to present series of discussions at Panmunjom. NKs would call for and claim we are breaking understanding for mutual agreement on what we would say publicly about those proceedings. It might also force their hand on trial of crew, and we should be prepared to face this contingency.2 But Pak’s performance yesterday confirmed what we here have believed since this exercise began—that is, that we will not be able to get back these men on anything resembling our terms. The exercise was necessary but unless it is desirable to keep it going to cover up other possibly useful contacts, it seems to have run its course. As to next moves, several possibilities were mentioned in State 119560 (para ten) and Seoul 4321.3 They offer no panaceas but unless we undertake some psywar and/or economic measures we will soon be without even the appearance of motion provided by the fact of the closed sessions at Panmunjom.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus.↩
- In telegram 125332 to Seoul, March 6, the Department of State advised that a response to an announcement that the crew would be tried was being considered and asked for Embassy suggestions to prepare for that eventuality. The Department of State also admitted that the closed talks may have reached a dead end, but they would not be broken off yet. (Ibid.)↩
- Documents 282 and 279.↩