Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 22, 1968, 2142Z.

119560. 1. We are unable for a variety of reasons to meet the North Korean request at the eighth meeting for an apology based on the confessions and other documents as a condition for the release of the men. Since North Koreans have refused to accept our offer to express regrets after an official inquiry, in the event results of inquiry justify our doing so, we may be approaching a deadlock in these private meetings of U.S. and North Korean seniors at Panmunjom.

2. We are therefore contemplating a four-pronged effort to find a solution.

3. At the next meeting we propose to say that the North Korean proposal for an apology in advance of the release on the basis of the confessions and documents submitted to us does not offer any possibility of a solution. We will repeat our offer of an inquiry after the men and ship have been released and say we will submit the confessions and documents to the Board of Inquiry as evidence pertinent to the inquiry.²

4. If the foregoing is not acceptable to the North Koreans we will offer them the alternative of an investigating commission once the crew, documents and vessel are released, to examine all aspects of the seizure and all documents and statements, and make its finding public. Each side would appoint a member and the two sides would agree on a third member from another country to serve as chairman. If the findings find us culpable we will offer to express regrets.

5. It is virtually certain the North Koreans will reject the investigating commission and possibly both proposals, but at least they will have something to chew on.

6. Before calling the ninth meeting we would make the following additional moves.

7. Embassy Seoul would approach the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and inform them that the eight meetings have produced no result. For their private information, we have offered to express regrets after the men are released and an official inquiry held, should our findings warrant such expression, but the North Koreans are demanding an apology now based on the confessions and documents as a condition of release.³ That offers no possibility of a settlement as far as we are concerned. They should also be told of the alternate offer we will make at the next meeting. All this for their private information.

8. What we would like the Swiss and Swedes to do, or either one, depending on what Seoul and they decide, is to convey to the Poles and Czechs their alarm at the delay in releasing the vessel and crew. They can venture their opinion that the U.S. must hold an inquiry after the release, and that clearly the confessions and other documents will be introduced into that inquiry. Further that the Americans will have to publish the results, and if there was any violation or fault, the Americans would have no choice except to apologize. The North Koreans have got all the propaganda value they can out of the case, and what is now required are moves to ease the tensions arising from the seizure of the Pueblo. If the North Koreans try to press the U.S. too far and make impossible demands on them, the already grave situation can become even graver. They therefore urge the Czechs and Poles to try to impress on the North Koreans the need for an immediate release.⁴

9. The third move will be made with the Russians, possibly through Dobrynin or Thompson or both or in a highest level or ministerial level message.⁵ We will supply the Soviets with the transcripts of the eighth closed meeting, and indicate our plans for the ninth meeting. We would stress that an apology before an inquiry after the men are released is out of the question, and that if the North Koreans do not accept either of our proposals or come up with a reasonable solution, then we have reached the end of what we can say to the North Koreans or offer them. We could indicate our concern about reports that crew will be tried. We would let the Russians draw the conclusion that we shall soon have to tell our people and the UN that the meetings have produced no results. Our hope is that the Russians will get to the North Koreans before the next meeting or soon thereafter and urge on them the need to affect an early termination of this matter by release.

10. Our fourth approach will be to the Japanese and British, the two main non-communist trading or shipping nations with North Korea. They will be informed of our plans for the next meeting and of our general view that it looks as if we are reaching the end of these talks. They will be asked to inform the North Koreans privately at an appropriate time after the ninth meeting—if no progress is indicated there—that the gravity and tension in the area are such that they are considering suspension of all shipping into North Korean ports. We shall ask the Japanese and UK to agree in principle to suspend shipping if we should ask them to do so so that this is not regarded by them or the North Koreans as a bluff.⁶

11. The Japanese and UK will be told that we are not at the moment thinking of more forceful measures, and are still hoping to find some peaceful solution.

12. Japanese, UK and Soviets should be told that gravity of the problem should not be underestimated by them. We anticipate that March will see the start of a new North Korean campaign of violence in the DMZ and the despatch of more raider teams which, if the Pueblo and crew are still in North Korean hands, will further heighten the tensions which already exist. The release of the crew would draw the focal point of acute tension and make it easier to deal with the other causes of tension in the area.

13. The foregoing is for your information and comments which we would like soonest.

Katzenbach

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis; Cactus. Also sent to Moscow, London, and Tokyo. Drafted by Berger, cleared by Rostow and Read, and approved by Rusk. Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to the President at his ranch in Texas, explaining that he, Rusk, and Clifford met that morning, February 22, and rejected apologizing to the North Koreans based on the alleged confession by the crew, and developed the approach contained therein. (Telegram CAP 80489 from Rostow to the President, February 22; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February])
2. In reply the Embassy in Moscow strongly urged omitting this proposal and proceeding directly to the next alternative. Thompson believed doing so “would greatly increase possibility of Soviets bringing pressure on North Koreans although I am not sanguine they will go very far in any event.” Thompson also noted that making “graduated concessions may encourage Koreans to hold out for more.” (Telegram 2888 from Moscow, February 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. The Swiss and Swedish members had received similar information from the Czech and Polish members, who met with Pak on February 21 to discuss the status of the crisis. (Telegram 4418 from Seoul, February 22; ibid.)
4. At a meeting on February 25 Smith asked the Swede and Swiss members if they would impart this information to the Polish and Czech members and if they, in turn, would report it to the North Koreans. The Swede and Swiss members agreed and anticipated the information being passed to Pak. (Telegram 4476 from Seoul, February 25; ibid.) That and a follow-up meeting produced little, and in telegram 121942 to Seoul, February 28, the Department of State advised the Embassy that the NNSC approach had been taken “as far as can be useful for the time being.” (Ibid.)
5. Thompson’s inclination was to send a letter from Rusk to Gromyko, if only to preserve the record, although that step could make it somewhat more difficult for the Soviets to act. If the Soviets were approached through an informal discussion, Thompson suggested a meeting between Rusk and Dobrynin. (Telegram 2888 from Moscow, February 23; ibid.)
6. The Embassy in Tokyo had no objection to approaching the Japanese Government, but could not “be sanguine as to results or, even if GOJ does agree, how much effect this would have on Pyongyang.” (Telegram 5847 from Tokyo, February 23; ibid.) The Embassy in London could not comment on the potential British reaction. (Telegram 6696 from London, February 23; ibid.) In telegram 120318 to Tokyo and London, February 24, the Department of State advised that a decision on the shipping suspension had been left open and instructed the embassies to bring the Japanese and British up to date on the current status of negotiations and on the U.S. approach to the upcoming ninth and tenth meetings. (Ibid.)