Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

283. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 23, 1968, 0945Z.

4463. Ref: State 119560.²

1. We agree with general thrust of reftel, which as we interpret it is that (a) North Koreans show no signs of willingness accept our past proposal, (b) that closed meetings cannot be continued much longer, and (c) time has come to go to outer limits of our position, backed by as much support as we can muster by third parties. In general, we concur that efforts it outlines are worth undertaking. Following comments are designed primarily to indicate limitations that apply to such efforts and some pitfalls we foresee.

2. North Koreans are now awaiting our comment on their demand for apology in advance of crew release. If this is completely unacceptable to us, we agree that ninth meeting is time to say so. We see no harm in repeating our previous proposal for purpose of establishing absolute clear record of their refusal of our offer. (And we are convinced they will not accept it.) There is possibility that proposed procedure could result in Pak going back for further instructions, resulting in a tenth meeting before Adm Smith could table alternative suggested para 4 reftel.

3. We agree with implication in reftel that offer of investigating commission should be made, at least for record purposes and as indication our willingness to bring impartial judgment to bear on Pueblo case. It would no doubt be to our advantage with respect to world opinion to be able to say we made such an offer and that NKs rejected it, as we agree they would probably do. Certainly there is little in their private or public positions on Pueblo or in their past history to suggest they would agree to anything like impartial outside inquiry into their affairs.

4. In highly unlikely event they consent to concept of investigating commission, negotiations on establishment thereof would offer them variety of opportunities to delay and wrangle. There is serious doubt that we and they could ever agree on chairman to be chosen jointly by their rep and ours. They would doubtless balk at releasing crew before investigation began. They would also seek to enlarge scope of charges against us which commission should evaluate beyond mere question of whether Pueblo intruded into their territorial waters. In short, we should make this offer only if necessity to establish this kind of record is overriding and we should be prepared to state at outset in very clear terms just what it is we envisage commission will investigate.

5. Other moves suggested reftel would be useful in terms of eventually establishing our case before world opinion. We are not hopeful, however, that Swiss and Swedes can accomplish much. They can talk only to Czech and Polish members of NNSC, who in turn can talk only to Pak or to their own and perhaps Russian embassies in Pyongyang. As Dept recognizes, NNSC is channel of limited utility, available for passing information but not for exertion of pressure.

6. Para 8 reftel also raises some other questions, which precise Swiss and Swede would doubtless inquire about. If they tell the Pole and Czech that we would have no choice but to apologize if impartial inquiry reveals any violation or fault, what will this imply to North Koreans? Violation or fault with respect to territorial waters? Or violation in terms also of other NK charges: commission of espionage, hostile acts, war provocation, etc. Does it mean we will punish crew? Does apology mean we abandon position that Pueblo was naval vessel with right to be where it was and doing what it was, and that only recourse of NK under international law was to warn and escort it out of territorial waters?

7. We agree with reftel that attempt to engage support or pressure from UK, Japan and Sovs could be useful. We question, however, need to provide them with transcripts of closed meetings. This is more than we have been doing with ROKs, and if word got back to our friend here that we have provided something to Japanese and Soviets, in both form and substance, which goes beyond what we have told them, we would have another ROK eruption. Accordingly urge that Moscow, London and Tokyo not pass transcripts until Dept has decided what we do about ROKs in this matter.³

8. This leads of course to observation of immediate importance to us in Seoul that ROKs would not be very happy if they had full information on positions we have taken heretofore and would bitterly oppose notion that we would submit our case to investigating commission which would include friends of NK and before which US and NK would appear as equals. We may simply have to live with their reaction, but we should not minimize its importance simply because they are now quiescent.

9. Finally, while argumentation in para 12 reftel would be useful in appeals to Sovs, Japanese and Brits, we should recognize that it has no relationship to real attitudes of either North Koreans or ROKs. North Koreans find heightened tension in this area entirely to their advantage for a complex of reasons. They have deliberately raised tension and we fully expect that their future actions will be carefully calculated to maintain it. They have obviously decided long ago that stability in this area works only to advantage of their sworn enemies and they have taken serious risks to upset that stability. They must regard Pueblo seizure and Blue House raid as highly successful operations from their point of view, results of which indicate that US at least will tolerate very high degree of tension, perhaps one ruinous to US/ROK relations and stability in ROK, and that they run little risk of retaliation unless ROKs get out of hand.

10. As for the ROKs, return of Pueblo and crew under conditions which we have proposed would not relieve their anxieties, frustrations and desire to retaliate. We do not expect that prior return of Pueblo and crew would have material effect on ROK desire to retaliate. If North Koreans resume raids in March, ROKs will want to retaliate whether or not crew has been returned.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis; Cactus.
2. Document 282.
3. In reply the Department of State made note of Porter’s comments, but was reluctant to provide the South Koreans with transcripts “because of well-known ROK proclivity of leaking documents to press.” The Embassy was instructed to continue briefing the President or Prime Minister on the substance of the meetings. (Telegram 120307 to Seoul, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)