Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 24, 1968, 1853Z.

120290. Subject: Instructions for Ninth Closed Meeting.

1. You should request next closed meeting soonest.

2. At next meeting, Admiral Smith should open with following statement.

a. In previous meetings, I have made a specific proposal for resolving the controversy over the Pueblo and its crew. I have made it quite clear that the US Government is prepared upon the return of the ship and its crew to conduct a full inquiry and to make the results public. We have taken note of the various documents which you have handed over in these meetings. I can assure you that these documents² are pertinent to the proposed inquiry and will be submitted to it. It would, of course, be important to authenticate these documents by testimony of the crew members involved.

b. As I have also previously made clear, we are willing to express regret if the inquiry would justify our doing so.

c. An expression of regret based exclusively on the documents you have provided might later prove inconsistent with the facts which a full and impartial inquiry would disclose. Moreover, until the officers and the men of the Pueblo have been released, the evidence which you have submitted is unverifiable either by us or by anyone else. In any event, an expression of regret on our part prior to a full inquiry into the facts and in advance of the release would not be understood by the American people.

d. Our previous discussions in these meetings indicate that factual questions divide us. There is no dispute that the Pueblo’s mission was to gather intelligence. We disagree as to precisely where this mission was carried out and where the Pueblo was seized. The U.S. is not reluctant to have these factual issues resolved.

e. We would welcome any impartial resolution of this disagreement and would be willing to have the facts reviewed by any impartial, international, factfinding body. For example, we would accept assignment of this task to any person or persons named by the President of the International Court of Justice.

f. We are prepared to express regrets, if the international body should find that, in violation of its orders, the Pueblo entered waters closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korea.

g. Whatever the body agreed upon, we do not see how an impartial inquiry into the facts could be conducted with the crew still in North Korean hands. We believe it would be appropriate to return the crew immediately to the United States. We would, however, accept release of the crew to the custody of a neutral party, for example the Swiss Government.

h. I urge you to consider most seriously adopting one of the concrete approaches to settling this matter which we have placed before you.

3. Pak will presumably not be in a position to respond to our proposals at this meeting. If this is the case, Smith should say:

a. As you can see we have given most serious consideration to everything you have said in these meetings. We have placed before you concrete proposals which, if accepted by you, would permit settlement of the matter before us.

b. You have now held the crew of the Pueblo for over a month. We can see no reason why you should want to detain them further.

c. I hope that you will give me an answer to our proposals at our next meeting which will result in an immediate release.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to Tokyo, London, Moscow, Stockholm, and Bern. Drafted by Yager; cleared by Walsh, Clifford, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Forwarded to the President at his ranch in Texas; that copy indicates that the President saw it. (Telegram CAP 80531, February 24, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February])
2. The phrasing here and elsewhere was changed to “photographs of documents” on Seoul’s recommendation that merely to refer to “documents” could “mislead the NKs into believing that we accept these photographs as valid evidence” and because of Smith’s reluctance “to concede that any meaningful documents have been received at these meetings if this is not really the case.” (Yager/Ericson/Smith Telcon, February 24, and telegram 120342 to Seoul, February 25; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. The ninth senior MAC members meeting was held on February 26. In reporting on the meeting the Embassy noted that “Pak was completely unprepared for what RAdm. Smith had to say and was forced to discard all statements he had prepared in advance.” (Telegram 4503 from Seoul, February 26; ibid.) The verbatim text was transmitted in telegram 4504 from Seoul, February 26 (ibid.) and forwarded as telegram CAP 80584, February 26, to the President at his ranch in Texas by Rostow, who noted in an introductory opening paragraph that the North Korean response to the U.S. proposals was “surprise and virtual silence,” meaning that “the next meeting will be critical.” CAP telegram 80584 contains a note that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February])