Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

290. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, March 4, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Next Steps on Pueblo

1. Facts:

North Korea at the tenth closed meeting:

A. Rejected our offer of impartial inquiry.

B. Insisted on apology.

C. Indicated apology would make release of men possible.

D. Threatened “some other measure” if no apology forthcoming.

2. Next Steps Available:

A. Restate our ninth meeting position, i.e., that we are prepared to submit factual issues to an impartial international body, that we would express regrets if warranted by results of inquiry by such body and that we would accept release of men to neutral body prior to inquiry.

B. Try to get NNSC to issue appeal for release of men primarily on humanitarian grounds.

C. Military moves (aerial feints, aerial reconnaissance, blockade, sailing USS Banner off North Korea under escort, etc.).²

D. Exploit internal inconsistencies in North Korean case (alleged confessions and navigational data) by either:

(1) Informing Russians of these inconsistencies and of fact we are seriously considering exposing North Korean case at United Nations, or³

(2) Simply publishing our analysis of North Korean “evidence”.

E. Offer in private Panmunjom talks to express regrets, concurrently with release of Pueblo crew, for any hostile acts contrary to international law which may have been committed by the Pueblo.⁴

F. Ask North Koreans for precise language which they would accept as expression of regret justifying concurrent release of Pueblo and crew.

3. Relevant Considerations:

A. Impartial inquiry non-starter. If held it could only show up North Koreans as liars.

B. If we stick to our present position, there is high risk of men being put on trial and punished.

C. NNSC appeal almost certainly non-starter. North Koreans not interested in humanity.

D. Available military action would be mere pin-pricks unlikely to move North Koreans, and would probably prejudice chances of getting men back.

E. North Koreans would probably reject conditional expression of regret and insist on unqualified apology.

F. Apology, whether conditional or otherwise, can be undercut after return of crew. In tenth meeting, General Pak hinted that 1964 helicopter case might be precedent. In that case (inadvertent intrusion), the North Koreans insisted that we admit “criminal espionage” as well as intrusion. General Combs signed receipt admitting “crimes of espionage and illegal intrusion…” and guaranteeing “that it will not commit such criminal acts… in the future”, but repudiated this admission publicly the next day. There appears to have been little or no adverse reaction in the US to the temporary admission of wrong-doing made to get the men back.

G. Soviets might be disturbed by any threat to expose North Korean “evidence” and might press Pyongyang to settle Pueblo case promptly.

H. Course followed by US in Pueblo case could have important impact on our relations with ROK and possibly also on those with South Viet-Nam and Thailand. Thus, abject apology, particularly after prolonged private negotiations, would outrage Seoul and probably also Saigon and Bangkok. On the other hand, open attack on North Korean evidence would clearly gratify these allies.

4. Recommendation:

Smoking out North Koreans on precise language of acceptable expression of regret would keep the private talks going and possibly provide us with useful information without in any way prejudicing any of the other options listed in 2. above. We therefore recommend approval of the attached draft instruction to Seoul for the eleventh meeting.⁵

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis.
2. Next to this paragraph Walsh added the following handwritten notation: “Bohlen opposes this.”
3. Next to this paragraph Walsh added the following handwritten notation: “Bohlen thinks this premature.”
4. Next to this paragraph Walsh added the following handwritten notation: “Bohlen prefers this.”
5. The draft instruction was not attached. The memorandum does not indicate if the recommendation was approved or disapproved.