Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

289. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, March 4, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Tactics in the Pueblo Case

1. We should rule out definitively as inappropriate, unseemly, not in the American character, and a knuckling under to simple blackmail:

• —a swap of Korean prisoners, of whatever ilk, for the Pueblo crew;
• —any form of ransom;
• —an apology if we are unable to establish that one is called for.

2. I reluctantly conclude that our best tack for the foreseeable future is sticking to the diplomatic pressures line, while building up, rapidly, substantially, and very overtly, ROK capabilities.

3. U.S. forces in Korea, although understrength, should not be built up at this time because of Vietnam needs, balance of payments problems (the 25,000 men required for minimal meaningful buildup would cost $200 million per year), and various adverse readings which would be taken in many quarters because of greater American presence, other than in Vietnam, on the Asian continent.

4. While something like symmetrical retaliation theoretically would have been the best move immediately after the Pueblo capture, I do not believe we would now profit by small-scale harassing military actions. If there were one or more ships which could be “snatched,” I would not rule this out, but the Korean ships stay too close in and non-Korean ships should be off limits. Other harassing military actions would not be designed to release the crew, but would probably have the opposite effect and would damage our legal position as the injured party. Such harassing actions would invite retaliation. There would almost certainly be gradual escalation and a second front could easily result.

5. While we are on the diplomatic course, and now that tensions are reduced, we might release a carrier force for Vietnam duty. It could return fairly quickly if needed and meanwhile its departure could give an excuse to the North Koreans to take a favorable step forward if they have any reason to do so.

6. In addition to beefing up ROK capabilities, we should build up our overall strategy posture from which we can speak and be listened to. This would mean calling up reserves, and keeping larger reserves in CONUS, but the better we are prepared the less likely we are to have to use additional force. We do not now have the military posture to take risks in Korea, according to the JCS.

7. While we should be ready to talk at all times, we should not play along in seeming weakness with the North Korean propaganda game by seeming to want frequent meetings. Each side has given its position and I don’t see how we can alter our last position appreciably. Over-eagerness is weakness.

8. We should keep the NNSC channel open, but I am not sanguine as to its utility.

9. We may yet want to return to the UN, particularly if a trial seems likely and the Panmunjom talks can be shown to have broken down because of North Korean unreasonableness. We should prepare thoroughly for this contingency through such means as a detailed handwriting analysis of the recent letter to the President, and its signatures. The North Koreans are on a weak wicket in any multilateral forum, because of the increasingly convincing record of fabrication on their part.

10. As galling as it is, I fear that on this Pueblo case we may have to lick our wounds, wait out release of the crew, and wait our chances for action when the advantage is more ours. The only way I see where we could act sooner would be in Vietnam—presumably by mining Haiphong Harbor. North Korean actions seem partly designed to aid the Communist Vietnam effort and it is important that we not permit that to happen.

11. Some people in town are playing with the idea of coming a bit closer to what the North Koreans want by way of an apology. I do not quite understand what we have to apologize for unless we did invade territorial waters, but this presumably we do not yet know. It seems to me that absolutely basic to problems of this sort is the integrity, prestige and credibility of the United States. As tempting as it might be to make an apology—with tongue quite prominently in cheek—in order to ransom the 83 crew members, I believe that such opportunistic duplicity would be playing loose with the ultimate security of 200 million Americans. In today’s world the adversary can escalate—short of allout war—to match us. Short of allout war, then, our one tremendous advantage over the enemy lies not in what we do but in what we are. That must be safeguarded at all costs. It means we should not apologize unless an apology is in order just as it means we should apologize, with dignity, and promptness, if one is in order.

Alfred Jenkins ²

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. VII, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 14. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.