288. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
Seoul, March 4, 1968,
0855Z.
4652. Subj: Summary and comments on tenth closed senior MAC members meeting at Panmunjom, March 4.2
- 1. Today’s meeting lasted 48 minutes, mostly devoted to uncompromising presentation by Pak of NKorean position as stated in sixth and subsequent meetings and equally firm rejection of proposals we put forward at ninth meeting. At end of his opening statement, Pak handed RAdm Smith English version with heading again describing him as rep of Govt of DPRK. He also gave Smith handwritten letter addressed to President Johnson purportedly signed by entire crew, including wounded. Letter says wounded in final stages of recovery. [Page 648] Text of letter being transmitted with comments by septel.3 Smith accepted letter as “document addressed to President of the United States” to avoid any endorsement of authenticity.
- 2. Following Pak’s long statement, Smith made statement based on guidance contained para two, State 122259.4 Pak responded with shortened version of his previous line. Meeting ended with Pak proposing recess after Smith had said he would refer Pak’s statement to appropriate authority and advise Pak when he had reply.
- 3. Believe following aspects this meeting are noteworthy:
- A. Communists obviously used interval between meeting to draft letter to President Johnson with considerable care and to obtain (or possibly forge some of) crew’s signatures.
- B. Pak had carefully rehearsed his presentation. He deliberately projected tough image during portion of his statement in which he rejected impartial inquiry by third party and indicated U.S. in no position to “accept” release of crew to neutral custody. He added in very harsh tones that such remarks constitute defilement of DPRK sovereignty and asked rhetorically and sneeringly whether this meant U.S. believes DPRK has neither law nor ability to deal with situation. He concluded this most dramatic portion of his presentation with statement in softer tones that it would be height of folly for US to believe that it can compel DPRK to accept “unwarrantable” claims.
- C. Pak’s presentation contained only vaguest references to possibility that crew might be tried, but implication was present in such statements as: “As long as your side keeps on taking such an unwarranted stand as present at our meetings, our side will have no other way but to understand that your side has no concern about the fate of the crew of the Pueblo and tries to evade the responsibility for them. Accordingly, our side will have no alternative but to consider another step.”
- D. In arguing for U.S. acceptance of DPRK position, Pak at one point referred to existence of “precedents of having settled similar cases in the past under the terms acceptable to both sides,” by which he doubtless meant helicopter crew.
- E. Pak clearly left door open for further meetings, although there equally clearly no give in DPRK position.
- F. There was nothing in Pak’s presentation to indicate DPRK thinking in terms of prisoner swap or ransom as suggested last week by Czech and Polish NNSC members.
Porter
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus.↩
- A verbatim text of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 4655 from Seoul, March 4. (Ibid.)↩
- The texts of telegram 4652, the letter from the crew, and Porter’s comments, which center on an analysis of the signatures appearing on the letter, were transmitted in telegram CAP 80651, March 4, from Rostow to President Johnson. In the letter, which had been read over Radio Pyongyang, the crew admitted violating North Korean territorial waters, argued that North Korea properly deserved an apology, and urged the President to issue an apology so that the crew could return to the United States. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February])↩
- Document 287.↩