273. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Mr. President:
I have been speculating with the members of my staff most directly concerned with the Korea problem. We have been looking beyond the present situation to the possible failure of Panmunjom or its endless stringing out.
We are conscious of the following weaknesses in all the forms of action which have been proposed: [Page 619]
- —The Soviets have committed a high proportion of their Far East fleet to the area. They will feel their prestige is on the line if we move in on North Korean ports or attack North Korean installations with our air or naval power.
- —but equally, in our message to Kosygin we have indicated that time was relatively short before some form of action might have to be taken. Nothing would damage our credibility with the Russians more than if, having put forces in the area and stated to Kosygin the urgency of the matter, we did nothing.
- —it is true we can pick up some North Korean-Polish ships; but they turn out to be almost wholly Polish. Sect. Rusk is worried about possible pressure on the road to Berlin if we fuss with Polish transport, although I don’t think the Poles want a Berlin crisis at the moment. But you should know that Gronouski, when sounded out, said in effect: Please don’t.
- —we don’t have any firm fix on the possibility of a Free World denial of shipping and bunkerage in trade to North Korea, but it doesn’t look like a very substantial measure.
In the face of these thin prospects and our desire to avoid a second front in Korea—at least at our initiation—the following thought has arisen: that we now mine the Haiphong and other harbors of North Viet Nam. The advantages are:
- —even if not a decisive action, it is an important action which bears upon the major battle we are fighting;
- —the Russian capacity to deal with it, and the Russian commitment to deal with it on a military basis is much less than something done in the Sea of Japan;
- —it would maintain our credibility with Kosygin & Company, especially if timed in relation to the indication in the letter concerning the Pueblo.
If we wish to institute the policy by increments, we could start by laying mine barriers in the south of North Viet Nam and progressively but swiftly moving north, perhaps using a back channel to suggest to Moscow that if they wish to have the mining stop short of Haiphong, they had better deliver the Pueblo and its crew.2 But it is a course which, once embarked upon, we would have to mean.
As for the men and the crew, we could continue being just as patient in the Panmunjom negotiations as the other side; but we would have to accept as likely that we would not get them back for some considerable period of time.
[Page 620]I am not recommending this course of action; but I believe it deserves careful thought if in fact the North Koreans and the Soviets are going to play this game out to extract humiliation of us.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February). Secret. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it.↩
- The wisdom of saying anything to Moscow—even back-channel—would have to be checked. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]↩