Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

272. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 7, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Panmunjom Talks—Next Steps

1. The North Korean stand at the Fourth Meeting is unpromising for an early settlement and could further complicate our relations with the Republic of Korea.² The North Korean requests for the addition of a deputy, the exchange of minutes and more formalized procedures, including press releases, seem to have the following purposes:

a. To establish even more clearly that we have moved to government-to-government negotiations for prestige purposes.

b. To spin out the negotiations on the assumption they can do so with impunity, and to inhibit us from taking more forceful action while the talks continue.

c. To increase the existing strains on ROK-US relations, for the very idea of government-to-government talks, and especially without them, is anathema to South Korea. The North Koreans perhaps hope that these strains might become so acute as to produce street demonstrations in Seoul, and growing public resentment that would lead the ROKG to withdraw some of its forces from Viet-Nam, or at least keep them from sending additional troops.

d. To keep the situation sufficiently unsettled and roiled as to keep US forces pinned down in the area. The North Koreans know, of course, about our foreign exchange problems, budgetary deficit, and the President’s domestic difficulties, and it may be they think maintaining a certain amount of tension in Korea will put added strains on our resources and add to the President’s troubles at home.

2. The request for a change in procedure, per se, presents no great problem for us, and we could accept it were it not for the strong [South] Korean reaction. However, we need not make a decision on this request for another meeting or two. By then, the news of the additional $100 million in military assistance will be public, and this might help moderate Korean feelings about these talks.

3. Probably the most significant sentence of the Fourth Meeting is: “You will be able to express your opinion at the next meeting on the disposition of the case of your armed spy ship Pueblo.” This is a clear indication that they expect us to table some specific proposal.

4. At the next meeting we should state again that we agree with them that a situation of acute tension, of which they complain, exists in the area, and it will not be reduced until:

a. The crew and vessel are released.

b. The provocations against the ROK stop.

5. We should stress that no amount of talk in this forum, or any other forum, is going to produce agreement on the facts.

6. We therefore see no special need for a new procedure. The North Koreans should be asked what the new procedure can do that can’t be done under existing arrangements.

7. We should at the next meeting say we are ready at that meeting to table proposals for the disposal of the case. If this is a true negotiation they should table their proposal for disposal of the case at the same time. Are they prepared to table? If not, will they table theirs at the next meeting?

8. We have two proposals we can make:

a. We might state that we are prepared to submit the Pueblo issue to an international fact-finding body provided they agree to release the crew and vessel to us in connection with such an inquiry. This will give them something to chew on and smoke them out on this course of action. They are not likely to agree since they say the issue should be settled in direct talks.³

b. Our second proposal is to provide them with the following signed statement and assurance when the men and the vessel are released to us:⁴

i. “The USS Pueblo is a vessel of the US Navy. It was engaged in intelligence collection at the time it was seized by force of arms. It was, according to our information, in international waters at the time it was seized.

ii. “Vessels of the US Navy are under the strictest instructions not to approach closer than thirteen nautical miles off the coast. An inquiry will be held when all the crew has been returned to the United States. The question whether the Pueblo approached closer than thirteen nautical miles to the coast of North Korea will be particularly examined. We shall make public the results of that inquiry and take appropriate action.”

9. General Bonesteel is absolutely opposed to agreeing to the new procedure.⁵

10. Ambassador Porter recommends moving the talks outside Korea.⁶ The trouble with this is that it will take time, and the North Koreans may not agree if their purpose is to cause trouble between us and the ROKs.

11. I think we should hold to the present venue and arrangements for another meeting or two, by which time we may have the North Korean proposal for “disposal of the case.”

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Exdis; Sensitive.
2. The Embassy did not send a summary of the fourth Senior Members meeting, since it lasted only 26 minutes, but noted that the “meeting was again businesslike” and “Pak’s manner was cooperative and polite.” (Telegram 4047 from Seoul, February 7; ibid.) A verbatim text of the meeting was forwarded in telegram 4051 from Seoul, February 7, and corrections based on an analysis of the Korean-language tape recording of the meeting are in telegram 4058 from Seoul, February 7. (Both ibid.)
3. The instructions sent to Admiral Smith in preparation for the fifth meeting reflected this proposal. Smith was also instructed to inform the North Koreans that the United States had no objections to their proposed procedural changes. (Telegram 111812 to Seoul, February 8; ibid.)
4. Smith also received instructions covering potential responses to an unexpected release of the crew. (Telegram 112831 to Seoul, February 9; ibid.)
5. When informing Sharp of the North Korean proposal on instituting new procedures that would “in effect, make it more formal and obvious that meetings were between representatives of US and DPR,” Bonesteel stated unequivocally, “In light of intensifying ROK bitterness re U.S. unilateralism in MAC, I recommend strong opposition to any U.S. acceptance of any version of Communist proposal.” (Telegram KRA 0473 from CINCUNC to CINCPAC, February 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968)
6. Porter submitted his comments on the meeting and the implications for future negotiations in telegram 4062 from Seoul, February 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US) The Department of State informed Porter of its opposition by pointing out that to “change from military to diplomatic channels would go farther toward giving appearance of recognition of North Korea than present procedures,” which could only have a detrimental effect on official and public reaction in the ROK. (Telegram 111805 to Seoul, February 8; ibid.)