Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

271. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 7, 1968.

SUBJECT

• The Ball Report

In a meeting with the President by Ball, Clifford and Taylor, it was agreed that Ball would endeavor to obtain agreement from his colleagues on his committee for him alone to make an oral report of the principal findings to the President. He would avoid policy recommendations, limiting his comments to the specifics of the Pueblo incident.

In the written draft report,² the following points are made:

a. It would probably be wise to abandon efforts to conduct covert ELINT collection activities at sea. If this attempt were abandoned, then it would be possible to operate ELINT ships without radio silence and to protect a ship by an armed naval vessel further out to sea.

b. The government should review the sensitivity of coastal areas of ELINT interest before dispatching Pueblo-type ships on new missions.

c. There should be adequate destruction devices aboard ELINT ships to assure quick destruction in times of emergency.

d. Instructions to the skippers should be reviewed. Apparently there is an ambiguity in the instructions regarding the use of weapons in self-defense.

Ball is to pull in all copies of his draft report from other members of the committee. We will decide at the next meeting with the President (probably toward the end of next week) what kind of public statement to make upon query with regard to the Ball Committee report. Some such statement as the following seems to be contemplated:

“The Ball Committee has filed an oral report which emphasizes the complexities and technical character of many of the matters raised by the Pueblo incident and points out that committee has not been able to explore all these matters in depth in the time available to it. Hence, the report to the President limited itself to suggestions of certain areas which require further examination in order to determine appropriate action by the responsible governmental agencies. It took note of the fact that the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is already seized with certain aspects of the Pueblo incident and that the Eaton Board is in the course of making a thorough study of the many kinds of intelligence activities in which the Pueblo was engaged at the time of the incident.

“The President expressed his appreciation to the members of the Ball Committee for their help and for the effectiveness of their work in the relatively short time available to them.”

At the next meeting of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Pueblo matter will be given top priority. The principal question will be the scope of any study of the Pueblo incident which is within the capability of the Intelligence Board.

MDT

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Vietnam Policy, Memos to the President, T–167–69, Box 57, SPC–S–094–93. Secret. Drafted by Taylor.
2. A copy of the sixth and presumably the final draft of the committee’s report, February 7, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Pueblo, January 1968.