366. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Nitze)1
Dear Paul:
In answer to your letter of April 13,2 we will be
pleased to undertake a reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos by the
Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia. I would suggest one change
in the purpose of the exercise as stated in your letter: the Geneva
Agreements have not been “exploited” but rather consistently violated by
the North Vietnamese in the most blatant manner. I presume that North
Vietnamese “violation” rather than “exploitation” was meant, and we are
proceeding to set up the policy review on that basis.
It is now over a month since the Contingency Study Laos/Thailand3 was approved, and I enclose a Status
Report on developments during the intervening period which may be of
interest. I also enclose a paper entitled “What the Enemy Has Not Done
in Laos” which may also be of some help to the participants in the
policy review. Copies of these two papers will be separately
disseminated to all members of the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East
Asia.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 719]
Enclosure 14
CONTINGENCY STUDY LAOS/THAILAND
Status Report as of May 1, 1968
I. Military Situation In Laos
In the approximately six weeks since our Contingency Study was
approved, there has been no major enemy attack in Laos. The NVA has continued to apply pressure not
only in South Laos around the provincial capitals of Saravane and
Attopeu, but also around Thakhek on the Mekong in Central Laos and
against guerrilla posts in north Laos. It has taken only a few minor
friendly positions, for example Lahanam in southern Savannakhet
province on April 13, and such successes were not the result of
major military operations. The NVA
still retains the capability to overrun much of Laos, but the
approaching rainy season will soon limit the magnitude and speed of
a possible new NVA offensive.
II. Possible Augmentation of Air Assets for
Utilization in Laos
Consultations were begun with our Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok
about the possible utilization of Thai T–28’s (either “sheep-dipped”
or overt) and additional deployment of US air assets to Thailand.
Ambassador Sullivan in
Vientiane believes that the political disadvantages would greatly
outweigh the marginal military advantages of overt use of the Thai
air force in Laos. [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] he considers it preferable to
augment the number of “Class B” pilots (Thai pilots flying RLAF aircraft under control of our Air
Attache in Vientiane). A much more significant increase of tactical
deterrent air strength will result from the contemplated expansion
of US air resources in Thailand, particularly in propeller planes
which seem best adapted to operations in Laos. Ambassador Unger in Bangkok believes that there
would be no Thai political objections to the increase of US aircraft
in Thailand if the purpose is to shore up the defense of Laos. This
finding should help in speeding up deployment of additional tactical
prop-aircraft to Thailand, though they could not be there in time to
help counter an enemy offensive in Laos should one occur before the
advent of the rains later this month.
III. Lao Call for Article 4 Consultations
On December 30 and February 29 Souvanna
Phouma wrote to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva
Conference denouncing the North Vietnamese attacks in Laos and
calling for consultations among the signatories under Article 4 of
the 1962 Geneva Agreement. In March the UK suggested
[Page 720]
to the USSR that the Co-Chairmen
circulate both letters along with a joint message for which they
submitted a draft. Since the USSR
has not replied, the UK at our urging
has now finally decided to circulate both of Souvanna’s letters
unilaterally on May 6.
IV. ICC
Activity
- 1.
- The February 21 ICC “visit” to
Saravane (which may have played some role in restraining the
NVA in South Laos) was
followed by a visit of the Indian Chairman and the Canadian
Commissioner on April 12–13 to Attopeu, Saravane and Lao Ngam.
The Polish Commissioner again declined to join his colleagues.
Although a mortar attack on Attopeu occurred while the ICC visit was taking place there,
it is possible that the increased ICC activity may have some deterrent effect on
Hanoi. At any rate, it helps to buck up Lao morale. We can claim
no credit for the more positive Indian attitude in the ICC, which seems due largely to the
personality of the new Indian Commissioner and some tactical
gaffes by the Pole, who has now completed his tour of duty and
been replaced.
- 2.
- To encourage the Indians in their forward posture, we have
suggested to several governments that New Delhi be encouraged to
maintain its present relatively active attitude. The UK and Japan have taken action.
France is willing to help, though in a lower key. We do not wish
demarches in New Delhi to be too obviously orchestrated, so are
still holding in reserve the encouragement of similar diplomatic
actions by Germany and Thailand, both of whom are judged to be
willing. Australia will weigh in with Prime Minister Gandhi when
she visits Canberra in May. We have no illusions that even the
cumulative effect of such efforts will have any decisive
influence on the Indians, but it may make backsliding more
awkward for them.
V. Laos and US/DRV
Negotiations
Souvanna and the King are anxious that US military support for Laos
will continue even while we de-escalate in North Vietnam and that
Laos should benefit promptly from any lessening of hostilities in
South Vietnam. To that end, they are seeking both private and public
assurances from us that our negotiations with Hanoi will include a
strong requirement that the Geneva Agreements of 1962 should be
respected by North Vietnam.
Enclosure 25
WHAT THE ENEMY HAS NOT DONE IN LAOS
The Contingency Study of March 23 implies certain advantages of
continued U.S. adherence to the Geneva Agreements of 1962. These may
[Page 721]
become more apparent
by sketching out some of the actions the enemy continues to be
capable of taking in Laos but which he has not yet taken, partly
because we have not overtly upset the framework of the Geneva
settlement.
- 1.
- Setting up a rival (“neutralist”) government in Laos.
- 2.
- Obtaining Soviet and Chinese recognition for such a
government.
- 3.
- Raising the specter of Chinese intervention.
- 4.
- Pushing to the Mekong on a broad, or even limited, front, thus
diverting U.S. and Thai troops.
- 5.
- Pushing to Luang Prabang, thus delivering a major
psychological blow to the Lao Government forces.
- 6.
- Conducting terrorist raids against vulnerable Lao
targets.
- 7.
- Denouncing US/SVN intervention
in the Prairie Fire zone
on the basis of hard evidence.
- 8.
- Exploiting sensitive U.S. operations in Laos, using materials
and equipment captured at Site 85 and in the Muscle Shoals area,
and aircraft downed in Laos.
- 9.
- Increasing harassment of U.S. economic as well as military
activities in Laos.
- 10.
- Conducting terrorist raids against U.S. bases in Thailand,
such as Nakhon Phanom.
If the U.S. were to abandon its formal adherence to and observation
of the limitations of the Geneva Agreements of 1962, any inhibitions
on the communist side would disappear and the Geneva settlement
would collapse entirely; the Royal Lao Government would quickly lose
much of the international (including communist and neutral) support
which it now enjoys by virtue of its adherence to the Geneva
agreements, and leave us as virtually the sole supporter of a
no-longer neutral Laos—a costly and diplomatically poor position to
be in.
We would then have to deal with a government whose area of control
was rapidly shrinking and which would have lost the ability to
appeal to the Geneva Agreements which had created the basis for its
very existence.
