Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

365. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 7, 1968, 0435Z.

6316. Ref: A. Vientiane 5929; B. Vientiane 6045.²

1. Souvanna told me Saturday³ evening that he had finally signed the degree reorganizing the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. He said that, after a month of haggling, the generals seemed satisfied with the new plan.

2. As predicted Ref B, the plan falls far short of Souvanna’s original intentions, but it is at least a step in the right direction. It preserves the “one man, one job” principle by abolishing both deputy C-in-C spots formerly held by Kouprasith and Bounpone, making them respectively commanders of fifth and third military regions. It also abolishes the north and south tactical headquarters, as well as the Groupes Mobiles.

3. The Ministry of Defense, instead of being placed under direction of a weak general such as Bounleut, will remain (at least for now) in the hands of the colonels. Thongphanh will be asked to act in lieu of a director general and Souvanna has asked him to move six or eight “good colonels” out of the General Staff to head the new functional divisions being removed from the General Staff and transferred into MOD.

4. Souvanna said his next problem was to remove several generals who were useless and get them retired by one means or another. There might also be some colonels in this category. He had asked Quan to draw up an “execution list” of those who should disappear. After he got rid of these, he proposed to promote some of the “good colonels” to generals.

5. I told Souvanna that I thought his next serious problem was the Air Force, particularly the transport aircraft which were being used for smuggling and private commerce. He agreed and said that he had caught Bounpone red-handed in the latest smuggling effort to Saigon. I said Sourith seemed honest but not strong enough to control the senior generals. Souvanna again agreed and said he was thinking of putting the Air Force directly under the Ministry rather than the General Staff. I said I thought that would be pretty difficult for tactical air, since the I–28s had to be handled by the officers in charge of operations. However, I saw no reason why transport aircraft couldn’t be brought under direct control of the new logistics section of the MOD. He said he would look into that approach.

6. We have other information being reported separately which indicates that long-standing problem of integrated ranks for neutralist officers has also been agreed and forwarded to the King. If King accepts this proposal, this will resolve another nettlesome issue.

7. Comment: Although progress is slow and tedious, it is generally in the right direction.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
2. In these telegrams, April 19 and 25, the Embassy reported on Souvanna’s meeting with Lao generals at Luang Prabang to discuss military reorganization and on a later discussion between Sullivan and Souvanna on the same subject. (Ibid.)
3. May 4.