Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

364. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz)¹

Vientiane, May 6, 1968.

Dear Martin:

I was just about to answer your letter of April 24² when I received Westmoreland’s message to Wheeler advising him that he had decided to cancel the Haymaker aspect of Operation Delaware. Although the reasons attributed to this move reflect the possibility to leakage to the press, I would guess that another aspect is the fact that there currently appears to be very little enemy presence in the area where the operation was intended.

I don’t think, from this development, that we have seen the last of Haymakers, because I suspect that an effort will be made to launch a similar operation into some other more promising base area. Now that the principle has been established I am sure that MACV will not fail to exploit this possibility.³

As you point out in your letter, I did not submit any specific comments on the MACV proposal for Operation Delaware. My decision to take this course was based on a number of considerations. First, the Haymaker conception, which is a considerable retreat from Southpaw and York, brought into action forces which have already demonstrated their ability to operate in Laos without press leakage. Secondly, the move was contrived in such a way that it could be described entirely in terms of action to be taken for the protection of United States forces on the A Shau battlefield. Thirdly, it was within the framework (Prairie Fire) which Oley Sharp, Westie and I had agreed in our last SEACOORD meeting might be the only tolerable arrangement to which I could give concurrence.⁴

Therefore, I placed my entire considerations on the question of the relationship of this proposed action to the President’s de-escalation policy. The Air Force has been so nervous about air operations in the north of Laos which might impinge on that policy that I was frankly somewhat surprised when approval for Haymaker was given quite so rapidly. However, I suppose it reflects the President’s annoyance that North Vietnamese infiltration efforts have apparently stepped up rather than relaxed since the March 31 speech.

There have been some communications back and forth between Westmoreland and myself on this whole subject which have not been repeated to Washington. I think that it is probably best that they remain in this category for the sake of mutual good faith and continued collaboration. On the whole, however, I think you on the desk and we in the field have remained very much on the same wave length and I appreciate all that you have done to hold the line. As we move into the successively more complex period of negotiating while fighting, I think this sort of entente becomes even more important. Especially, I believe it is going to become important for us all to have our facts and our intelligence straight before making decisions. I have recently sent in a cable expressing some skepticism about the infiltration figures projected from North into South Viet Nam during the rainy season.⁵ This will doubtless cause some consternation in DIA and elsewhere, but I feel it would be very useful for you to bring it to the attention of Bundy, Katzenbach, and the Secretary⁶ as the sort of thing we must be absolutely sure about when we make political and military decisions in the near future. We must remember that the North Vietnamese are perfectly capable of running deception operations and that our military intelligence system is so attuned that it vibrates violently in response to such deceptions.

For the moment then all is well that ends well on Haymaker. But for the future, I think a little more careful questioning of intelligence premises and the alleged facts needs to be done by our State Department sources whenever they are called upon to make decisions of this dimension.

All the best,
Sincerely,

Bill

1. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret; Official-Informal.
2. Not found.
3. Herz wrote the following marginal note at this point: “Yes, but the principle that you can’t keep it secret, which was a condition for approval, has been established.”
4. Herz at this point wrote, “this is new.”
5. At this point Herz asked, “GMG [Godley] wasn’t it No Distribution Outside Dept?”
6. At this point Herz wrote the following: “Note: Message was almost two weeks old by time this arrived; was superceded by a much better (exdis/no distribution outside Dept.) message on the same subject; as GMG said INR is sure we’re not being spoofed; so did not distribute further.”