Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

350. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, March 26, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Study Laos/Thailand

At Mr. William Bundy’s request I am forwarding for your information a copy of the Contingency Study Laos/Thailand.

Although the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate² will conclude that a rapid extension of Communist forces in Laos in a westward direction (to the Mekong) is on balance unlikely, the enclosed Contingency Study has been prepared on the assumption that the present clear enemy capabilities may result in just such an action.

The study, which also indicates a number of actions that could be taken now in an attempt to deter the North Vietnamese from such a westward move, has been prepared in close cooperation with Defense and CIA.

Benjamin H. Read

³

Attachment

Washington, undated.

CONTINGENCY STUDY LAOS/THAILAND

I. Purpose of Study

In view of the current intensification of the war in Laos and the capabilities of the NVA/PL forces in Laos to take over the entire country, to examine the actions available to the RLG, RTG and USG under the assumptions described below.

II. Assumptions

1. If the enemy wished to take the lowlands of the Laos Panhandle, he could make quick thrusts to key points on the Mekong with little advance notice. This would involve small forces maneuvering in open country which would make them highly vulnerable to air power. However, such operations could succeed within days in the face of crumbling Lao resistance.

2. While the enemy would require a substantial buildup over a period of weeks or even months to mount a coordinated drive to occupy all the lowlands in the Panhandle, he could achieve the same objective by following up his initial thrusts with a gradual buildup to extend his hold on the lowlands. Such a strategy would be feasible, but would probably require substantial diversion of forces and resources from other operations.

3. If the enemy wished to take over all of Laos, including the mountainous areas of the North, he would require a substantial buildup over a period of months. However, a successful campaign in the Panhandle could result in a crumbling of resistance also in the North; and it is therefore possible that Laos might be reduced to an enclave around Vientiane in a matter of weeks after the launch of a determined enemy campaign.

III. U.S. Commitments & Assurances (See Tab A)

A. Thailand. We are committed by Article IV of the SEATO Treaty⁴ to consult with the other parties if Thailand decides that Communist actions in Laos threaten it or endanger the peace of the area. Such consultations would be held “in order to agree on the measures which shall be taken for the common defense.” By the same article we are committed to “act to meet the common danger” if a Communist attack in Laos were not simply a threat but were part of an armed attack against Thailand.

In July 1963, we privately assured Thailand that the U.S. “will not sit idly by and allow the Communists to become entrenched on the borders of Thailand.” President Johnson authorized consultations in 1964 “looking toward joint Thai-U.S. military planning of measures to be taken in the event of a Communist drive toward the borders of Thailand.”

The President stated “we must be prepared to act promptly and effectively to check such a drive if necessary.” The resulting plan (Project 22⁵) calling for substantial U.S. and Thai actions in Laos as well as Thailand was approved by the Joint Chiefs in May 1965.

Project 22 is a plan, not a commitment. It provides for implementation “only upon mutual agreement and consent of both the United States and Royal Thai Governments.” However, the Thais will justifiably expect the U.S. to take meaningful action to meet a threat to the Thai border.

U.S. or Thai operations in Laos to protect Thailand in the contingency stated require the consent of the RLG. Failure to obtain that consent would raise serious legal problems under the 1962 Geneva Agreement and SEATO, and would preclude reliance on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as Congressional authorization of such action.

B. Laos. The United States has no defense commitments to Laos, but the obligations of Article IV of the SEATO Treaty extend to the territory of Laos. However, the 1962 Geneva Agreement committed the RLG not to recognize the protection of SEATO and not to allow the introduction of foreign troops into Laos. The Geneva Agreement was not intended to deprive Laos of its inherent right of self-defense against armed attack, but the present Lao Government, which owes its existence to the Geneva Accords, is not likely to request foreign troops even in circumstances in which such action could be justifiable. It would almost certainly not repudiate the 1962 Agreement by involving SEATO, despite the Western view that the SEATO Treaty could be applicable should the RLG justifiably invoke it.

IV. Thai and Lao Political Attitudes in the Contingency

A. Thailand. Although deeply concerned by the recent Tet offensive, increased insurgency in North Thailand, and Communist advances in Laos, the Thai Government has kept its nerve and reacted calmly. This has been based on confidence that these setbacks are temporary and the U.S. has the strength and will to defend Thailand effectively.

Any indication that the U.S. was unwilling to carry out what the Thai regard as our commitments, particularly under present circumstances, would result in a very serious and adverse Thai reaction. This could include loss of cooperation and operational flexibility in use of Thai air bases, delay or refusal to deploy the forces currently training for Vietnam, etc.—in short an “agonizing reappraisal” of the whole basis of Thai support for the United States in Southeast Asia today.

The Thai have made it clear in the past that if we are considering the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Thailand as a deterrent to Communist actions in Laos, we must be prepared to use these forces outside of Thailand. They are not interested in another deployment a la 1962 when U.S. forces came simply to stay in Thailand. Additionally, the Thai have made it clear that if we are prepared to bring in troops for use outside Thailand, they are prepared to join forces with us in these operations.

B. Laos. A concerted enemy move to the Mekong would be a heavy blow to the position of Souvanna, but he might be persuaded to remain as Prime Minister on the grounds that he is best able to obtain foreign support and to function as national rallying point. Any other Prime Minister would be confronted with even greater internal dissension unless the King, with U.S. support, were to intervene with unaccustomed vigor. National divisions would be especially along North-South lines, with the southerners tending to seek foreign support without reference to Vientiane. In the southern cities there would be panic, and the mass exodus across the Mekong would not be confined to civilians. Southern leaders might, however, think in terms of holding beachheads around such cities as Thakhek, Savannakhet and Pakse.

If the Communists move militarily to take over all of Laos, we must assume that they would take parallel political steps such as the presentation of a “true” Government of National Union. It is hard to see how the Soviet Union could avoid transferring its recognition to such a government. Even if this were not to occur, but especially if it does, Souvanna would consider his position untenable and his neutralist government would come to an end. Under the contingency of an all-out Communist effort, the crumbling of the political structure would be of major proportions. There would be defections of important political leaders to the Communists, particularly from among Souvanna’s Neutralists. Even if the Government remained in a Vientiane enclave, many other political (and military) leaders would cross into Thailand.

Although Souvanna Phouma has consistently said that he would not ask for foreign military intervention because he did not wish to turn neutral Laos into a major battleground, it is conceivable that in a calamitous military situation he might ask for foreign intervention to avoid the extinction of his country. More likely, however, he would resign and let another leader issue such a call. Intervention would presumably be asked on the grounds of collective self-defense rather than the SEATO protocol.

V. Possible Deterrent Actions

A. Diplomatic

1. Lao Actions: Call for Geneva Conference. We believe Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma would be prepared to issue such a call (presumably addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the 1962 Conference) since it fits in with his carefully phased sequence of approaches which has now reached stage 3 of the following series: (1) calls for action by the ICC; (2) appeals to the Co-Chairmen; (3) asking the Co-Chairmen to call for “consultations” among the Geneva signatories as called for by Article 4 of the 1962 Declaration, which Souvanna did February 29, without success to date. The logical next step (4) is to call for reconvening the Geneva Conference, a call which the Communists would resist unless they are ready to agree to such a meeting for discussions of a wider Indochina settlement. The Lao Prime Minister would probably prefer to take step 4 in an emergency, rather as a deterrent to head off the contingency.

A call for a new Geneva Conference would have some limited value by helping to dramatize the situation and by showing that Laos was exhausting all means available to it under the Geneva Accords. Although the 1962 Declaration does not specifically envisage a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, Article 4 obligates the signatories “in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.”

2. Thai Actions (SEATO). Thailand could also call for consultations under Article IV(2) of the Manila Pact. These consultations could be used to publicize the Communist threat in Laos. This could be a prelude to a SEATO Council meeting on this matter—either a special meeting or the upcoming annual Council meeting of April 2–5.

3. Other U.S. Measures. U.S. note to the Geneva Co-Chairmen, in support of initiatives of Souvanna under 1 above, with appropriate publicity, and with lateral circulation to other signatories of the 1962 Accords.

Bilateral U.S. discussion with the Soviets, in an attempt to convince them that we would have to react militarily if the military equilibrium in Laos were destroyed. (Warnings of this kind have been given, more or less explicitly, on several occasions. Our Embassy in Vientiane issued one to the Soviet Embassy there in January; the Soviets seemed to understand the message, but there was no visible result. On the other hand, the Secretary’s remark to Ambassador Dobrynin in February,⁶ which was specifically keyed to the situation at Saravane, may have resulted in the NVA/PL exercising some restraint there—although the Communists may not have intended to take Saravane.)

Suggesting to the British, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen, that they make parallel demarches to the Soviet Union.

U.S., British, and other friendly demarches to the Indian Government in an effort to prod the ICC into activity.

All the foregoing steps could be taken or repeated now, but they would have greater credibility, in terms of the stated or implied threat of U.S. forceful counter-action, if they coincided with an obviously critical military situation.

B. Military

1. Air

a. Thai Air Actions.

1) Use Thai T–28’s for Strikes in Laos. With US/RLG/RTG agreement, additional T–28’s in the RTAF inventory (total now is 46) could be drawn against to augment the present RLAF capability. Additional Thai pilots could be provided to man these. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

2) Overt Use of Other Thai Air Assets. To impress the enemy with the credibility of Thai intentions, the RTG, with agreement of the RLG, might employ the tactical air assets of the RTAF overtly in combat operations in Laos. Air strikes could be accomplished by the T–28’s, F–86F’s, and F–5’s in the RTAF’s inventory. However, of the 27 F–86’s in the inventory, only 15 are currently operationally ready. Also, the limited number of F–5’s (6) diminishes their potential military contribution. Their principal contribution would be psychological, i.e., a forceful demonstration of Thai willingness to act to meet the threat.

b. U.S. Air Actions

1) U.S. Tactical Air Operations in Laos. Areas of U.S. “armed reconnaissance,” called Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll, are presently confined to the eastern Panhandle and northeastern Laos (Maps at Tab B). Strikes by U.S. tactical aircraft outside these areas may now be conducted in response to RLG requests concurred in by Embassy Vientiane. In order to cope with situations envisaged under this contingency in a systematic manner and to enable full employment of U.S. tactical air power against the enemy, the RLG would probably request necessary enlargement of presently established “armed reconnaissance” areas of Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll to coincide with significant areas of Communist penetrations. Target selection would have to be controlled to avoid unnecessary danger to the Lao civilian populations.

2) Arc Light Operations in Laos. B–52 strikes on Communist forces advancing on or in the Mekong lowlands could be conducted to supplement Arc Light operations presently being conducted in the eastern Panhandle, generally opposite the DMZ, and add to the interdiction efforts of U.S. tactical air. Arc Light targets in new areas would be coordinated with Souvanna by the Embassy.

3) U.S. Air Units to Thailand. The crowded air base situation in Thailand and the possible deployment to Vietnam of available air units would limit our flexibility in this regard. Additional construction and the attendant delay would be necessary to increase B–52 basing in Thailand. However, an increase in tactical air assets could, with RTG concurrence, be accommodated at existing bases. These would add sortie assets for use in Laos. However, a decision to deploy additional tactical air assets without utilizing Nam Phong would saturate existing facilities and decrease the effectiveness of base operations. Given the situation of a major Communist drive toward the Mekong and the attendant requirements for increased U.S. air efforts in Laos, very high priority would be given to the allocation of appropriate U.S. air resources, propeller aircraft as well as jets. If the decision were made to deploy additional U.S. tactical air assets, the move should be coupled with appropriate publicity linking this action with our concern about the situation in Laos, to achieve maximum deterrent effect.

2. Ground

a. Thai Ground Actions

1) Deployment Of Additional Thai Ground Units To Northeast. Only about 21 infantry maneuver battalions (18 Army and 3 Marines) and perhaps as many as six battalions of artillery, tank and/or engineers, could be deployed to the Northeast relatively quickly, and these only as a show of force. Their operational readiness is severely hampered by logistics deficiencies, especially in the area of tactical mobility, training, and low manning. Before they could begin to participate in combat operations, the U.S. would have to take extraordinary logistics actions to include airlifting equipment from CONUS stocks since in-country U.S. depot stocks have been drastically depleted. Depending on when executed, stocks may not be readily available in the U.S. Even then, Thai capability to sustain effective combat operations would be minimal.

The current status of the Royal Thai Army may be summarized as follows: The on-board strength of the Thai Army is approximately 100,000 (72% of its authorized level of 139,000). MAP-supported strength totals 89,000. The remaining 11,000 are such non MAP-supported units as General and Special staffs, Military Circle Headquarters, and the King’s Guard. The MAP-supported units include 3 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, a separate regimental combat team, and miscellaneous airborne, special forces, engineer, artillery and signal units. Collectively, on paper, the RTA has about 30 infantry maneuver battalion equivalents, 10 artillery battalions, 3 tank battalions, 4 engineer battalions, 1 airborne battalion, and a special forces battalion. In terms of actual on-board strength, these units total approximately 40,000 men, well below their authorized level, of which about 11,000 are infantry personnel (the equivalent of 18 maneuver battalions, if some patching together were done). The remaining 39,000 MAP-supported personnel comprise non-combat signal, transportation, ordnance, QM, medical and headquarters elements.

Some five infantry maneuver and three artillery battalion equivalents are currently deployed on counter-insurgency missions.

Additionally, there are three maneuver battalion equivalents of Thai Marines garrisoned in the Sattahip area.

2) Divert Thai Force Now in Training for SVN to Northeast. A Thai brigade of some 5,500 personnel is now in training for deployment to SVN in July. The force could be deployed to the Northeast in lieu of Vietnam, if the final phases of training were completed after deployment. This assumes the force would not engage immediately in combat operations. However, this step should not be taken lightly. Once deployed to the Northeast, it is highly questionable that it would redeploy to Vietnam as long as a threat from Laos existed. In this event, the Communist threat, even though perhaps not implemented, would succeed in tying down this operationally ready and well-equipped force when its services would be better utilized in SVN. One additional factor is that this force consists of 50% volunteers whose notivations are, at least in part, based on the financial remuneration of Vietnam service. This would be denied if the force deployed to the Northeast. The morale implications are obvious. In summary, the diversion of this unit from its SVN mission should be considered only as a last resort.

3) Call-Up Thai Reserves. The RTG has a mobilization system and plans which provide for a call-up of approximately 200,000 personnel. Except for the possible favorable domestic impact this would have in the U.S. (should U.S. Reserves be called, we could at least point out that the Thai have done the same), this action should not be seriously considered. These reservists have had no active-duty training since their discharge from the Army; qualified officers and NCO’s are not available for assignment to the units called; and the problem of equipping the personnel called up appears virtually insurmountable.

b. U.S. Ground Actions

1) Deployment of U.S. Ground Forces to Thailand. The deployment of perhaps a brigade or two of the U.S. Army would probably have a significant deterrent effect on an enemy decision on whether to proceed to the Mekong. Thai misgivings regarding U.S. deployments to be used in a defensive posture would first have to be overcome. A deployment of this magnitude, however, would require a call-up of U.S. reservists or a drawdown of Army units from elsewhere. With Reserve callup, two brigades could be made available by the end of July,⁷ but would preclude any further deployments to South Vietnam, if required. An additional division could be made available through Reserve callup by the end of September, but major problems with equipment procurement and additional funds make even this capability doubtful. An argument against providing forces to Thailand is the commitment implication attendant to such an action. Should the deterrent effect not be accomplished, the RTG will undoubtedly expect that this force will be committed to operations, as the first increment of additional U.S. forces they would expect under Project 22. Another possibility, perhaps more remote, is that if Communist activity in Laos were coupled with significantly increased insurgent activity in Thailand, to include attacks against air bases, the RTG might ask that U.S. forces be committed to CI operations in Thailand. In either event, it might be politically difficult to get U.S. forces out should we decide not to implement Project 22.

2) Measures Related to Possible Reconstitution of U.S. Stocks in Thailand. A possible deterrent measure would be an effort by us to give the impression that we are rebuilding U.S. project stocks in Thailand to the point where they were in 1964. This would entail certain overt gestures, in the form of providing readily available material to the stocks, with appropriate unofficial “leaking” to insure the other side got the word. Some actual rebuilding of the stocks, albeit necessarily minimal, would have to be accomplished to maintain a degree of credibility vis-à-vis the other side, but no special emphasis should be placed on the action in any discussions we may have with the RTG.

3. Unconventional

a. Prairie Fire (US/GVN Special Forces into Laos). This program employs about 2,000 Special Forces personnel (including 300 U.S.) organized into reconnaissance and exploitation teams which presently operate from SVN bases against enemy lines of communications in Laos within an area of operations as shown on the attached map (Tab C). Exploitation of targets west of this area could be accomplished on a case-by-case basis through coordination between CINCPAC and Embassy Vientiane, and if considered necessary, with Washington approval. Operations will be significantly more effective by using Thai staging bases when weather prevents the use of SVN bases.

b. CAS Operations. A significant increase in CAS operations is extremely difficult before the end of the present dry season. Depending on time available and the location of the threat, intensification is possible which would result in increased intelligence on advancing NVN/PL forces and intensified harassment of these troops placing an additional burden on the attackers. Intensification of guerrilla operations would be greatly enhanced if additional tactical air and helicopter support were made available.

VI. Possible Actions if Deterrent Fails

A. Diplomatic

I. Laos

a. Geneva Machinery. An enemy drive to the Mekong would lend urgency (as well as greater plausibility) to Souvanna’s appeal for reconvening of the 1962 Geneva Conference. The considerations under section V would apply, except that such a conference would be pointless if convened only after the enemy had achieved all his objectives. There is no reason to believe that the Communist countries would heed a call to such a conference unless they were prepared, on terms acceptable to them, to deal with the entire Indochina problem. In view of the need for speed, Souvanna might try to settle for a “little” Geneva Conference without the Communists. Even non-Communist signatories of the 1962 agreement (France, India, Burma, Cambodia) would probably refuse to attend such a meeting, which would be only a minor propaganda operation.

b. Appeal to the UN Security Council. In addition to his appeal for a Geneva Conference, which would take some time to bear fruit even under favorable circumstances, Souvanna should be encouraged to take his case directly to the UN Security Council. He is judged to be reluctant to take his case to the UN, largely because of his past experiences with an ineffectual UN mission to Laos, and also because he regards the Geneva framework as overriding, but he could probably be persuaded to appeal to the UNSC in a desperate situation, as means to arouse world public opinion. There would be difficulty in obtaining inscription, but a majority would probably be found in favor.

While a Soviet veto would presumably preclude any helpful resolution, resort to the SC would have two beneficial aspects: (1) Souvanna’s credentials as a neutralist and the record of his appeals to the Geneva machinery would make his denunciations of Communist aggression fairly effective; and (2) he would imply, or perhaps state, that he was exhausting the last peaceful means available to him before calling for direct foreign assistance. This could be an important signal to the enemy. On the negative side, we must expect any SC discussion to degenerate quickly into a sterile rehearsal of old charges about Vietnam.

Should Souvanna go to the Security Council before he had exhausted the scenario envisaged under V.A above, it is possible that the Soviets would claim that the matter should properly be discussed by a reconvened 1962 Geneva Conference rather than by the UN. This would be a plus if it were to mean that the Soviets would support the convening of a Geneva Conference. In effect, there would be an aspect of ju-jitsu: utilizing the momentum of Soviet opposition to SC consideration to impel them to a Geneva Conference. More likely, however, the Soviets would oppose inscription and try to confuse the debate without actually commiting themselves to a Geneva Conference.

2. Thailand. SEATO. Following consultations (see V.A.2 above) the SEATO Council could meet in special (or the regular) session as a means of further dramatizing the seriousness of the situation. The U.S. should be prepared to take the lead but would seek support from other Asian member nations as well.

3. U.S. Intensified actions pursuing the initiatives taken under V.A.3 and supporting those under VI.A.1&2.

B. Military

1. Partial or Full Implementation of Project 22. A full scale Communist thrust toward the Mekong lowlands could well trigger a Thai request for implementation of Project 22 (CINCUSTAFF Plan 1/65) or similar SEATO contingency plans. At Tab D is a listing of U.S. and Thai force commitments under Project 22. U.S. forces committed total 138,440 (of which 134,040 are Army) and Thai forces, 62,800. Of the approximately 63,000 Thai forces committed, some 10,000 are relatively operationally ready but, even with these, certain equipment deficiencies would have to be remedied by the U.S. particularly in the area of mobility. Furthermore, many of these personnel are presently committed to CI operations in Thailand. The remainder of the Thai units committed to the plan have serious manning and logistical shortfalls, especially the combat support units. Indeed, many of the units do not even exist. Even with a concerted effort by the U.S., utilizing existing equipment in theater, these problems are not susceptible of rapid solution. In short, we should not encourage the Thai to believe we are prepared to move into the Mekong lowlands.

2. Expand Prairie Fire Program in Panhandle. Prairie Fire (US/GVN Special Forces into Laos) operations could be expanded and improved by removing the existing western limitation to Prairie Fire operations; by permitting employment of teams throughout the Panhandle; by author-izing operations into Laos from Thailand bases and from forward operating sites in Laos, if available; and by authorizing Prairie Fire to supplement its operations by developing the tribal guerrilla warfare potential.

VII. Conclusions

A. If the enemy moves to take over the Panhandle lowlands, it is unlikely that we will be able to determine his ultimate intentions quickly. His initial moves might be probes (as in the past), or diversions, or the beginning of a much more ambitious undertaking.

B. Even though an enemy operation to take over all of Laos in unlikely and also apt to be preceded by a considerable buildup, the possibility of a crumbling of almost all Lao resistance exists if the enemy makes some determined thrusts in the South and follows them up with occupation of the populous Southern lowlands.

C. The following factors will make it difficult to reach a firm U.S./Thai decision on major military countermeasures such as the implementation of Project 22:

1. Shortage of readily available Thai and U.S. personnel, compounded by serious logistic problems;

2. The uncertain legal basis for action on Lao territory without the consent of the RLG, and predictable differences between the U.S. view of its commitments to Thailand and Thai expectations;

3. The difficulty of evaluating enemy intentions as evidenced by experience in November 1965 when Communist forces pushed to Thakhek on the Mekong (and were repulsed by the FAR) without triggering contingency plans.

D. The factors cited above point in favor of undertaking promptly measures short of Project 22 for their deterrent effect.

E. If these measures should not prevent the Communists from establishing themselves in force on the Mekong, a wholly new strategic situation would result which would raise serious questions about whether the U.S. should deploy major forces into Thailand, enter Laos in force from the East, etc. This contingency lies outside the scope of this paper and would have to be examined separately.

[Here follow Tab A, “Legal Basis for U.S. Military Assistance in Defense of Laos”; Tabs B and C, maps of Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll areas of operation; Tab D, a map of the Prairie Fire area of operations; and Tab E, “U.S./Thai Force Commitments Contained in CINCUSTAFF 1/65.”]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. For the additional drafting information on this study, see Document 348. Sent also to Steadman, Special Assistant to Clifford, and on April 2 to Taylor at the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LAOS)
2. Document 346.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature as well as an illegible handwritten signature of the officer who signed for Read.
4. For text of the SEATO (Manila Pact) Treaty and Protocol of September 8, 1954, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. II, pp. 912–916.
5. Code name of a U.S.-Thai military plan for the contingency of a Communist drive toward the Mekong lowlands, which the Thai regard as vital to their security. It was authorized by the President on June 22, 1964 (from which its name—Project 22. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. See Document 331.
7. The contingency of a rapid enemy thrust to the Mekong applies only to the dry season, which lasts from October to May. [Footnote in the source text.]