299. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
Vientiane, July 18, 1967,
0330Z.
326. Joint Embassy, ARMA, AIRA, USAID, CAS message. Subject: Dry season wrap-up.
- 1.
- After a false start in early June, the rainy season made a tardy beginning in July. Lao “patriotic” forces preferred to call an earlier and [Page 599] more traditional halt to the dry season at a May 18 celebration in Sam Neua. Despite their grossly exaggerated claim of having killed over 3500 “reactionary” troops, shot down or damaged 183 planes, and liberated over 40,000 people, they were probably much more anxious to see the end of this than previous dry seasons.
- 2.
- Unlike prior years when they made significant dry season gains, North Vietnamese troops, abetted by the Lao People’s “Liberation” Army, were unable to seize and hold any major objective except Nong Khang in northern Houa Phan Province. They additionally lost control over a substantial area in the Sedone Valley that had been under Communist jurisdiction for approximately a decade. Despite repeated attacks, government troops were able to retain exposed sites like Nakhang in Xieng Khouang and Nam Bac in Luang Prabang. A steady flow of refugees from Communist zones testified to the difficulty of life in enemy areas.
- 3.
- The government military stance was stronger because of increased devastation from air strikes due to (a) improved intelligence from road watch and reconnaissance teams; (b) better exploitation of; prisoners, particularly North Vietnamese and LPLA defectors of stature; (c) improved communications between ground observers and strike aircraft that have shortened the time gap between reporting and attacks on targets; and (d) night flying aircraft that made their debut November 2 and have been hampering enemy truck movements during darkness. Other factors include increasing North Vietnamese involvement in South Vietnam which has brought no fewer but much greener North Vietnamese troops to Laos; a lowering of enemy morale because of food shortages, labor levies, and fear of air strikes; increased cooperation, since Kong Ke’s ouster on October 17, between FAR and Neutralist troops, even to the extent of conducting the joint operation around Lao Ngam in April and May; and slightly improved morale of government troops due to successful retention of the Nam Bac Valley and the military achievements of the Lao Ngam operation.
- 4.
- Better government posture did not always match military success. However, the army still largely thinks in terms of occupying territory rather than winning people. While civil-military relations were good in Vang Vieng, Nam Bac, and Lao Ngam, they were poor in other areas like Kassy, southeastern Wapikhamthong Province, Pakkhanya, and Muong Soui. Some of these unfavorable examples permitted enemy exploitation of the civil populace in attacks against both Lao and Americans.
- 5.
- The most significant new enemy activity during the recent dry season was increased terrorism against Americans. An IVS worker was assassinated in Pakkhanya March 25. The USAID house was attacked and looted at Houei Mun in southern Savannakhet March 30, but Americans [Page 600] had already been withdrawn.LPLA troops have been firing on and stopping USAID vehicles at several locations in south Laos during the last few months. The LPLA blew a hole with a bazooka round through the USAID house in Kassy June 8. No one was killed but some non-Americans were wounded. LPLA soldiers have warned villagers near Nong Bok not to ride in American vehicles lest they also become targets.
- 6.
- This shift to enemy concentration on Americans is in part testimony to the impact USAID efforts are making in rural Laos. Failure to establish full security in cluster and forward area operations has halted or hampered USAID development efforts in Kassy, Nong Bok, Nam Bac, Houei Mun, and Pakkhanya, however.
- 7.
- Although Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky attributed the absence of significant Communist military action during the dry season to a Communist desire to freeze the military position along its present lines (State 208755),2 the North Vietnamese actually tried hard to make advances but were less successful this time. They may well look to a freeze, based on incapacity rather than willingness, as the only means of maintaining the status quo.
- 8.
- Thus although the recently ended dry season marked modest gains in the government position, the costly war of attrition in Laos is far from over. The North Vietnamese retain their dual objective of keeping the corridor open to South Vietnam, and occupying much of North Laos under the facade of the Lao “Patriotic” Front. They may favor a freeze tactically, judging that for the time being their resources would be better used elsewhere. Strategically, there is no indication of North Vietnam’s willingness to abandon its ultimate goals in Laos.
Sullivan