300. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Steadman) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib)1
Dear Phil:
As you are well aware, we have been trying for over two months to resolve the problems posed by the proposed ground surveillance activity in support of Illinois City and the political objections thereto. The areas of controversy are three: first, the expansion of the Prairie Fire operational area; second, the launching of operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; and third, the employment of US/Thai teams in Laos.
Since the desired operational date of 1 November is fast approaching, and since the Illinois City capability will be a limited one at that time, we need to reach an agreement promptly on at least a limited, initial program. As time goes on, as the Illinois City program expands, and as our operational experience dictates, we can address the appropriate modifications.
The essentials of this limited program are outlined below. It should be realized that this is far less than an optimum solution from a military standpoint and may not prove satisfactory. This would only be an initial effort sufficient to provide limited ground support to the early Illinois City system and to develop operational experience.
- a.
- Operations limited geographically to the existing Prairie Fire area.
- b.
- Team composition to be US/Vietnamese.
- c.
- Operations to be conducted from RVN to the maximum extent possible.
- d.
- Operations to be conducted from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when weather precludes operations from RVN.
- e.
- Teams to be staged through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] remaining in isolation on the base for minimum periods (probably no more than three nights).
- f.
- Use of Muong Phalane in Laos as a site to refuel and replenish ammunition for helicopters when operations are launched [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
As the additional munitions and aircraft become available, the Illinois City system will unquestionably expand its coverage in Laos. Whether the expansion will swing north, south or west (see map attached)2 [Page 602] is still uncertain and will depend a great deal on what the VC/NVA reaction will be to the initial efforts. When this expansion takes place a comparable extension of Prairie Fire limits will be required; however, this extension can be deferred and addressed specifically at the appropriate time.
The concept of shuttling teams from RVN [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is unwieldy and unresponsive and one which COMUSMACV has indicated as the least desirable solution. Operational experience with this concept may well dictate that this restriction be modified to permit a longer stay for teams at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], or perhaps at some other isolated location [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Again, however, we are prepared to make the initial effort using [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for minimum staging and control only.
We still consider that the use of US/Thai teams for this operation is a worthwhile concept, which should not be finally dismissed. Not only would these teams provide a higher quality source of manpower, but their use would eliminate any political problem which might stem from introduction of Vietnamese into Thailand. The objections to this concept in Embassy Vientiane are still somewhat obscure; and we feel that this idea merits further consideration.
In summary we seek your concurrence in the limited program outlined in paragraph 3 above, with the understanding that this should not be considered as a final resolution of those aspects of the plan which we now agree to defer.
Sincerely,