Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

298. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Saigon, July 11, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Arc Light Restrictions and Thai Based Fighter Aircraft

In accordance with your instructions, the two proposed papers are attached which would lift restrictions on B–52’s and Thai based fighter aircraft.²

For the Commander:

Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.³
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

Attachment

B–52 ARC LIGHT RESTRICTIONS

Restrictions

(1) B–52 strikes in Laos by Thailand based B–52’s are prohibited.

(2) B–52 strikes in Laos from Guam based aircraft must be made during the hours of darkness.

(3) Over-flights of Laos by B–52’s en route to targets in North or South Vietnam are prohibited.

Discussion

(1) B–52’s based at U–TAPAO could strike any target in South Vietnam or Laos and return in four hours or less. U–TAPAO based B–52’s could strike targets in DMZ or Mu Gia Pass area and return in less than three hours. Present route south of Cambodia requires up to six hours.

(2) Requiring B–52 strikes in Laos from Guam based aircraft only during the hours of darkness, places an undue restriction on the employment of the force. We should have maximum freedom to schedule the strikes so that we can take advantage of a divert situation for a target of opportunity in South Vietnam. Thus, the scheduling of strikes should be related to ground action in South Vietnam whenever possible. To limit such flights to the hours of darkness is tactically unsound.

(3) For an 800 sortie per month rate, the desired basing is 30 aircraft at U–TAPAO. To realize the best effectiveness from such basing, the three to four hour flight time is crucial in order to get strikes into the ground battle area when the ground commander wants them. Overflight of Laos is essential for exploitation of U–TAPAO basing. No tankers are required with this basing, thereby saving some 350 air refueling sorties per month.

Action Required

(1) Agreement between State and Defense to lift current restraints.

(2) Instructions from State to Ambassador Thailand and Vientiane to work out local arrangements in accordance with State/Defense agreement.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Paul C. Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, MCNTN XIV, Misc. (3). Top Secret. Copies were sent to JCS and CINCPAC.
2. The paper on the use of Thai-based fighter aircraft in South Vietnam is attached, but not printed.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Kerwin signed the original.