Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

292. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

CM-2453–67

Washington, June 17, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Prairie Fire—Phase III

1. Reference is made to:

a. JCSM–215–67, 20 April 1967.²

b. Letter from the Director, CIA, to Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 19 May 1967.³

2. Reference a recommended approval of a COMUSMACV concept to initiate a guerrilla warfare program in southeastern Laos. This program would exploit certain highland tribal groups who inhabit the area and are currently being exploited by the enemy to support infiltration activities. The concept is visualized as a supplement to ongoing Prairie Fire reconnaissance and interdiction operations and would be stated within the existing Prairie Fire zone with tribes who live astride the RVN/RLG border. If and when successful development of the guerrillas indicated, expansion beyond the existing Prairie Fire zone would be desirable in specific areas. Such expansion would, of course, be coordinated with any ongoing CAS operations.

3. Reference b raised certain objections of the Central Intelligence Agency to the concept. First, the capability to develop an effective guerrilla force is questioned; and second, a conflict between Prairie Fire and CAS operations is feared should the program expand.

4. The southeastern Panhandle of Laos is an immense, heavily jungled area, where the enemy has shown great skill and ingenuity in keeping his routes open and his bases secure. Although air operations, CAS, and Prairie Fire have all increased in capability and enjoyed increasing success, they have only reduced slightly the flow of enemy troops and material. Proportionate to the area and the size of the enemy forces deployed therein even the expanded CAS and Prairie Fire programs would be very modest in scope. The guerrilla concept is simply one more way to reduce the enemy’s security in the Panhandle and to force him to divert more effort to protect his supply lines and base areas. MACSOG has already made sufficient contacts with tribal groups living astride the RVN/RLG border to be confident that a real potential does exist, particularly with the Bru and Sedang tribes.

5. There is no intent on the part of CINCPAC or COMUSMACV to enter into conflict or competition with any CAS program. On the contrary, these programs are seen as being complementary. Initially, recruiting and development activity would be restricted to the Prairie Fire area. Only when and if the potential developed and the situation indicated, would a guerrilla warfare area be designated beyond that limit; and then such an area would be coordinated with CAS to ensure the most effective use of assets and over-all program. There is no intention to simply move the Prairie Fire line west to the Se Kong-Tchepone line.

6. Discussions between SACSA and CIA representatives indicate that the reservations expressed in Mr. Helm’s letter may have stemmed from a misunderstanding of the proposal, and that the CIA would not, in fact, object to the program within the present Prairie Fire area.⁴ However, they would rather defer any discussion of expansion beyond those limits until such a time as a guerrilla potential has actually been developed and a specific proposal can be made. This position is not incompatible with the JCS proposal, which recommends initial efforts limited to the present Prairie Fire area with later expansion as indicated by the situation that develops.

7. Accordingly, it is recommended that approval be granted to initiate the guerrilla warfare program within the present Prairie Fire zone. The problem of coordinating an expanded area will be reopened if and when it arises.

Earle G. Wheeler

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1967. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance saw it.
2. Document 282.
3. Not found.
4. In a June 28 memorandum to Vance, Helms indicated that after reading this memorandum the Agency view of the Joint Chief’s proposal “remains essentially as outlined to you in my letter of May 19. We do not see significant difficulties for existing Agency operational programs in the Laos Panhandle so long as the guerrilla force is deployed within the current Prairie Fire area.” Helms did suggest that the proposal raised “several political questions,” but noted that these were matters for the Department of State. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1967)