Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

293. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, June 21, 1967, 8:15–11 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Dinner for Foreign Minister Gromyko: Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Side:
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Goldberg
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., EUR
• Soviet Side:
  • Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
  • Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
  • Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko
  • Mr. Aleksandr Soldatov, Dep. Minister of Fon. Aff.
  • Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev, interpreter

The Secretary wondered if there were any possibility of solving the situation in Laos. We thought it could be solved in 8 hours. Did Mr. Gromyko see any way to proceed?

Mr. Gromyko said that the broadening of U.S. interference in Laos is the problem. U.S. aviation and U.S. military activities had increased. He was sorry about the U.S. behavior in Laos, which weakened Soviet arguments for maintaining the Laos agreements. The U.S. knows that the Soviet Union is not in Laos and is not active there.

The Secretary asked if the Soviet Union was prepared to go to 1000% agreement of all parties in Laos.

Mr. Gromyko asked if the U.S. was ready to do so tonight, to which the Secretary replied affirmatively. But, Mr. Gromyko said, the U.S. is in Laos tonight.

The Secretary said that 6,000 North Vietnamese troops had been left behind in Northern Laos after the agreement had been signed.

Mr. Gromyko said this was one-sided information which he could not accept as factual. However, it was a fact that the U.S. was in Laos. How could the U.S. say it was not interfering?

The Secretary said it should be understood that if a North Vietnamese division moves into Laos, we will bomb it. We don’t want to do so, but this is what will happen.

Mr. Gromyko said that if the U.S. was not in Laos it could talk of no interference with the observance of the agreement. But the U.S. is in Laos. There is not one Soviet soldier there.

The Secretary said that North Vietnamese troops are there. If we got out, would they get out? He suggested that the USSR should use its influence, as co-Chairman, to bring about the departure of the North Vietnamese troops.

Mr. Gromyko said that the U.S. was not a good example for others. At one time, the U.S. was not in Laos openly. We had military personnel there but they were in civilian clothes. Now the U.S. military operates openly. The U.S. is present, and this weakens the Soviet position as co-Chairman, and makes it difficult to use its influence positively.

The Secretary asked if the USSR would join with the other co-Chairman to get all of the parties out of Laos.

Mr. Gromyko thought it would be better for the Control Commission to take such responsibility. There are three groups in Laos. They should coordinate their actions better than they do. This difficulty is probably a result of U.S. influence on certain factions. If the U.S. used its influence correctly, there could be better cooperation among the 3.

The Secretary said it was our understanding of the English text of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement² that none of the three powers of the ICC could use the veto to restrict ICC activities.

Mr. Gromyko said they had a different interpretation. He continued that the U.S. position on Laos is weak—weaker than before. The U.S. is not only present, but it is present in a new way.

The Secretary asked what Mr. Gromyko thought about the North Vietnamese presence, but Mr. Gromyko said the problem was the United States presence.

The Secretary said that we had an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1962, but the North Vietnamese didn’t recognize it for a moment.

Mr. Gromyko thought there should be a discussion between the three groups in Laos. He thought the U.S. had more influence with Souvanna Phouma than the Soviets. It probably was the U.S. which complicated efforts at coordination among the three groups. If one compared the U.S. position in Laos with that of the Soviets, the U.S. position was worse.

The Secretary said this was not the point. The North Vietnamese are there and that is against the agreement.

Mr. Gromyko, in something of a non sequitur, said that the killing of a well-known leader of one of the political factions—Foreign Minister Pholsena³—had complicated the situation.

The Secretary said the circumstances of this were unclear. Some said Pholsena had been involved in the assassination of other figures.

Mr. Gromyko reacted strongly, saying there was not a grain of truth in this story. Had there been an investigation? Pholsena had been a neutralist, a Souvanna Phouma man. In any event, the Soviets were sorry that the situation in Laos had become worse. They had wanted agreement. He did not exclude that the Soviets would revert to the Laos problem again.

The Secretary asked why we could not all act to support the original agreement in Laos.

Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviets would be prepared to consider realistic problems without prejudice, but that we should not complicate the situation with false stories. (The latter was apparently in reference to the discussion about Pholsena.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in Rusk’s office on June 27. The dinner meeting was held at the Secretary’s apartment in the Waldorf Towers. The conversation on Laos is one part of seven memoranda of conversation. All are ibid., Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Rusk-Gromyko.
2. Rusk is apparently referring to the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1078–1083.
3. Minister Quinim Pholsena was assassinated on April 1, 1963.