Office of the Historian

282. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM–215–67
Washington, April 20, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • Prairie Fire—Phase III
1.
Reference is made to:
a.
COMUSMACV message to CINCPAC, 250820Z March 1967, JCS IN 89390.
b.
CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 010011Z April 1967, JCS IN 13559.2
2.
(TS) The area of Laos between the Tchepone-Se Kong River line and the Lao/Vietnam border continues to be dominated by North Vietnamese forces and to serve as the principal infiltration route and support area for enemy operations in South Vietnam. The avowed neutrality of Laos and the US desire to conform as closely as possibility to the provisions of the Geneva Accords have limited friendly activity in the area to Prairie Fire reconnaissance and exploitation missions, air operations, and some CAS road watch teams. Although all of these efforts have gradually increased in scope and effectiveness, they are by no means capable of stemming the infiltration or denying the use of the area. Therefore, the search has continued for new or improved concepts to deal with the problem without a drastic shift in policy toward Laos and without upsetting that country’s political and military balance.
3.
(TS) During the conduct of Prairie Fire operations over the past few months, COMUSMACV’s Studies and Observations Group (SOG) has identified and assessed a potential for the establishment of a friendly guerrilla force in the Annamite Mountain Region of southern Laos. This potential is the Kha tribal group which inhabits the area and is being exploited by the enemy. Past experience with Montagnard groups in [Page 568] Southeast Asia has shown that these people will respond to Caucasian influence and can be developed into guerrilla forces. Such a program could provide an important supplement to the existing counter-infiltration effort at a low cost in men and materiel and with a low risk of embarrassing the neutralist Government of Laos.
4.
(TS) CINCPAC has endorsed (reference 1b) a COMUSMACV proposal (reference 1a) that SOG develop and direct a guerrilla program in southeastern Laos. The proposed concept of operations is outlined in Appendix A hereto. Estimates at this time indicate a potential force of some 3,000 men and a requirement for 135 US Army personnel.
5.
(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the proposed concept and consider that this course of action should be pursued. Time consuming and carefully executed preliminary activities such as contact, exfiltration, training, indoctrination, reinfiltration, and recruiting must be undertaken before it will be possible to determine the exact scope and area of the program. These initial steps can be taken without an expansion of the Prairie Fire zone or the commitment of additional US Army Special Forces into Laos. However, this initial activity should not be undertaken without conceptual approval of the over-all program.
6.
(TS) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a.
The guerrilla warfare concept contained in Appendix A3 be approved in principle for further planning, training, and discussion with RVNAF.
b.
Execution of the preparatory phase (Appendix A, subparagraph 1b (1)) be approved.
c.
Execution of the exploitation phase (Appendix A, subparagraph 1b (2)) be approved, subject to the successful accomplishment of the preparatory phase and further assessment.
d.
The phased PCS deployment to RVN of 135 additional US Army personnel be approved.
e.
Additional funds in the estimated amount of $2,000,000 be provided to the Department of the Navy for the support of this program through the fourth quarter FY 1968.
f.
A memorandum substantially as contained in Appendix B hereto, together with Appendix A, be forwarded to the Secretary of State.
7.
(U) Upon receipt of your approval, the implementing message in Appendix C hereto will be dispatched.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler 4
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1967. Top Secret; Sensitive.↩
  2. Neither reference has been found, however both are described in the text.↩
  3. Appendices A–C are attached but not printed.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.↩