Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

283. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, May 1, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Limitations on Military Actions in Laos

1. You asked me to set out in a paper my estimate of the limitations which face us with respect to extending military actions, both ground and air, in Laos. I will list by subheading those various items which have been proposed or contemplated, and give you my current best judgment with respect to each.

2. Ground Action

A. Prairie Fire. As you are aware, the Prairie Fire zone has been extended to accommodate a strip 20 kilometers deep from the DMZ down to the old Shining Brass area. It then runs south to the Cambodian border in a zone which varies between 20 and 35 kilometers deep. The ground rules for operations in this zone have been progressively extended until they now permit harassment actions by forces which can number up to three “platoons”. These platoons are a little larger then normal infantry platoons and have three US advisers per unit. Helicopter infiltration and exfiltration are also authorized; ambush and harassment are undertaken. A variation on these operations is called the “SLAM” concept which combines strategic air, tactical air, and Prairie Fire operations teams.

Currently, the opportunities afforded to MACSOG by the Prairie Fire rules considerably exceed their abilities. There are far more targets and far more objectives in the current Prairie Fire zone than there are Prairie Fire teams which could operate against them. The SLAM concept, which concentrates teams on so called base areas, usually employs everything that is available to MACSOG at any one time, leaving nothing left over for other operations. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no reason even to contemplate extensions in the Prairie Fire business unless and until MACSOG is able to handle everything it already has on its platter. This is particularly true with the SLAM areas, which are only being nibbled so far.

B. Airborne Battalions. It is partly because of this over-extension of MACSOG resources that Westmoreland has proposed the possibility of introducing an airborne battalion to undertake the operations originally planned for Prairie Fire teams, especially in the base areas. There are two great problems with this proposal. The first is that it would probably destroy completely the element of clandestinity which is an essential factor of Prairie Fire. The second is that the airborne battalion would by definition not be trained in those special skills which make the Prairie Fire teams capable of operating in hostile territory. In other words, the airborne battalion would very likely be decimated on its first operation.

Quite aside from the military factors it seems to me that jumping from clandestine teams to conspicuous airborne operations would cross the threshold of Souvanna’s tolerance. He has made it clear that he cannot provide positive acceptance to an overt ground force operating in Laos. He would, therefore, have to make official and public protests against this sort of operation with the consequence which I shall describe in another part of this paper.

C. The ARVN Division. As an extension on the airborne battalion concept, Westmoreland has proposed the idea of an ARVN ground division to be introduced into Laos from the A Shau Valley. This division would invest and hold the terrain which embraces the juncture of several supply routes and complexes. It would be Vietnamese led, and Vietnamese operated with American air and logistic support.

Obviously the objections which pertain to the airborne battalion would be present in spades for the ARVN division. Moreover, given the consequences of taking and holding territory, rather than just raiding into it, I feel that this one goes well beyond the limitation of anything which really requires serious consideration.

D. The Barrier. There are several facets to the barrier which would concern Laos. Many of them have to do with terminology and public relations. That is, if we announce that we are creating a barrier across South Vietnamese territory from the sea to the Lao border and that we intend by this barrier to seal the DMZ hermetically, we introduce one set of problems. This set of problems has to do with forcing the North Vietnamese to make an end run into Lao territory. Souvanna has carefully refrained from saying exactly how he would react to this, but he has indicated that it would cause concern to him.

If we create a barrier from the sea to the foothills and then introduce obstacles and electronic devices in the hills, we clearly cannot say that the barrier hermetically seals South Vietnam at the DMZ. This introduces a new set of problems, but a set which is more tractable.

If we talk in terms of introducing a barrier from the sea all the way across Laos to the Mekong River, we once again cross the threshold and get beyond the range of anything which Souvanna could tolerate.

If I were to describe the sort of thing which I think Souvanna would agree to, I would shape it something like this. The portion of our obstacle course which extends from the sea to the foothills could honestly be called a barrier. Everything westward of that cannot honestly be so called and we should deliberately refrain from applying that label to it. Instead, we should describe what we were doing west of the foothills as an enhanced program of aerial interdiction against infiltration. In other words, we should merely say that we are expanding and concentrating on exactly the same sort of program in which we are currently engaged.

In such a concept, I believe we could seed a portion of Laos extending westward from the end of the DMZ at least to the limit of the Prairie Fire zone. We could then turn northward along the North Vietnamese border with a similar pattern of devilish devices sown from the air. However, for political as well as military reasons we should cover the entire strip from the foothills to the Lao border in South Vietnam and we should also run this zone into North Vietnam along the North Vietnamese/Lao border. At the very least it should cover hill 1001 and the staging area at Vi Thu Lu.

Such an area could be sown with button bomblets, gravel mines, sensor devises, and any other instruments developed for this purpose. Immediately to the south of the border in South Vietnam and extending into Laos to the depth of the Prairie Fire zone, MACSOG teams could be intermittently deployed for monitoring purposes.

This is the sort of arrangement which I believe I could sell to Souvanna. Anything beyond this would be highly questionable. As a matter of fact, Admiral Mustin said the other day this sort of arrangement makes better sense than all the other options which the Practice Nine group would like to preserve for themselves. It seems to me, therefore, that you should push to saw off the concept at this stage and not permit a myriad of options which take no account of political considerations.

One final point on this arrangement. The MACSOG teams should be Vietnamese teams recruited and controlled as they now are. If there is any reason for them to have to stage through Thailand because of weather that could be arranged. However, the introduction of Thai recruited teams run from Thailand would be more than the traffic could bear. There are two reasons for this. The first would be the fact that this sort of team would extend the knowledge of Prairie Fire to still a fourth country and could result in a consequence which is further than Souvanna can tolerate. The second reason would be Souvanna’s suspicion (and my own) that the use of Thai teams is purely a device to attempt a later expansion into some sort of Golden Eagle operation. This sort of thing would predictably bring the Soviets and several more friendly countries down on our heads for a margin of our satisfaction which is certainly infinitesimal.

3. Air Action

A. Overflights. Despite the Soviet protest and the probable ICC action on US overflights of Laos, I think Souvanna will hold the line and permit these to continue. The one exception to this would be B–52 overflights. For some reason which is hard to define (perhaps the nuclear capability) overflights by B–52’s carry much more propaganda wallop than overflights by fighter bombers. The political and propaganda repercussions of such overflights are in my judgment far greater than the limited marginal operational gain. In short, the 20 minutes to an hour which we would save by overflying Laos rather than going south of Cambodia are just not worth the consequences. Therefore, I believe we should hold the line in running our B–52’s from Utapao south of Cambodia.

The B–52’s which come from Guam will continue to execute the bulk of the raids in Laos in any event. I am not convinced that there is such a crying need for flexibility that we must change this pattern. Consequently, we must avoid public acknowledgment of B–52 activity in Laos and we must guarantee no slippage by preventing B–52 overflights from Utapao.

B. Air Seeding. As I indicated above, air seeding can be done provided we characterize it as a continuing part of our interdiction campaign and don’t label it a barrier. As a matter of fact we have already done some air seeding in Laos and I have Souvanna’s concurrence in it. Therefore, if we handle this one correctly it presents no problems. If we get the issues all tangled up with barriers it could cause many great difficulties in attempting to obtain Souvanna’s concurrence.

C. MSQ-77. Air Forces wishes to install MSQ-77 at site 85. I am having further discussions with Air Force Secretary Brown and Chief of Staff McConnell today. In general, I think Souvanna would reject this if it were put to him honestly. He has agreed to the installation of the navigational devices in Laos and we have installed TACANs on Lao soil. However, the TACAN is a passive device. The MSQ-77 is a command radar which takes positive control of air strikes in North Vietnamese territory. Moreover, it involves several buildings and about 40 men. It would be very conspicuous. I wonder if it is worth it.

4. Political Consequences

If we decide to ignore Souvanna’s objections and go ahead with some of these proposals despite him, we would have serious consequences. At the very least, these consequences would involve the withdrawal of Souvanna’s collaboration on many other matters of importance to us, including ground actions within Laos which are designed to protect the Mekong Valley area. At the very worst, he could chuck in his job, retire to France and let the country degenerate into a Pathet Lao occupied, Communist controlled fief. If he retired, the Soviets would predictably support the Pathet Lao. The North Vietnamese would directly attack toward the Mekong and we would lose all the territorial gains we have made in the past three years. Therefore, for limited operational advantages on the Ho Chi Minh Trail (none of which I am convinced would succeed) we would probably lose the entire Mekong Valley. To quote President Kennedy, this would be really trading an apple for an orchard.

1. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East, General. Top Secret.