284. Editorial Note
In a May 1, 1967, memorandum to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy set down the “line of thought” that he expressed to Secretary of Defense McNamara on April 29 concerning strategy in Vietnam. Included in that memorandum as a “Factor Affecting Possible Changes in Our Military Action” was the following information on Laos:
“Last Friday [April 28] we went through General Starbird’s plans for more effective action against the Corridor in Laos. I think these make sense, although they cannot be expected to do more than make use of the Corridor somewhat more difficult. (We should at once get away from linking these with the true ‘Obstacle’ planned in the eastern area of SVN next to the DMZ. The two are entirely different, and the words ‘obstacle’ or ‘barrier’ as related to Laos have very unfortunate political implications in both Laos and Thailand.) The small ground force team Starbird needs in Laos can be handled, in Sullivan’s judgment.
“Beyond this point, Sullivan and I would both be strongly opposed to any such idea as sending a GVN division into Laos. It would almost certainly be ineffective, and the cry would at once go up to send more. Sullivan believes, and I agree, that Souvanna would object violently and feel that his whole position had been seriously compromised.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, May 67)
The Department of Defense was working on the concept of a barrier, and anti-infiltration system involving strong points and obstacles on the ground immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam in the northeastern part of Quang Tri Province. Air interdiction would form part of the barrier. According to Department of Defense planning, such interdiction would extend into eastern Laos across the panhandle. In addition, the Department of Defense raised again the idea of construction of an international highway, Route 9, across Laos into Thailand as part the anti-infiltration system. (Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Steadman to Unger, I–35288/67, March 23; ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
In an April 21 letter to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Steadman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger stated that reconstruction [Page 574] of Route 9 across the Lao Panhandle, as an adjunct to the Strong Point-Obstacle System, was impractical and not desirable. Construction workers would have to be preceded by substantial military forces to retake territory held by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops. Forces would have to remain to provide security. The introduction of U.S. military personnel into Laos would not be politically acceptable, nor would the Souvanna government agree to such a proposal because of its often expressed opposition to steps that would widen the war in Laos and lead to direct military confrontation on Lao soil. (Ibid.)