Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Sylvester) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, July 19, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Credibility and the Release of Casualty Statistics from Laos

We are faced with a serious problem in connection with reporting U.S. casualties suffered in operations in and over Laos. Although we have claimed total accuracy in the reporting of our casualties from Southeast Asia, which is true for next of kin, actually we have not told the general public of all of our casualties incurred in Laos. In the case of deaths, MIA, and detained personnel, next of kin are notified of the casualty, where the casualty occurred, and the known circumstances. We reply accurately to specific press queries as to whether a specific individual was killed or lost in Laos, but we do not issue full statistics or lists of names of casualties.

This question was raised in a background session of Thursday, May 5, on an off-the-record basis (transcript at Tab A).² We stated or at least inferred at that time that Laotian casualties would be folded in to our casualties report from Vietnam. We were, in fact, only talking about combat deaths and at that time, in response to persistent inquiries, had made a special release of the total number of such deaths incurred since the beginning of our Laotian requested reconnaissance sorties in Laos—11.

Based on conversations with the Deputy Secretary, I assumed that I had authority to fold such deaths in to our weekly statistical casualty reports to the press. However, the Directorate for Statistical Services, OASD (Comptroller) did not agree, and the deaths have not been included. I should add that until now this has not caused difficulty, since the “Pentagon Regulars” understand our problem and have pushed us only mildly on the matter.

It is possibly just as well that the action was deferred since the problem is more difficult than appeared at that time. For example, we have neither announced nor confirmed the 11 servicemen killed in Laos prior to the initiation of our reconnaissance flights, nor have we said anything specific concerning wounded, missing, or captured personnel. The entire problem should be addressed, not just the KIA portion.

What is at stake now is the credibility of the Department of Defense and of the Administration as a whole. We have been accused recently of not telling the whole story with respect to all our Southeast Asia combat casualties, and we cannot truthfully deny such accusations. To date, no one of note has questioned this matter but we cannot hope to stay clear of the problem indefinitely. I have discussed this matter at length with the key members of my office and we are all agreed that we must face up to it now or be subjected to great censure if some enterprising journalist or politician digs into it.

There are several alternatives available:

1. Continue as we are at present, not announcing Laotian casualties as they occur but making future periodic announcements of the total killed in Laos since the initiation of reconnaissance flights. This course would not take care of the 11 KIA’s which occurred prior to the beginning of those flights nor would it accommodate other types of casualties, such as missing in action. Consequently, our credibility would still be suspect and understandably so. Further, we would be subject to being caught at any time because of unclassified Defense Department reports of Laotian casualties, which receive wide circulation. I refer particularly to the report issued weekly by the Directorate for Statistical Services (sample at Tab B).³

This course probably would be acceptable to Ambassador Sullivan and the Laotian Government but does not solve the credibility problem.

2. Fold in all casualties (not just deaths) on a predetermined date with our Vietnam casualty reports and then keep up to date as casualties occur. This would have to include our daily release of the names of casualties (which do not include mention of the country concerned), since both AP and UPI keep book on us and make sure that the total number of names released equals the total numbers announced. This latter requirement provides the basic weakness of this alternative since the wire services, by specifically requesting where each individual listed was killed or was located when reported MIA or wounded, could extract the total casualties incurred in Laos—even though this information was not available from the published totals. Such action would permit them to publish separately and regularly a Laotian casualty list. This would be obviously contrary to our national policy. We could possibly decline to answer such specific requests on the basis of national security but the information could be obtained from the next of kin if the wire services or some other media or political group wished to take the trouble to check. Needless to say, Ambassador Sullivan might complain. Should we adopt this alternative today, we would have to include 28 KIA (including the 11 killed prior to the beginning of the requested reconnaissance flights, the names of the 11 disclosed in May and six new dead since then), 26 WIA, 34 MIA, and two captured. This influx of names almost certainly would cause a short press flap. However, we could live with this except for the potential problem already mentioned of weekly, press generated Laotian casualty reports.⁴

3. Begin issuing regular Laotian casualty reports. This has the major disadvantage of being completely contrary to current national policy, distasteful to the Laotians and Ambassador Sullivan, and might give an indication of the level of our effort in Laos. On the plus side, however, it is the best solution from the standpoint of credibility. We could truthfully rebut any accusation of hiding our casualties in connection with the war in Vietnam.

4. Do nothing. This alternative would be most acceptable to Ambassador Sullivan and Souvanna Phouma, but put us in a hopeless situation should the matter of the credibility of our casualty statistics ever be seriously pushed. We would also be on the spot should we ever begin to use B–52’s regularly in Laos or mount clandestine ground operations in that country which result in casualties.

Basically, the problem revolves around two points: (1) Is it more important to the Administration to cater to Souvanna Phouma and continue to try to hide our Laotian casualties, or (2) is it more important to strike a blow to close the alleged “credibility gap” and assure the American public that we are telling the truth about all our combat casualties in Southeast Asia. I believe that the latter point is overriding. Our credibility is under attack and the severe blow which could be inflicted by the revelation that we are hiding casualties could be a telling one in the November elections.

I recommend therefore that we adopt alternative 2, concurrently explaining the national security ramifications involved to the responsible newsmen concerned in the hope that they do not push on the matter of trying to issue regular Laotian casualty reports.

Arthur Sylvester

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Laos 1966 (Laos 704). Secret.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. McNamara approved Alternative 2 on July 20.