Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, July 16, 1966, 2:27 p.m.

9249. Ref: A. Vientiane’s 249. B. ARMA 0471, DTG 140545Z July.²

Operation Prasane

1. Based on your estimate of prospects for success of Operation Prasane, we inclined go along with your recommendation that we assist FAR in planned assault on Nam Bac.

2. We somewhat disturbed at magnitude of planned operation in area only 60 miles from Dien Bien Phu at time when both King and PriMin out of country and FinMin Sisouk urgently seeking more foreign economic assistance. Not sure how these plans square with implications Souvanna’s recent admonition to General Staff not to provoke sharp enemy reactions (JANAF 0454).³

3. Nevertheless, we prepared at this time to approve use of your in-country assets, e.g., Air America H–34 helicopters, to provide needed airlift assistance to FAR for this operation.

4. We have serious reservations, however, over introduction of USAF aircraft and pilots into Laos for airlift operations.⁴ We would consider this step as major departure from present policy of tactical air support to but not participation in Lao ground operations.

5. Believe political implications this proposal such as to require, as minimum, request from Souvanna for US intervention in this form.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Slutz, cleared by Hamilton of DOD/ISA, and Ewing, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG/THAI. As of July 1, 1966, Department of State telegrams to all posts were numbered consecutively according to the time they were sent. Telegrams repeated to posts for information used the same number.
2. In these telegrams, both July 14, the Embassy and the ARMA set forth the concept of Operation Prasane, a plan to take the strategic town of Nam Bac in Luang Prabang province and thus improve security of the royal capital and lessen pressure on RLG positions in Nam Bac in Phong Saly province. (Both ibid.)
3. Not further identified.
4. The Embassy estimated that to airlift 1,400 FAR troops by helicopter to positions north of Nam Bac would require 10 helicopters with Air America pilots. The Embassy suggested that, instead of tying up so many helicopters, 4 USAF 3–C aircraft with USAF crews should be employed. The risks were considered minimal for the 2-day operation. (Telegram 249 from Vientiane, July 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
5. In telegram 335 from Vientiane, July 19, the Embassy reported that as the operation was already underway and delay would adversely affect morale, it was prepared to use in-country assets, Air America helicopters and pilots. (Ibid.) Printed from an unsigned copy.