241. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1

24021. Subj: Laotian air operations.

1.
From an informal letter addressed to me from Ambassador Unger,2 Deputy Assistant Secretary Far Eastern Affairs State, I conclude that possibly the Cricket Operation3 is being touted at Department level as the cure-all for our interdiction efforts in the Laotian Panhandle.
2.
This operation has been most effective and shows a sound potential for achieving even more success in the future. However, the tasks facing [Page 477] us in interdicting the principal lines of communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail challenge us to combine and apply all our assets to that end. There is no question of competition between the use of strategic bombing forces and tactical air but only their appropriate application. The devastation and psychological effect achieved by B–52 bombing makes it the most effective and efficient weapons system available for striking area targets. Further, it frees tactical air for use in Cricket and Tiger Hound as well as for explanation of Arc Light results.
3.
Our nominations of Arc Light targets in Laos have been for the purpose of attacking a complete LOC system—ration and ammunition dumps, way stations, maintenance areas, warehouses and open storage—as well as the forces involved in support of these resources. It is considered essential, therefore, that the B–52 weapon system be employed in our endeavors in Laos.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Repeated to the Department of State for Unger, which is the source text,OSD, and JCS. Handled as Exdis upon receipt at the Department of State.
  2. Not found.
  3. Operation Cricket used airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs) to direct strikes by attack aircraft against promising targets. Rapid assaults on targets was possible because of instantaneous communication between airborne FACs and RLAF headquarters.