Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 3, 1966, 0521Z.

641. Subj: Effectiveness of USAF operations in northern Laos.

1. Believe action and information addressees will find of more than routine interest following recapitulation of contribution of USAF air operations to ground actions in northern Laos from April 1966 to present.

2. Enemy strength in northern Laos (Provinces of Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Houa Phan, and Phong Saly) has increased spectacularly over past year from total of 39 battalions as of 1 July 1965 to 63 battalions as of 1 July 1966.

A. On 1 July 1965 we estimate there were (1) one bn NVN; (2) 15 bns PL with NVN advisers; and (3) 23 bns PL/NVN (bns with attached NVN units of company size).

B. On 1 July 1966 we estimate there were (1) 13 bns NVN infantry; (2) 10 bns NVN engineer troops; (3) 15 bns PL with NVN advisers; and (4) 25 bns PL/NVN.

3. This large build-up of NVN troops began last fall and culminated in largest DRV offensive yet seen in northern Laos. Offensive began in November 1965 and succeeded in taking number of long existing sites from friendly forces in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province as well as sites recently regained by Vang Pao. Friendly forces did not panic, fought series of bitter actions against NVN units, and moved to new bases north and west of enemy forces in order to be so placed as to put continuing pressure on enemy flanks. Enemy intention was apparently to establish a secure LOC along Route 6 to Plain of Jars with ultimate objective of being in position to resume offensive at start of next dry season (October 1966).

4. In April 1966 an integrated close air support system was introduced. Additional forward air controllers were stationed in area; A 1–E’s were used as airborne forward control; approximately 32 jet sorties were scheduled daily; and close collaboration was established [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] to provide detailed and timely intelligence on enemy movements and on enemy logistics on Routes 6 and 7.

5. Marriage of excellent intelligence furnished by CAS and superb performance by 7th AE units enabled outnumbered friendly units not only to contain enemy offensive but to mount a counter offensive which has now regained 90 per cent of area lost from November 1965 to April 1966. RLAF T–28’s also made considerable contribution to this effort. Enemy troop strength is still greater than friendly troop strength but high casualties inflicted on enemy units plus severe shortage of supplies brought about by airstrikes on enemy logistical system lowered morale of both NVN and PL units. Loss of morale and lack of supplies have enabled friendly elements to gain and hold the initiative.

6. Enemy casualties in northern Laos from November 1965 until June 1966 in total of 952 ground clashes have been 1,359 KIA and 783 WIA; friendly losses this period have been 517 KIA and 678 WIA. During May/June alone, in 348 clashes enemy lost 556 KIA and 134 WIA. Although these figures reflect combined NVN/PL casualties, they were predominantly North Vietnamese regular troops and were result of a grinding guerrilla campaign of ambushes, small unit actions, etc. In addition, from November 1965 until June 1966 enemy lost by conservative estimate (predominantly from ground observers) some 4,300 KIA and 700 WIA from USAF and RLAF air strikes.

7. Apart from their in-country significance, operations in northern Laos have thus made an important contribution to Allied military effort in Vietnam by engaging a substantial portion of DRV forces cited in paragraph 2B above in costly operations outside main theater of operation in SVN. Single most important factor rendering these operations costly to enemy has been USAF tactical support. Recommend CINCPAC extend our appreciation and congratulations to commands concerned through appropriately classified channels.

Swank

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG, and OSD. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and sent to the President under cover of a note from Rostow, August 3, 3 p.m., which reads: “We often forget there is a significant—secondary—war going on in Laos. Here is an interesting account of recent operations.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67)