200. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- The Vice President; His Highness Souvanna Phouma; His Royal Highness, Prince Khampan, Lao Ambassador to the United States; His Excellency, Sisouk na Champassak, Lao Minister of Finance; Mr. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Far East; Mr. George Carroll, Assistant to the Vice President; and Mr. John Rielly, Assistant to the Vice President. An interpreter was present.
The Vice President welcomed His Highness, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and gave him the personal greetings of President Johnson, who regretted that illness prevented him from enjoying the privilege of seeing the Prime Minister.2
Souvanna Phouma thanked the Vice President and expressed regret that the President was ill. Souvanna Phouma had enjoyed meeting President Johnson when he was Vice President.
The Vice President had watched with increasing admiration the achievements of Souvanna Phouma and his government. Souvanna Phouma was a courageous man. His visit gave us happiness. The economic and political progress in Laos was impressive.
Souvanna Phouma thanked the United States for assistance. During the last ten months the military and political situation had ameliorated. Military officers had a greater appreciation of their roles. Political leaders understood the situation, as well as each other, better. Leadership was more cohesive; they now cooperated. They understood the need for solidarity. During the last six months the military situation had improved. Officers had a good hold on the Army: discipline had improved. Armed Forces had been reorganized. Officers had a full understanding of their roles. Many areas had been seized from the Pathet Lao. Resupply from North Vietnam of the Pathet Lao was more difficult to accomplish. As a matter of fact, the Pathet Lao had not been able to mount their usual monsoon offensive.
Souvanna Phouma pointed to defections from the Pathet Lao. After three to six months of training and indoctrination a full infantry company of former Pathet Lao had been sent into combat against the enemy. In addition, approximately three to four companies of former Pathet Lao are now in training.
The Vice President expressed appreciation for those improvements in the situation. They had been well reported by Ambassador Sullivan.
Souvanna Phouma complimented Ambassador Sullivan. He said it would take several more months to consolidate several recaptured areas. Toward the effort the highway between Luang Prabang and Vientiane would be repaired. Work would commence early in November. Road building equipment was being placed halfway between the two cities and work would then progress at the same time in both directions.
The Vice President wanted to assure the Prime Minister of two things. First, U.S. economic, technical and military assistance will continue as long as it was effective and so long as the Prime Minister’s policies [Page 403] continued. The President had been encouraged by the cooperation that existed in the field of foreign assistance between of Governments of Laos and the United States. The Congress supported the program. Secondly, the U.S. Government was determined to resist aggression in Southeast Asia. We wanted stability and peace in the area. President Johnson saw Southeast Asia as an entire region. Our assistance to Laos was related to all other U.S. assistance in Southeast Asia. We intended to establish peace in the area until a Regional Development Authority could do its work.
President Johnson had outlined his plans for assistance in the economic development of the area in his address at Johns Hopkins.3 That speech attempted to sketch the beginning of his hopes for Southeast Asia. Laos was an important part of that development. The Nam Ngum Dam Project in Laos, it was hoped, would be the first, or one of the first development projects.
The United States did not want war in the area. It sought peace. It would remove its military as soon as conditions permitted. The United States wanted each state to be free to work out its own destiny, to develop its resources and people in its own way.
Close to President Johnson’s heart was assistance in the field of education. He had spoken his feelings in his recent address upon the centennial of the Smithsonian Institution. To succeed in the peaceful development of the region, all nations needed the kind of courageous leadership the Prime Minister was giving Laos. Observing the effectiveness and spirit of that leadership made us in America want to do a better job.
President Johnson wanted the Prime Minister to know of his deep intent to assist in the building of a prosperous region. For South Vietnam we were recruiting doctors, nurses and technicians to go to South Vietnam and to build hospitals and dispensaries. This was the kind of peaceful project that the President wanted for peaceful nations. He wanted peace, not war. At the same time, the United States intended to do whatever might be required to defend South Vietnam.
The Prime Minister was happy to receive assurances of the intention of the U.S. to continue assisting Laos. His country needed economic assistance to develop its resources. Laos had been at war for more than twenty years, actually since 1939 and the Japanese invasion. Laos had borne a heavy burden. It was difficult to improve life while surviving the attacks of the Vietnamese and Chinese. If Laos were to survive, it would need help.
The Prime Minister appreciated the adherence of the United States to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, but Laos needed weapons [Page 404] and firepower at least equal to that of the enemy. Now, Laos suffered a disadvantage. The Pathet Lao and Vietnamese had Russian and Chinese automatic weapons, while Laos had single-shot carbines. His army knew the terrain better. That was why several spectacular victories had been won. There had been the victory by the Cadet School over the Pathet Lao and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)—where Vietnamese soldiers were captured. There was also the victory at the village of Hua Muong, twenty-five miles north of Luang Prabang which had been recaptured.
These engagements demonstrated, as he had told Ambassador Sullivan, the need for helicopters. The height of the mountains and the distance between objectives required that air transport was necessary if soldiers were to move more than a few miles on foot each day.
The Vice President presumed that the Departments of State and Defense were looking into the problem.
Ambassador Unger stated that they were.
The Prime Minister said his National Armed Forces had only one helicopter for the North and one for the South. When Hua Muong was retaken only one helicopter transported one infantry company and cannons.
The Vice President said we would be glad to look into it.
The Prime Minister repeated that the Force Armee Royale (FAR) had only two helicopters.
The Vice President laughed, indicating he had well understood the Prime Minister’s point.
Souvanna Phouma smiled and said Laos needed ten helicopters.
The Vice President said that resistance to Communist aggression was a basic part of our response in Southeast Asia. While mindful of each other’s needs, we must be sufficiently ingenious so that we all could work as a team. Laos was independent. Thailand was independent. Each needed the cooperation of the other. The U.S. wanted to help each state to cooperate with the other. In any case, we would look into the Prime Minister’s suggestion.
Souvanna Phouma said that he explained to Bangkok officials his understanding that Laos needed a free Thailand. Internal trouble in Thailand acted against the interests of both countries. Laos was the first line of defense for Thailand. We should do all we can to prevent the spread of difficulty. He had explained this to Ambassador Sullivan and asked him to explain all this clearly to Thailand. Many lower level officials in Thailand still sympathize with General Phoumi and act against the interests of the two countries.
The Vice President said his Government was aware of the problem and understood the Prime Minister’s concern.
[Page 405]Souvanna Phouma said he would stop in Bangkok to achieve greater cooperation between the two countries.
The Vice President said it would also help for Southeast Asian responsible leaders to state publicly upon occasion that they knew the U.S. desired peace. Our country was subjected to propaganda to undermine the confidence others had in our peaceful intentions. The Prime Minister had witnessed demonstrations here against our policy in South Vietnam. These demonstrations were meaningless as far as changing our policy was concerned. They were well organized by forces that attempt to subvert Laos and elsewhere. He had no doubt the organizing capacities of Communist Parties around the world were at work in New York and Saigon. The people know President Johnson understands strategic warfare; the President wants to keep conflict limited. Only one-tenth of our demonstrators knew what they were doing. The rest just were demonstrating because they are young. We believe in free speech and assembly. The U.S. was in South Vietnam to stay.
The Vice President and the U.S. would be honored if the Prime Minister were to act as our spokesman of our peaceful intentions.
The Prime Minister knew the position of the United States. He appreciated its intentions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by George Carroll.↩
- On October 14 Read sent Humphrey a memorandum recommending that he see Souvanna during his visit to Washington, October 18–22. In an October 15 memorandum to John Rielly, Assistant to Humphrey, Read provided a briefing memorandum, a biographic sketch of Souvanna, and suggested talking points. (Both ibid., POL 7 LAOS)↩
- For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 696–698.↩