Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

201. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 18, 1965, 3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting With the Prime Minister of Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• H.H. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
• H.E. Sisouk na Champassak,RLG Minister of Finance
• H.R.H. Prince Khampan, Lao Ambassador
• Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, Far East Affairs
• Mr. Jose DeSeabra, Language Services, Interpreter

1. After greeting the Prime Minister and his party, the Secretary said that he would be interested in hearing the Prime Minister’s views on the situation in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister said that he had relatively little information regarding the situation in North Viet-Nam, but it is generally believed in Laos that there are serious difficulties in North Viet-Nam which have been increased as a result of US air activities. These bombings, he said, are having an effect in Laos, since it is quite clear that very small amounts of supplies are now coming into Laos for the Pathet Lao from North Viet-Nam. In particular, the bombing of roads leading into Laos made it extremely difficult, in the Prime Minister’s opinion, for the North Vietnamese to send men and supplies into Laos. He admitted, of course, that it is impossible to say what might happen when one was dealing with the North Vietnamese.

2. The Secretary asked what Pathet Lao intentions might be for the future. He believed that the Pathet Lao could not fail to see that, with the US commitment in Southeast Asia and the deployment of US forces there, a dark road was ahead for them if they were to try to achieve their objectives. The Secretary wondered whether the Pathet Lao leaders might not come around to the realization that the time had come to stop their aggressive activities. The Prime Minister replied that the Pathet Lao were the prisoners of Hanoi in the same manner that North Viet-Nam was a prisoner of Peiping. Hanoi could do nothing against Peiping’s will, although it might realize that as a result increased suffering was being inflicted on the population. He commented that Peiping would fight to the last North Vietnamese just as North Viet-Nam would fight to the last Pathet Lao. Until a solution was found to the Viet-Nam problem, Hanoi would not allow the Pathet Lao to return to the national community, since such a return would mean government control of Pathet Lao-held areas, thus preventing infiltration through Laos from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam.

3. In response to the Secretary’s question, the Prime Minister said that there had never been good faith on the part of Hanoi or Peiping during the Geneva conference or subsequently. Only a few technicians were withdrawn from Laos following the conclusion of the 1962 Agreements, and North Vietnamese troops have remained in force in Laos since that time. As proof of this, the Prime Minister showed interrogation reports of North Vietnamese prisoners who have been captured in Laos during the past year. Although the Communist ICC members (i.e. the Poles) were fully aware of the illegal presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, they would not admit it officially.

4. The Secretary then asked the Prime Minister whether he anticipated any changes in Laos in the next several months and whether developments in Laos depended solely on the situation in Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister replied that, although the situation in Laos was largely affected by developments in Viet-Nam, at the same time there had been improvement in the military situation over the past ten months.

5. The Prime Minister said that for the past four months, the Lao Government was making efforts to move the population out of the areas in south Laos where the Lao Air Force was bombing North Vietnamese infiltration activities and facilities. Aside from humanitarian considerations, this program was part of the government’s strategy to turn the area in which the North Vietnamese were moving into a desert so that they could not rely on the local population for food and transportation. He also mentioned that Lao guerrilla groups were operating behind enemy lines to interdict Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese movements.

6. The Secretary pointed out that an important aspect of US foreign policy that was not always understood abroad was that the United States had no ambition to impose its presence or seek advantages in other countries. On the other hand, people should know that Peiping wants to dominate their countries and advocates a doctrine of world revolution. The Prime Minister responded that he fully realized the danger which Pei-ping constituted for Laos. At the same time, however, Laos was fated, because of its geographic proximity, to have to live with the Chinese.

7. The Secretary expressed the bitter disappointment of the United States that the 1962 Agreements had not succeeded. At the time, President Kennedy had hoped that all countries would get out and leave Laos alone. This was to be a very important first step towards peace in Southeast Asia. However, Hanoi had not lived up to its commitment and continued to interfere in Laos, including its infiltration into South Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister said that the failure of the Agreements had also been a source of disappointment for Laos. He had gone to Hanoi and Peiping in early 1964 in an effort to find a solution. Peiping told him to talk to the leaders in Hanoi. In his talks with Tran Van Do, Ho Chi Minh and Giap, he was told that North Viet-Nam would not leave Laos as long as the South Vietnamese problem was not settled. Following this trip and the events of the April 19 coup, the Pathet Lao Ministers, claiming that their safety was in danger, left for the Plain of Jars.

8. In response to the Secretary’s query about General Phoumi, the Prime Minister mentioned recent talks with Thai Government officials in Bangkok in which he had underscored the importance of political tranquility in Laos so that necessary efforts could be concentrated on facing the enemies from the east. He said that Phoumi continued to be active against the interests of both Thailand and Laos and he had told Marshal Thanom that since Laos was the first line of Thailand’s defense, the Thai Government should do everything in its power to curb the activities of those elements in Thailand which sympathized with Phoumi. He planned to discuss this matter with the Thai again on his return and said that he had mentioned this matter to the Vice President during their meeting. The Secretary commented that we had had a good response from the Thai officials on the question of General Phoumi from which we were encouraged.

9. Turning to the subject of US aid to Laos, the Prime Minister said there was a urgent need for increased US economic and military aid and he had discussed this with Ambassador Sullivan and, earlier in the day, with the Vice President. He pointed out that Laos was experiencing some difficulties as a result of recent changes in the United States import program (USIP). He said it was vital that at least certain items relating to construction projects be reinstated in the program, particularly since construction activities were underway. He stated that it was important that US economic aid be maintained at the same level as last year and that support for the armed forces be increased. He specifically mentioned the fact that, although our military assistance was based on a Lao force level of 50,000 men, the Lao budget was supporting a force level of about 75,000 and that the US should, therefore, raise its support to the level of the actual strength of the Lao armed forces. The Prime Minister also referred, as he had to the Vice President, to the pressing need for more automatic weapons and ten helicopters. (On October 19, during the military briefing which was given to the Vice President by the Department of Defense, the Prime Minister referred to a need for ten to fifteen helicopters in talking with Mr. McNaughton.) Helicopters, he said, were badly needed for the movement of troops and equipment in areas where there were no roads and the Lao at present only had two helicopters.

10. The Secretary commented on the situation in Indonesia and said he felt that Prince Sihanouk could not fail to realize that Peiping had received a serious setback there with a resulting reduction of its influence in Southeast Asia. Prince Sihanouk also knew, as a result of US efforts in Viet-Nam, that Peiping would not be permitted to overrun Southeast Asia. Since Prince Sihanouk might not want to be on the wrong side in Southeast Asia, the Secretary wondered why he did not become a genuine neutralist. The Prince Minister agreed that it was extremely difficult to try to analyze Prince Sihanouk’s motives. He said that Lao relations with Cambodia were rather bad. The Prime Minister then went over some of the developments in this respect. He said Prince Sihanouk had thrown himself into the arms of Peiping in order to maintain the integrity of his country. However, in the face of the demonstration of US determination to resist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, Prince Sihanouk might realize that he had been wrong in betting on Chinese victory and non-intervention by the United States. The Prime Minister said he felt that any change of mind on the part of Prince Sihanouk would bring about a loss of prestige for him and that this prestige had already been badly shaken by the recent Soviet refusal to receive him. Another factor, however, which might make him change his mind would be the development of internal pressures, should they occur, as a result of a deterioration in the economic situation in Cambodia.

11. Commenting briefly on Indonesia, which he had visited last Spring, the Prime Minister said that, in his view, the Indonesian army disliked the Communists and was rather western-oriented, mainly because of the large number of officers who had been trained in the United States.

12. The Secretary expressed the appreciation of the United States for Laotian support to the total effort in Southeast Asia. He said that the voice of the Prime Minister was helpful in the present situation, even though our two countries could not consider ourselves as allies, since Laos was neutral. Nevertheless, under the present difficult circumstances, our two countries could have a common attitude with regard to Hanoi. The Prime Minister commented that in the light of information he had, North Viet-Nam could not hold out much longer. He said that unless there was increased pressure on the US by Moscow, Hanoi might be willing to accept proposals for negotiations in about four to five months. The Secretary replied that the US was under no pressure from Moscow, although he felt the Soviets were interested in a conference on Viet-Nam. With respect to Laos, the Prime Minister said that the Soviet Foreign Minister had told him that there was no change in Moscow’s position with regard to Laos, its neutrality or its Prime Minister. Mr. Gromyko had also said he continued to believe in the need for strict compliance with the Geneva Agreements. The Secretary commented that in our discussions with the Soviets, we always made it clear that an agreement existed between Washington and Moscow, at the highest level, guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos. The Secretary added that the Soviet attitude toward Laos was a factor of paramount importance in relations with the United States. At the meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, Khrushchev said “we agree on Laos” and this was something that the United States would not let the Soviets forget.

13. In conclusion, the Secretary commented that the United States had accepted Moscow’s candidate for the post of Lao Prime Minister and we had never regretted doing so. The Prime Minister stated that Moscow had no influence on Hanoi which was under Peiping domination. However, continued military action by the US might pull Hanoi away from Peiping.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS-US. Secret. Drafted by Jose DeSeabra of Language Services and Barbis and cleared in Rusk’s office on October 26.The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. Rusk’s next appointment was at 4:56 p.m. (Johnson Library)
2. In a supplementary memorandum of conversation, October 18, drafted separately because it was classified Secret-Limdis, Souvanna stated that he was pleased that all U.S. aid to the Meo (Hmong) was now going through his government. He requested that U.S. assistance to other tribal groups in Laos also go through the Royal Lao Government. Souvanna remarked that relations with Vang Pao were excellent. As for his request for additional helicopters, Souvanna stated that, if necessary, Thai crews could operate them. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS)