Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

325. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, September 27, 1966.

3954. For the Secretary.

1. I understand you will make a decision today on the Thailand MAP aid level you will recommend to the President.² I would like again to request that I be authorized to inform the Prime Minister that we will support the Thai military forces at the level of $70 million for the next three year.

2. I would be the last to argue that our professional military establishment has any more claim to infallibility than the rest of us. Yet I do think it important that after the most searching reexamination and reevaluation by Comusmacthai, by Cincpac, by the Joint Staff, and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is still their unanimous judgement that this level is essential. It is also pertinent to record that an independent evaluation by the staff of Assistant Defense Secretary En Tho Ven supports this conclusion and further notes the staff level unanimity throughout the government that the need is apparent, the Thai response and performance has been adequate, and the requests are reasonable in relation to the need and the Thai response. On the basis of my personal continuous, detailed and searching review I fully support these recommendations.

3. It is my understanding that ISA disagrees for reasons which have never been quite clear. Certainly their positions, as they have been made known to me, are demonstrably unsupported by the facts, as any objective examination of the records will clearly attest. The last argument of which I have heard is typical of the rest, that our inability to secure Rtc clearance for permanent PCS establishment of General Accounting Office unit, was indicative of Thai reluctance to have auditors around. The actual facts are (1) The Thai have been concerned that any further augmentation of an already large American presence could cause problems we have so far successfully avoided; (2) they have indicated they do not favor additional permanent assignments with families which will compete for already scant housing; (3) they have no objection to our TDY introduction of as many auditors as we wish, and; (4) eight GAO auditors arrive next week for an indefinite stay. And so it goes.

4. Therefore, I believe the recommended Map level is fully justified on its own intrinsic merits. Even if this was not the fact that all professional judgement certifies it to be, there are still compelling political reasons why it should be approved.

5. The first is the argument you made so appropriately to Thanat at Canberra—that the insurgency should be aggressively smashed now, as, in retrospect, you wished had been done in Vietnam in 1961. Thanat and I have both used this very effectively since to push for maximum commitment of Thai resources to this end.

6. The second reason is the dilemma produced by the first. In this commitment of their own resources, with a consequent budget deficit of 25 percent, they have gone as far as they can without grave risks of inflationary spiral which has cost the Vietnamese and US so dearly. The only other alternative is for Thai to scale back their commitment of the extraordinary percentage of their own income (60 to 70 percent) they have for a decade invested in the social and economic infrastructure programs which have contributed so much to stability here. We learned late in South Vietnam the essentiality of paralleling the military effort with “nation-building.” The Thai are deeply so engaged and I think it would be vast and really unforgivable mistake to force them to break this pattern which, in the nature of things, is not likely to be resumed.

7. More current compelling reasons include the dangerous game Thanat is now playing on his own in New York. As is sometimes the case, too much public attention can contribute to certain delusions about ability to translate successes in international affairs into domestic political support. If Thanat is not elected to the World Court, he presently is thinking of avoiding loss of face by challenging this present government in some fashion. He hopes to come back having “forced” US into what he will present openly as far more binding bilateral security commitment, if not, unless Pote dissuades him, he may lash out at US in openly demanding participating in determining military strategy as a price for continuing to enjoy the unlimited freedom now accorded US. Or he may resign with blast at US. In any of these cases his primary point of attack internally will be the inadequacy of our military aid level, hoping thereby to attract a military following essential to a viable power base. In any event he may have done great damage within US and to Thai-American cooperation.

8. I do not believe Thanat can succeed in securing influence internally here he was not authorized to take the actions he has taken in demanding the bilateral. If we can remove the chief point of vulnerability by moving affirmatively on $70 million MAP level, I am confident we can completely box him in here.

9. In view of forthcoming Manila meeting, I strongly recommend we make no concessions to him now. Whatever is decided upon in way of new security arrangements should be done with Prime Minister at Manila. To attempt to mollify Thanat will gain us no lasting advantage with this government which presently is in mood to drop him. I would recommend nothing be done with Thanat to accede to his demands until you or Alex can talk with Pote, who can influence him. And if MAP recommendation is approved we can forget about him as a threat. Although he has been useful, there are other Thai such as Pote or Konthi who could serve our short and long range purposes equally well.

Martin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–THAI. Secret.
2. The issue was not sent to the President until October 13, see Document 329.